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CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Moiseyev Says More Arms Do Not Ensure Security *[TASS]* 1
Team of U.S. Inspectors Arrive To Observe Exercise *[TASS]* 1
U.S. Congressmen Visit SS-20 Destruction Base *[TASS]* 1
Nazarkin Says Verification Key to Arms Cuts Accord *[IZVESTIYA 9 Aug]* 2

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Perfilyev Says Polish Government 'Internal Affair' *[TASS]* 3
Further on Perfilyev's 10 Aug News Briefing 3
TASS Summarizes Remarks 3
Perfilyev Cites Hekmatyar's Intransigence *[Moscow Radio]* 4
Cautions Against Israeli Retaliation *[Moscow Radio]* 4
U.S. Official Blasted for Export Controls Stance *[PRAVDA 5 Aug]* 4

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

'Columbia' Mission Dedicated to Pentagon Program *[TASS]* 6
General Comments on 'Columbia' *[TASS]* 6
Correspondent Views Bloch, Hirsch Cases *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 11 Aug]* 6
Deputy Foreign Minister Arrives in Washington *[Moscow International]* 7
Congressmen's Visit to Labor Camp Reported *[TASS]* 8
Congressman McCloskey Cited on Visit to USSR *[TASS]* 8
U.S. Naval Visit to Sevastopol Continues *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Aug]* 8
U.S. Consul's Visit to Estonia Reported *[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 12 Jul]* 9
U.S. Disagreements on Afghan Policy Cited *[TASS]* 9
Congress, White House Differ on Arms Budget *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Aug]* 10
Powell Appointed Joint Chiefs Chairman *[TASS]* 11

China

Tibetan Separatist 'Clique' Assailed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Aug]* 12
Soviet Observer on Chinese Workers' Strike *[Malin on Moscow International]* 12
PRC Lawyers Leave After Visit to Ukraine *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 11 Jul]* 13

Northeast Asia

Further on Denial of Japan-USSR Kuriles Deal *[Tokyo KYODO]* 13
Japanese Prime Minister Election Outcome Noted *[Moscow TV]* 13
Japanese Draft Military Budget Criticized *[Moscow Radio]* 14
Soviet Fish Minister on Outcome of Japan Visit *[Moscow International]* 14
Mongolian Defense Head on Relaxing Asia Tension *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Aug]* 15

Near East & South Asia

Shell Hits Soviet Cultural Center in Beirut *[Moscow Radio]* 15
Analyst Interviewed on Resumed Iran-U.S. Relations *[Moscow International]* 15
Iranian Budget Priorities Analyzed *[Andreyev on Moscow International]* 16
Soviet Official Meets Afghan Politburo Member *[IZVESTIYA 5 Aug]* 16
Katushev Receives Afghan Deputy Premier *[IZVESTIYA 3 Aug]* 17
No Early Prospect of Afghan Peace *[PRAVDA 3 Aug]* 17

Soviet-Israeli Medical Project Reported *[TASS]* 19
Indian Envoy's Presentation of Credentials Noted *[PRAVDA 9 Aug]* 19
Polisario Founding Member Returns to Morocco *[Rabat Radio]* 20
Gorbachev Congratulates 'Arafat on Birthday *[PRAVDA 5 Aug]* 20

East Europe

Solidarity Tries To Split Polish Coalition *[Moscow Radio]* 20
Polish Opposition 'Contradicts' Democracy *[Moscow Radio]* 20
Problems With Polish Food Prices Foreseen *[IZVESTIYA 2 Aug]* 20
Walesa Rejects 'One-Party Monopoly' *[PRAVDA 9 Aug]* 21
Polish Food Price Hikes Spark Strikes *[PRAVDA 8 Aug]* 21
Rakowski Cited on Polish Worker Party Tasks *[PRAVDA 6 Aug]* 22
Polish Leaders Thank Leaders for Greetings *[PRAVDA 5 Aug]* 22
Shalayev Meets Polish Official Trade Union Head *[TRUD 2 Aug]* 22
Poland Decides To Introduce Market Forces *[SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 1 Aug]* 23
Hungarian Worker's Party Plenum Reported *[PRAVDA 31 Jul]* 23
Shcherbitskiy Receives Croatian Delegation *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 11 Jul]* 23

West Europe

Finnish Premier Has Talks With Estonian Leader *[Helsinki International]* 24
Petrovskiy, Austria's Klestil Meet for Talks *[Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG 5 Aug]* 24
Gorbachev Message to Friendship Festival Published *[IZVESTIYA 6 Aug]* 24

Latin America & Caribbean

Shevardnadze Applauds Tela Accords *[TASS]* 25
Contra Leaders Request U.S. Political Asylum *[TASS]* 26

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political & Social

Estonian Supreme Soviet Passes Strike Resolution *[TASS]* 28
Estonian Leadership Issues Statement on Strikes *[TASS]* 28
Strike Situation in Estonian Republic Detailed *[IZVESTIYA 11 Aug]* 28
Bashkiriya Workers Threaten Strike Over Pollution *[Moscow TV]* 29
Kuzbass Workers Initiate Warning Strike 4 Aug *[TRUD 4 Aug]* 29
Correspondent Apportions Blame for Kuzbass Strikes *[Moscow Radio]* 30
Unrest Continues in Abkhaziya, Meetings Held 31
Efforts To Ease Tension Viewed *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 11 Aug]* 31
164 People Arrested *[Moscow Radio]* 32
Commentary on Abkhaziya Situation *[Moscow Radio]* 32
Supreme Soviet Commission Reviews Death Sentences *[Moscow TV]* 32
USSR Law on Legislative Acts Published *[PRAVDA 4 Aug]* 32
Supreme Soviet Body Reviews Capital Construction *[SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 30 Jul]* 34
500 Moscow Prisoners Stage Hunger Strike *[Moscow International]* 34
Further Reported on Komsomol's 8th Plenum 35
Agenda Outlined *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 29 Jul]* 35
Mironenko Describes Komsomol Tasks *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 1 Aug]* 36
Chairman Klykov Gives Speech *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 1 Aug]* 46
Plenum Activities Updated *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 1 Aug]* 49
Latvian Central Committee Plenum Opens *[Moscow Radio]* 50
Vagris Addresses Plenum *[TASS]* 50
Format, Agenda Cited *[IZVESTIYA 11 Aug]* 50
Draft Law for Latvian Economic Independence *[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA 1 Jul]* 51
Latvian Planning Chief on Economic Autonomy *[IZVESTIYA 4 Aug]* 55
Report Issued on 9 Apr Tbilisi Events *[ZARYA VOSTOKA 22 Jul]* 58
Natadze on People's Front Structure, Aims *[ZARYA VOSTOKA 23 Jul]* 63

Saratov Oblast Party Official Relieved of Post *[Moscow TV]* 65
Lithuanian Deputy Criticizes PRAVDA *[GIMTASIS KRASTAS No 30]* 65
PRAVDA Article on Baltics Scored *[TIESA 14 Jul]* 67
"Lituanica" Club Members Explain Goals 68
Draft Election Laws Discussed in Ukraine *[TASS]* 70
Azerbaijan Names Light Industry Minister *[Baku Radio]* 71
Editor of Revolutionary Party Paper Visits Armenia *[Yerevan International]* 71
Belorussian Official Views Perestroyka Process *[PRAVDA 1 Aug]* 71
Uzbek Language Law Highlights Problems *[IZVESTIYA 23 Jul]* 74
New Radio Program for Kazakhstan Germans *[Moscow Radio]* 75
Chairman Shalayev Interviewed on Unions' Role *[PRAVDA 31 Jul]* 75
Deputy Interviewed on Status of Judges *[Moscow International]* 79
Committee Appeals for Funds To Combat AIDS *[PRAVDA 7 Aug]* 79
Legal Recourse for Fired Strikers Viewed *[TRUD 29 Jul]* 80
Aviation Official Interviewed on Service Problems *[Moscow TV]* 82
Chief Appointed To Fight Against Organized Crime
[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 2 Aug] 83
Moscow Committee Set Up To Fight Crime *[TASS]* 84
Moscow Soviet Discusses Crime Problems *[TASS]* 84
Problems of Former Prisoners Addressed *[TASS]* 84
USSR United Workers Front Holds Congress *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 2 Aug]* 85
Shortage of Food Supplies in Moscow Addressed *[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 23 Jul]* 85
Central Election Commission Resolution Outlined *[Moscow Radio]* 86
Situation Around Chernobyl 'Markedly Improved' *[TASS]* 86
'State of Emergency' in Omsk Due to Smoke *[Moscow Radio]* 86
Freak Weather, Pollution Hit Black Sea *[IZVESTIYA 19 Jul]* 86
Safety of Nuclear Test Range Questioned *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 21 Jul]* 87
Article Urges More Discussion of CPSU's Role
[SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 28 Jul] 89
Cooperatives Said To Abuse Legal Loopholes *[TRUD 26 Jul]* 91
Forces 'Undermining' Perestroyka Detailed *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 29]* 92
Gorkiy Cathedral Returned to 'Believers' *[TASS]* 93
Draft Law on Taxation of Artwork Criticized *[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 29 Jul]* 94

Economic

Vlasov Discusses Consumer Goods Shortfalls *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 28 Jul]* 94
Officials Study Marketing at Academy, Abroad *[TASS]* 101
Large Free Trade Zones Planned in Four Areas *[Hamburg DIE WELT 22-23 Jul]* 102

Agricultural

Soviet Farms To Earn Convertible Currency *[TASS]* 102
Ligachev Speaks on Increase of Fruit, Vegetables *[PRAVDA 4 Aug]* 102
Nikitin Describes Agro-Industrial Complex *[TASS]* 105
Ligachev Addresses Sugar-Production Seminar *[Moscow TV]* 105

Scientific

Details Given on 'D' Module for Mir Station *[SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 2 Aug]* . 106

Moiseyev Says More Arms Do Not Ensure Security

LD1008121989 Moscow TASS in English 1203 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—In an article published in the August issue of the magazine MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN (International Affairs), Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, writes that, in pursuing its military policy, the Soviet Union believes that an increase in weapons and armed forces will not result in stronger security and peace.

Lending its military doctrine a clear defensive edge, the Soviet Union began realising proclaimed obligations on unilateral reduction of armed forces in Europe and Mongolia. General Moiseyev cites detailed information on cuts in forces and armaments and declares the USSR's readiness to withdraw all nuclear weapons from the territories of its allies in 1989-1991 if the United States takes a similar move.

The article points to the need for including all means of warfare in the disarmament dialogue, which are now outside its framework. Moiseyev calls for spreading the talks to tactical nuclear weapons, naval forces and their armaments. He writes that "it is very important not to take steps which could complicate the negotiating process and give new impetus to the arms race, including those under the pretext of modernisation".

Noting a definite progress in questions of detente, General Moiseyev voices concern over the fact that no substantial changes have taken place so far in the strategy of the North Atlantic alliance. The work on the SDI programme continues in the United States with a swing, which will eventually destroy the ABM Treaty. The U.S. side presents the implementation of its military programmes as a forced measure in response to vulnerability of American interests from the Soviet military might, while Soviet statements on changes in the military doctrine and strategy are described as "Soviet rhetoric".

Speaking of restructuring Soviet troops along the Soviet-Chinese border in line with the principle of reasonable sufficiency, Moiseyev points out that the Soviet Union is ready to withdraw military units and armaments from border areas by agreement with China, leaving only personnel necessary for ordinary border service.

Team of U.S. Inspectors Arrive To Observe Exercise

LD1108120689 Moscow TASS in English 1151 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 11 TASS—The United States Government made a formal request on Thursday to observe the present Soviet troop manoeuvres, of which all participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe were notified in June.

Guided by the document of the Stockholm conference and the interests of building trust and security in Europe, the Soviet Union has granted the request.

The team of four U.S. inspectors arrived in the USSR today.

U.S. Congressmen Visit SS-20 Destruction Base

LD1008212389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1315 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Kiev, 10 Aug (TASS)—TASS correspondents Viktor Mazanyy and Vladimir Khrustov report:

A delegation of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, headed by the committee's chairman, Les Aspin, today visited a base for the elimination of RSD-10 [SS-20] auxiliary equipment, situated close to the town of Sarny in the Rovno oblast (southern Ukraine). A large group of journalists from television and radio companies of a number of foreign countries who wanted to witness the destruction of launchers and transporter vehicles for the delivery and reloading of missiles, described in the West as SS-20's, arrived with them.

The arrival of the guests coincided with the anniversary of the beginning of work at the base on implementing the Soviet-U.S. treaty on intermediate and short-range weapons. Over this period, Soviet soldiers, with the participation of U.S. inspectors have dismantled 195 complexes, and their transporters have been integrated into the national economy.

The U.S. parliamentarians and foreign journalists familiarized themselves with the conditions in which the U.S. inspectors who are monitoring the elimination of the SS-20 installations live and work. Here they were given two comfortable villas, and there is a cafe and a bar. There is a fine pine grove next to the residential zone. There are pretty flowers and decorative plants along the avenues. Everything seems to show that the people living here are occupied with work which is deepiy peaceful.

All the necessary conditions have been created at the base for fruitful work by the U.S. inspectors who can follow the entire technological chain of dismantlement. The visitors saw for themselves that before them stands precisely the equipment which is mentioned in the INF Treaty. The guests observed with interest as the equalising supports [vyravnivayushchiye upory] and the sections of the chassis frame were cut, using a plasmotron. Now the multiwheel installation is no longer fit for providing the launch of a missile bearing a lethal charge.

"It seems not so long since, in the mid-seventies, I took part in placing on combat duty the menacing missile weapon," Soviet Colonel Yevgeniy Kozlov, leader of the dismantlement, said. "And although it is amoral to call lethal missiles a 'miracle weapon,' precisely the SS-20 is

a model of perfection and dependability. But we are now parting with the complex without regret. We understand that our actions are bringing relief to the entire world."

The dismantlement is being conducted in a qualified way and according to a definite cycle. The tractors can be used, after everything 'superfluous' is removed from them, in the national economy; for example, powerful cranes can be fixed on them. And the diesel plant removed from the complexes will also have other uses. Many former units of combat machinery will be smelted down.

During the visit to the base, the U.S. congressmen were able to see that Soviet specialists are precisely observing the INF Treaty, which has become an important practical step toward improving relations between the USSR and the United States.

"We and our Soviet colleagues possess full mutual understanding on all issues," Michael Chritsik, leader of the group of U.S. inspectors, said. "Businesslike and friendly relations are helping us to fulfill our mission precisely and thoroughly. We realize that our combined work serves improvement of the mutual relations between our countries and serves stability in the world."

Nazarkin Says Verification Key to Arms Cuts Accord
PM0908155789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kosinskiy report: "Adjustment of Positions"]

[Text] Geneva—The 11th round of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons has ended in Geneva. Summing up its results at a press conference, Ambassador Yu. Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation to the talks, specifically touched on the work to prepare a draft treaty for a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons. He noted that during the 7 weeks of talks, the positions of both sides in the sphere of foreign and defense policy were adjusted taking into account the change of U.S. administration, questions which are still outstanding were discussed, and progress was achieved in the amplification of individual formulations. But despite the existence of mutual understanding during the discussion of terminology and technical details and procedures, there was unfortunately no progress in the solution of the main outstanding problems.

The Soviet delegation to the talks insisted on taking into account the objective interconnection between the reduction of strategic offensive weapons and limitations on anti-ballistic missile defense systems, with the 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons being backed up by the insurance of the sides' mandatory observance of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. As far as the Americans are concerned, they upheld their former position, deeming it possible to deploy further anti-ballistic missiles systems including space-based elements of the SDI program.

Serious differences also remain in the approach toward problems concerning long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, which are an important component of strategic arsenals. Putting forward a proposal for limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles, the Soviet side associates the effective solution of this question with appropriate verification measures. No positive response has been received yet from the U.S. side, which believes that any verification concerning sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles is superfluous.

The heads of the delegations to the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons are unanimous that the conclusion of work on the draft treaty for the reduction of strategic offensive weapons is associated with the solution of the verification problem. In the opinion of the U.S. delegation head, all methods of monitoring and verification concerning the strategic offensive weapons to be covered by the future treaty must be tested before it comes into force. The Soviet side advocates the most effective monitoring of the treaty's limitation or prohibition provisions.

The participants assess the climate at the talks as favorable and businesslike. This gives hope that the sides' positions will be brought closer together during the next round of the talks, due to resume 25 September.

Perfilyev Says Polish Government 'Internal Affair'
LD1108133689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1234 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 11 Aug (TASS)—Attempts to use the process of forming a government in Poland in order to destabilize the situation in the country and inflict any sort of damage on its alliance obligations, including those regarding the Warsaw Pact and on Soviet-Polish cooperation are not in accordance with the interests of stability in Europe, Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, stated at the briefing here today.

Answering a question about the Soviet assessment of the numerous commentaries connected to the formation of a new government in Poland, he said that there are, indeed, quite a few commentaries on this subject, including some in Soviet publications. But of course, Vadim Perfilyev went on, not all of these pieces reflect the official view. As is known, the appointment of the chairman of Poland's Council of Ministers has taken place. As for the formation of the government—and this process is in progress right now—that is, naturally, the Poles' internal affair.

The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman noted that, under the conditions of the policy of national accord being pursued in Poland, the formation of the government is being conducted taking into account the interests of all influential political forces in the country. He also expressed the hope that a well-considered approach will prevail and appropriate ways of solving the problems facing Polish society will be found.

Further on Perfilyev's 10 Aug News Briefing

TASS Summarizes Remarks
LD1008165689 Moscow TASS in English 1621 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—The most extremist part of the Afghan opposition feels that the ground is slipping from under their feet, First Deputy Head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Directorate Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing here today.

He spoke about the situation in Afghanistan, including the relations inside the Afghan armed opposition. He said that the Islamic Party of Afghanistan leader Golbuddin Hekmatyar was particularly unwilling to accept ways of peaceful settlement of the Afghan internal differences.

Hekmatyar, undoubtedly, feels that his actions aimed at increasing military confrontation in Afghanistan and further bloodshed have run in a deeper contradiction with the sentiments of the Afghan people, Perfilyev said. Hekmatyar's ultra extremist position has distanced him even from other members of the alliance of the seven, Perfilyev said.

He emphasised that such a critical assessment of Hikmatyar's actions did not reflect the Soviet attitude towards other sections of the Afghan opposition. He repeated the words Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said in an interview with the BAKHTAR News Agency that the Soviet Union firmly supported the national reconciliation policy in Afghanistan and was ready to continue direct contacts with all Afghan opposition forces and act as intermediary in the inter-Afghan dialogue.

Perfilyev also commented on the reaction of Pakistani mass media means and diplomatic corps on the results of Shevardnadze's working visit to Kabul. He noted that some Pakistani political observers had concluded that the visit demonstrated once again that the Soviet and Afghan sides see no reasonable alternative to a peace settlement and call for ending the bloody war on the basis of reasonable compromises and national accord.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman told the journalists about Shevardnadze's reaction to the U.S. State Department's decision to change recommendations concerning the travelling of American citizens to China, including a return of the families of U.S. state employees there. "We welcome any steps designed to normalise the situation in any part of the world and it is only natural that we should only welcome such U.S. steps in the context of Soviet-Chinese relations," Perfilyev quoted Shevardnadze as saying.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed the Soviet Union's concern over the situation in Lebanon. Speaking of Tel Aviv's possible attempt (in the opinion of analysts) to take punitive actions in retaliation for an attack on an Israeli military motor vehicle column in South Lebanon, he pointed out that this would further aggravate the situation in Lebanon and would make it more difficult to free the hostages.

Asked about the formation of a "Zionist Union" in Moscow, Perfilyev said that it was one of the many informal organisations which are currently being set up in the Soviet Union. They are not banned by the law but should act within the Soviet Constitution.

He said that the Soviet people's attitude to the union's creation had been revealed in Soviet press. He stressed that the official Soviet position on Zionism was well known to the world—the Soviet Union supports the U.N. resolution on Zionism which declares it a form of racism and racial discrimination.

Perfilyev Cites Hekmatyar's Intransigence

LD1008184789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Today, at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center, Perfilyev, first deputy chairman of the Information Administration of the USSR Foreign Ministry, familiarized Soviet and foreign journalists with the situation in Afghanistan, and the Soviet assessment of the actions of the Afghan armed opposition. He said inter alia:

[Begin Perfilyev recording] The armed opposition detachments have continued the shelling of population centers. Today, as a result of rocket projectiles hitting the area adjacent to the airport, [as heard] 10 people were killed and 12 people injured. Najibullah, president of the Afghan Republic, ordered the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Afghanistan to create in all areas of the Afghan capital commissions to render aid to those affected by the opposition's rocket shelling of the city.

Armed forces subunits of the Republic of Afghanistan continued operations in the district of Chaparhar, in Nangarhar Province, as a result of which a great amount of the enemy arms and ammunition was seized. The formations of the irreconcilable opposition, with the support of Pakistani Army artillery, shelled the positions of the government troops and residential areas in Jalalabad. A reply attack was carried out on the extremists, as a result of which 17 insurgents were eliminated and 26 injured. Among those killed, according to reports from Afghanistan, were Pakistani servicemen and Saudi mercenaries.

Among members of the Afghan armed forces—to be more exact, among the so-called irreconcilables—who persit in rejecting peaceful ways to resolve internal Afghan disagreements, Golbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan stands out especially. No doubt he feels that his actions, aimed at intensifying military confrontation between Afghans, and further bloodshed, no longer correspond with the mood of the Afghan people. Hekmatyar discerns a threat to his personal interests in any event which could lead to positive changes in the situation in and around Afghanistan. It is not fortuitous that he made an attack, in particular on the improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations. Nor is it fortuitous that the tone of his utterances has hardened as regards the so-called moderates within the Afghan opposition. As a result, Hekmatyar, thanks to his ultraextremist positions, is becoming ever more isolated, even among his own partners in the Alliance of Seven.

This description of Hekmatyar's actions is not at all a reflection of our attitude as a whole to all aspects of the Afghan opposition. We are prepared to continue direct contacts with all Afghan opposition forces and to act as an intermediary in the inter-Afghan dialogue. [end recording]

Cautions Against Israeli Retaliation

LD1008201489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1805 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] A briefing on international issues was held today in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center addressing Soviet and foreign journalists, Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the Information directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs dwelt on the aggravation of the situation in Lebanon. He said in particular:

[Begin Perfilyev recording] A possible attempt by Tel Aviv to undertake—as observers fear—punitive actions in connection with an operation against an Israeli military convoy, which was carried out in the Israeli illegally created security zone in the south of Lebanon, would aggravate even more the situation in this country and would complicate the problem of releasing the hostages. All this confirms once more the necessity of urgent fulfillment by Israel of UN Security Council Resolution 425, which demands a complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon. The cessation of the occupation on the southern Lebanon territory and the interference of Israel into the internal affairs of Lebanon would, undoubtedly, remove many obstacles on the path of serching for the way out from the crisis in and around Lebanon.

A mood in favor of ever more energetic actions called upon to promote a just settlement in Lebanon is developing in the international community. Permanent members of the Security Council speak in favor of this, too. As is known, the Soviet-U.S. statement on Lebanon, and also the statement signed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Francois Mitterrand reflect the support for the peace-making efforts of the League of Arab state and stress the pressing necessity to overcome the Lebanese crisis. The Soviet Union is actively working in the spirit of these statements. We consider they contain an important peace-making potential.

U.S. Official Blasted for Export Controls Stance

PM1008134789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Aug 89 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent Vladimir Bolshakov dispatch under the rubric "Viewpoint": "Shortsighted"]

[Text] Paris—Allan Wendt, chief of the U.S. State Department's Strategic Technology Policy Department, visited Paris recently. This abstruse title conceals Mr Wendt's basic function of leading the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls [Cocom]. This is the Western countries' coordinating committee based in Paris—actually in the U.S. Embassy in France—to keep an eye on exports to the USSR and other socialist countries. Until recently the U.S. partners in Cocom very dutifully observed the prohibitions drawn up in Washington. And these prohibitions were worded so as to exclude deliveries of any modern equipment and technology to the USSR.

Recently, however, the United States' West European partners in Cocom have begun to grumble. They have rightly pointed out to Washington that the prohibitions of the "cold war" times no longer make any sense and only hold up exports from West Europe to the USSR—which does economic harm primarily to the West, not to the Soviet Union. Under pressure from the West European allies—France and the FRG above all—a number of Cocom prohibitions really have been lifted recently. Having seen the new opportunities for themselves, certain U.S. companies have also tried to break into the Soviet market with modern technology. But those moss-covered anticommunists who have not the slightest intention of giving up their positions either in the United States or in the NATO leadership clearly dislike this trend. Particularly as it has emerged along with perestroyka, as though in itself emphasizing the democratic, peaceful nature of the development of socialism in the USSR and the other socialist countries. This is clearly why all hands were called on deck in Mr Wendt's department and he himself rushed off to Paris to hold an on-site inspection of Cocom.

A correspondent for the Paris-published INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE put this question to him: "Now that tension in East-West relations is easing and the military threat to the West from the Soviet Union has diminished, has the time not come to relax control over exports of Western technology to the East?"

Mr Wendt said most decisively in reply to this that, from his viewpoint, the time has not come, that the Soviet threat has not been lifted, and that they must not be deceived with regard to the USSR's withdrawing, let us say, 10,000 tanks. It will then introduce, he said, 5,000 new tanks equipped with technology bought from the West.

The Cocom curator's statements reflect a very alarming trend in those Western circles, primarily U.S. circles, which determine policy with regard to the Soviet Union. There is no shortage of articles in both the U.S. and the West European right-wing press whose authors still proceed from the following premise: "The worse the situation in the Soviet Union, the better it will be for the West." William Safire, one of the U.S. conservatives' ideologues, writes: "The very best way to help Mr Gorbachev succeed in what the West wants (a free market and free people) is to wish him success and allow bleak circumstances to make him put an end to the (existing) system and reduce the size of the empire."

Sober-minded people on both sides of the Atlantic categorically reject such recommendations for the speediest restoration of capitalism in the USSR along Safire's lines. In the modern interconnected world, they warn, it is madness to promote economic and political disaster in the Soviet Union, for the consequences could prove disastrous for the West itself.

The USSR really is experiencing considerable difficulties now in the transitional period to a higher and more democratic stage in the development of socialism. The sooner it achieves success in this, the more salutary the political climate on our planet will be and the wider the opportunities for international cooperation in all spheres. Both the East and the West need this equally. It is not so tragic when Cocom fails to understand this. But it is far worse when people at the level of the U.S. and NATO leadership begin to heed the recommendations of Messrs Wendt and Safire.

United States & Canada

'Columbia' Mission Dedicated to Pentagon Program

LD1008185489 Moscow TASS in English 1815 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] New York August 10 TASS—U.S. Air Force Secretary Donald Rice today confirmed that the astronauts of space shuttle Columbia, now in near-terrestrial orbit, had successfully deployed a satellite.

He said at a ceremony at McDill Air Force base in the environs of Tampa, Florida, that it was a very successful launch but refused to specify the satellite's purpose.

Earlier, officials of the U.S. Defence Department announced the exact parameters of space shuttle Columbia's orbit. According to UPI, the spaceship is at an orbit which is some 296 kilometers high and makes one revolution in 90 minutes.

The data about the Columbia's parameters enabled specialists to suppose that U.S. astronauts released a top-secret photo intelligence satellite, KH-12, which is designed to snap highly detailed photographs of military facilities and other strategic targets on earth. Given the disclosed parameters, the KH-12 can conduct surveillance over 80 per cent of the Soviet territory.

The present flight of the Columbia with five astronauts is dedicated solely to the Pentagon program. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) announced already during the flight that the Columbia will return to earth on Sunday morning at Edward Air Force base in California. However, the Columbia crew are expected to deploy one more secret satellite under the "Star Wars" program before landing.

General Comments on 'Columbia'

LD1108103589 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0954 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 11 August (TASS)—Major General Yuriy Markelov, who heads the press center of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, sees the launch of the U.S. intelligence-gathering satellite from the Columbia spacecraft as a "gesture quite incommensurate with the atmosphere of the expanding Soviet-U.S. dialogue."

Commenting today on the statement by Donald Rice, secretary of the Air Force, who confirmed that the satellite had been launched, Gen Markelov, in a conversation with Oleg Moskovskiy, a TASS correspondent, drew attention to the fact that the satellite, now in orbit, is capable of receiving images of facilities situated on the territory of the Soviet Union, China, states in the Middle East and other regions of the world.

The strict secrecy of the Columbia spacecraft flight program compels one to reflect that Washington continues, as of old, to see space as a possible theatre of military operations, concludes General Markelov. Special attention is, moreover, being paid to the implementation of the space shuttle program which, from the very beginning, was made subordinate to the interests of the Pentagon. The U.S. space shuttles are to be used for intelligence-gathering, for inspecting facilities in space, for testing SDI components, and for testing new types and systems of weapons. "The launch of the spy satellite on Thursday is evidence that these plans are hardly theoretical in nature," said Gen Markelov.

An impression is being created that certain U.S. military and political circles are trying, by any possible means, to spread the arms race to space, without pausing to reflect on the consequences of such actions for international peace and security, said the general. This approach is in sharp contrast to the USSR's approach to making use of space. "Our country is in favor of space forever remaining clear and free of any weapons, so that it does not become an arena of arms race and a source of exacerbating relations between states," emphasized Gen Markelov.

Correspondent Views Bloch, Hirsch Cases

PM1008192989 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Aug 89 First Edition p 5

[TASS correspondent N. Turkatenko dispatch specially for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: "A Moment with a Briefcase and Other Scenes from the 'KGB Agent' Spectacular"]

[Text] Washington—"Curiouser and curiouser," said Alice in Wonderland as she fell down the magic tunnel, simultaneously realizing that the phrase was ungrammatical.

Alice would have been even more surprised were she today in the U.S. capital—not a magic capital, but a real capital. There events continually happen whose initiators would very much like readers and TV viewers to forget not only the rules of grammar but also other elementary rules, under which, for instance, it should be shameful to publicly slander someone.

You do not have to go far to find an example. For umpteen days now Washington officials and distinguished press and TV commentators have been whipping up the "case of the ranking State Department staffer" Felix Bloch, the TASS correspondent in Washington reports specially for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. The former prefer to speak off the record, while the latter sign their names to judgments and commentaries on their own and others' judgments.

Just what is this "case"? The press—not without "leaks" from "competent officials" of course—has declared Bloch, who long worked as a counselor at the U.S.

Embassy in Vienna, to be a "Soviet spy" who "clearly" passed secret information to Soviet agents. ABC-TV, which, incidentally, was the first to break the "Bloch story," even ran a videotape of the "moment when Bloch handed over a briefcase to a man in Vienna known to the intelligence community in the West as a KGB agent." But the next day the TV company had to apologize to viewers and admit that the "moment with the briefcase" was not real but had been staged by actors in a studio.

Things were to get even "curiouser." A State Department spokesman reported Mr Bloch had his entry pass to the State Department building removed and was sent on "paid administrative leave." But...As yet, not only have no charges been made against Bloch, he has not even been arrested or denied freedom to travel. Admittedly, each time he leaves his house, even to walk the dog, he is, as the newspapers put it, "accompanied" to prevent him from being "snatched by the Russians." When Bloch visited his relatives in New York State the press reported that he was followed by a carload of FBI agents and another carload of..."Soviet Embassy personnel, which was clear from the car registration number."

In connection with this report a State Department spokesmen was asked at a routine briefing just how "Soviet Embassy personnel" could follow the Bloch and FBI cars? Can the Soviets in Washington really just up and leave for New York without notifying the State Department? The same question was put to an FBI Press Section spokesman. The former stated that he had "no information," the latter that he could not comment on anything relating to the "Bloch case."

The FBI has also refused to answer this question: Bloch has not only not been arrested or tried, he has not even been charged, yet he is already declared a spy to the whole world. How, in the light of this, do matters stand in the United States regarding the presumption of innocence, which is considered the keystone of the American legal system.

It must be said, many people are now asking this question in the United States. Ganter Rouzinus [name as transliterated], for example, a reader of the capital's newspaper, THE WASHINGTON POST, writes in a letter to the editor: "Now that Felix Bloch has had the fool's cap put on and been led around the streets, should we not arrange a public trial in a stadium? We could then apply such methods to others suspected of committing a crime when there is not enough substantial evidence to press charges. But meanwhile could someone nevertheless tell us where due legal process and the presumption of innocence have disappeared to in this charade?"

However, for the time being the furor surrounding the "Bloch case" continues. The same ABC devoted a whole program to him with the participation of David Boren, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and a certain Stanislav Levchenko, who poses as a "former highly placed KGB staffer." The whole broadcast amounted to no more than calls "to step up vigilance."

While the "Bloch case" is being unraveled, the situation has undergone another development. At Washington's prompting the press and television raised a fuss about the "arrest of a person suspected of espionage for the Soviet Union" who is engaged in "secret service" in West Berlin, US Air Force Captain John Hirsch. On Wednesday 9 August THE WASHINGTON POST announced on its front page: "The Pentagon is backpedaling on its previous statements that investigations showed Capt John Hirsch to be a spy. The Pentagon is now describing its former reports as 'premature' and misleading." Incidentally, the Pentagon also confirmed that no charges have been made against Hirsch and that, like Bloch, he has not been arrested but is only "under observation."

Who needs all this? The answer is not new. Practice shows that every time positive changes begin to show or occur in Soviet-U.S. relations, people in the United States who seek to wreck this process are galvanized into action. Incidentally, according to press evidence, Bloch was a member of a State Department group that took part in drafting the regulations governing the sale of personal computers to the Soviet Union. The decision to sell certain types of computers to the USSR aroused panic among a number of congressmen and many Pentagon officials. U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney even stated publicly that he did not agree with this decision. The State Department had to explain that Bloch did not play a crucial role in examining questions linked with trade with the Soviet Union.

And that is not the only point. American "superpatriots" and "superconservatives" would very much like to keep Americans in a state of terror and force them to fear broadening contacts with Soviet people since the latter are allegedly all to a man either spies or recruiters of spies.

... Alice in Wonderland dreamed all her adventures and terrors. Alas, Americans are made fearful in their waking reality, and there is no aversion here to pinning the "spy" tag on "suspects" without any trial and investigation. Is that not an example of the attitude toward human rights in the United States—a country whose representatives at all forums instruct other people how these rights must be observed?

Deputy Foreign Minister Arrives in Washington
LD1008173489 Moscow World Service in English 1700 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh has arrived in Washington.

By mutual agreement he is to hold consultations with the leadership of the United States State Department in view of the coming meeting between the Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, and the American state secretary, James Baker.

It has been reported in Moscow that in the course of the consultations Aleksandr Bessmertnykh is to meet James Baker and other representatives of the State Department.

Congressmen's Visit to Labor Camp Reported

LD1008182489 Moscow TASS in English 1754 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—Two American congressmen, members of the committee monitoring the fulfilment of the Helsinki accords, were given an opportunity to visit a labour camp. They regarded it as evidence of the growing openness of Soviet society. Congressmen Frank Wolf and Christopher Smith returned from the city of Perm today where they had a five-hour conversation with prisoners from labour camp No 35 and familiarised themselves with their living conditions.

Wolf and Smith held a news conference at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow today. They said that the purpose of their trip to Perm was to find out if there are so-called political prisoners in labour camp No 35. They admitted that none of 24 prisoners they talked with was convicted on the basis of Article 70 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation which envisages punishment for anti-Soviet propaganda. However, they suggested that some of them could be classed as "political prisoners." They said that final conclusions on this problem would be drawn only after a careful study of the materials collected by them.

Congressman Wolf pointed out that the Perm camp had been specially tidied before their arrival and that conditions in which prisoners are kept were hard. Journalists who attended the news conference remarked that the quality of keeping prisoners in the labour camp was not connected with the character of the offence for which they were convicted and that hard conditions are typical of many prisons in the West.

Congressman McCloskey Cited on Visit to USSR

LD1008170289 Moscow TASS in English 1617 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—By TASS correspondents Igor Peskov and Mikhail Ivanov:

"We regard our stay in the Soviet Union as part and parcel of the overall dialogue between Soviet and American legislators", Congressman Frank McCloskey, member of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee delegation, currently visiting the USSR, has told TASS. The guests came to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet and left for a tour of the country this Wednesday after two days of negotiations in the capital. Sharing his impressions of the stay in Moscow with TASS correspondents, McCloskey noted that talks at the Supreme Soviet and the General Staff were very frank and reassuring. The legislators of the two countries have many problems in common and hence their mutual interest in each other, he stressed. It is natural, the American guest continued, that we were most interested in how military matters are decided in the new Soviet parliament. From talks with members of your Defence and State Security Commission I got the impression that the role of legislative power has increased substantially. The executive power, including representatives of the military establishments, will henceforth be accountable to the legislators. All this goes to show that the Soviet political system is becoming more open and democratic, he noted.

Asked about the attitude of American legislators to the Stategic Defence Initiative and the question of strengthening the ABM treaty regime, McCloskey noted that he personally, together with the majority of U.S. legislators, had voted for a "narrow" interpretation of the ABM treaty. He said he was very critical about the Strategic Defence Initiative, that his stand on these questions coincided with the views of Soviet parliamentarians and military experts. It is a pity that my view does not always coincide with the views of representatives of the executive arm, he said.

There are no easy solutions in politics, McCloskey believes. Any agreement calls for large efforts on the part of each partner, he said. I believe with President Bush on many problems, but I believe that he, just as Gorbachev, is concerned about the problem of safeguarding peace. The fact that the leaders of our two countries are prepared to speak with each other is very important itself, he concluded.

U.S. Naval Visit to Sevastopol Continues

PM1008131189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Aug 89 First Edition p 3

[Our correspondent Captain Second Rank V. Pasyakin report: "Free, Friendly Contacts"]

[Text] Sevastopol, 5 Aug—A detachment of U.S. Navy ships under the flag of Vice Admiral Raymond Paul Ilg, commander in chief of the U.S. Navy in Europe, is continuing its official friendly visit to Sevastopol.

At a press conference here yesterday Vice Admiral Ilg, Admiral M.N. Khronopulo, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and D. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, pointed out the importance of such visits in developing relations between our countries and organizing direct contacts between military fleets. They expressed a desire to make such visits a traditional and regular event.

The program for the visit is so packed that on the first day there were dozens of meetings at very different levels, not to mention unofficial contacts when U.S. seamen went into the city. I cannot talk about all the meetings—there were hundreds of them. But if I single out a common important characteristic of all them, I must talk about their ardent and sincere desire to get to know one another as far as possible. For no mass media or mediated contacts can replace direct personal contacts.

"These contacts," Vice Admiral Ilg said at the press conference, "will help us dispel the stormclouds of confrontation and the cloud of mistrust that has hung over our heads and prevented us from seeing one another clearly. It is profoundly symbolic that our ships stood alongside yours today. We hope that the visit to Norfolk only represents a small part of the great and important changes that have emerged in our relations, and we find confirmation of that here in Sevastopol."

"This event has gone beyond the bounds of an ordinary visit," Admiral M.N. Khronopulo, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, pointed out at the press conference, "and I believe that it is profoundly symbolic that our flags are fluttering together in the wind of good changes and the new political thinking."

I had a conversation on the "Azov" large antisubmarine warfare ship with Captain First Rank Ronald C. Bogle, commander of the U.S. frigate "Kauffman." He spoke highly of the Soviet warship, pointed out the exceptional amicability of its commander, Captain Second Rank A. Chelpanov, the ship's supreme seaworthiness and shipshape air, and the supreme professionalism of the Soviet seamen, advocated developing contacts, and even proposed joint maneuvers with our ships.

Vice Admiral Raymond P. Ilg laid a wreath today at the Glory Obelisk at Sapun-Gora. The U.S. seamen continued their acquaintance with the city sights. Thousands of the city's residents have visited the U.S. ships. D. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, gave a reception in honor of the municipal authorities and the fleet command.

U.S. Consul's Visit to Estonia Reported

PM1008153789 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 12 Jul 89 p 3

[ETA report: "Diplomat's Visit"]

[Text] On 11 July Mikk Titma, secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, met with Richard Miles, U.S. consul general in Leningrad, who is in our republic on an official visit.

The diplomat arrived in Estonia with his family 8 July. On that day the guests visited Narva, where they met with the leadership of the city soviet executive committee and visited the local history museum.

On 9 July R. Miles and his wife arrived on Saaremaa Island, where they visited the rayon soviet executive committee and made a familiarization tour of the city of Kuressaare and the island. Let us point out that R. Miles is the first U.S. diplomat to visit Saaremaa.

On 10 July the guests went to Pyarnuskiy Rayon, met with the leadership of Pyarnu City, and visited the "Edazi" Collective Farm.

On 11 July the diplomat met with representatives of the board of the Estonian People's Front.

The program for the guests' further stay in our republic's capital includes a meeting with the collective of the SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA Editorial Board and with Professor T. Sulling's scientific group of cardiologists. They then intend to visit Tartu, to familiarize themselves with Tartu State University, the university library, and Tartu Commercial Bank, and to visit Raadi farmstead.

The guests will return to Leningrad 14 July, having also visited Kuremyae Monastery.

U.S. Disagreements on Afghan Policy Cited

LD1008153989 Moscow TASS in English 1452 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Washington August 10 TASS—By TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev:

The U.S. Administration's hopes for a quick military victory of the Afghan opposition forces were unrealistic. This view, according to THE WASHINGTON POST, a high-ranking U.S. diplomat in Pakistan tried to impress on the State Department and the White House, but was reassigned to Washington.

In an article, transmitted from Islamabad, the newspaper reports that Edmund Mcwilliams, who "until last month was the chief specialist in the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan on the war in Afghanistan, has told colleagues that cables he wrote questioning U.S. strategy in the war were blocked by Ambassador Robert Oakley and that he was later transferred at least partly because he voiced doubts about the wisdom of U.S. policy." "In classified cables intended for Washington", the newspaper says, "Edmund Mcwilliams wrote that U.S. hopes for a quick military victory over the Kabul regime were unrealistic, that American policy makes were depending too much on Pakistani intelligence officers for their assessment of the war and that the United States was directing too much of its political support to the rebel Afghan interim government based in Pakistan".

McWilliams' views do not speak of his sympathies for the government of Afghanistan. According to THE WASHINGTON POST, he "felt a deep personal commitment to the efforts by the Pakistan-based Muslim rebels to overthrow the Kabul regime". The reasons are

much deeper. The newspaper notes that the consequences of the opposition's abortive attempt to capture Jalalabad are "still being felt within the ranks of the Afghan rebels and their supporters. The continuing military stalemate inside Afghanistan has touched off a growing debate about the effectiveness of U.S. policy and intelligence in Afghanistan. The debate has exposed disagreements not only within the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, but between Western Europeans and Americans, between the United States and elements of the Pakistani Government of Benazir Bhutto and among the rebel factions".

However, all these disagreements are related mainly to tactical problems. The end-goal of the United States, as unequivocally testified by THE WASHINGTON POST, remains to overthrow the present Afghan Government.

Congress, White House Differ on Arms Budget
PM1008152189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Aug 89 First Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Observer Vasiliy Pustov article under the "World Today: Problems and Opinions" rubric: "Balance Must Be Observed"]

[Text] Today marks the anniversary of the atom bombing of Hiroshima. The destruction of an entire city in the twinkling of an eye, reducing many thousands of people to radioactive dust, constituted a watershed in mankind's history. For the first time mankind approached a position where it had the capacity to commit suicide.

By no means everyone realized this straightaway. Realizing the threat nuclear weapons pose to the peoples, the Soviet Union was the first to advocate their banning and destruction, which did not, however, win the support of the Western states, above all the United States. But even while aware of the fatal nature of this mass destruction weapon, our country was forced to embark on creating such weapons and join the arms race. As a result of great efforts we attained military-strategic parity with the United States and even—let us be blunt—found ourselves in the lead in some areas.

Time passed and people began to perceive increasingly clearly that this could not continue any longer since the question of the survival of mankind itself arose. This realization is manifested in different ways in different countries. It was embodied particularly clearly in the new thinking elaborated by the CPSU and the Soviet state. Its affirmation in international relations, which is also facilitated by the realism increasingly manifest in the West, led to a qualitatively new situation in the world—an improvement in the international climate and a lessening of the danger of war.

The USSR's concrete steps, including unilateral steps, in the sphere of reducing armed forces and arms are common knowledge. Its impressive contribution to the limitation and elimination of certain types of Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons—in accordance with the fundamental aim that the sides' security must be identical and balance observed—is universally recognized. The continuation of USSR-U.S. dialogue encompassing a broad range of problems of great importance for international stability is particularly important. There has now been a marked rapprochement in the two countries' positions at the talks on nuclear and space arms and the banning of chemical weapons. This week the USSR Supreme Soviet sent an appeal to the U.S. Congress on questions of a moratorium on nuclear explosions and the cessation of nuclear tests.

The improvement in USSR-U.S. relations is clearly characterized by such events as the exchange of visits by warships and military leaders and other contacts in the military sphere, which seemed incredible 2-3 years ago. Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev's detailed statement in the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee was greeted with tremendous interest. The U.S. press noted that the congressmen gave the Soviet marshal a standing ovation when he said that the key element in the USSR's military doctrine is defense. As we can see, the enemy image which took many years to form is gradually being eroded within the Congress.

However, there are also other facts. They illustrate that people in certain extremely influential U.S. circles have still not stopped thinking about how to prepare for nuclear war and how to wage it in various theaters of military operations. It is not only a matter of individual speeches by certain "hawks," which would not be too bad, so to speak. Thoughts of the unthinkable were highlighted by the draft military budget for fiscal 1990 which the government has submitted to the Congress.

Its particular concern to improve and build up the components of the strategic "triad" on which the nuclear deterrence concept is based is marked. There is the new B-2 "Stealth" strategic bomber and the MX and "Midgetman" intercontinental ballistic missiles. The administration would like to have both these types of missiles in the arsenal. The third component in the "triad"—nuclear missile submarines—has not escaped attention. The new "Trident-2" (D-5) ballistic missile, which is considerably superior to its predecessor the "Trident-1" (C4) in terms of range, accuracy, and the quantity and yield of the nuclear charges it carries, is now undergoing tests.

The excessive appetites of the supporters of nuclear deterrence aroused quite sharp opposition in the House of Representatives. The congressmen voted by a majority to cut White House requests for funds for B-2 aircraft from $4.7 billion to $3.73 billion and for MX missiles from $1.9 billion to $1.4 billion, and they refused to allocate funds for the "Midgetman" altogether. The House of Representatives also rejected a resolution that envisages agreement in principle to full implementation of the program to construct 132 B-2 bombers at an overall cost of $70 billion.

Here the legislators were also swayed by the positive changes taking place in the world and the economic position in the country. According to U.S. press data, the economic position is characterized by emerging closures of factories and an increase in unemployment and the numbers of homeless people. During a conversation with the President, when discussing items in the military budget, the senators drew his attention to the fact that child mortality is increasing in the country. Considerable funds are needed to combat such alarming phenomena.

Under these conditions attempts to "play" on the something that is approved by both Congress and broad circles of the public—on the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms—did not help the administration. General J. Chain, head of the Strategic Air Command, and other high-ranking Pentagon officials scared the Congress with the thought that without the B-2 bomber they will supposedly "be forced" to review their position at the talks and maybe even abandon them. And the White House explained that the question of the MX and "Midgetman," along with that of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" is equally acute. "I do not want to hold talks with the Soviets without holding as many cards as possible," President G. Bush said.

It is not the limitation of the gigantic military programs but, on the contrary, their implementation and the militarization of space which may have an adverse effect on the Soviet-U.S. talks on strategic offensive arms and destabilize the situation in the world. People on Capitol Hill realize this. "If we value America's security," Congressman L. AuCoin stated, "we must ban 'Star Wars.'" (The security of other countries and all mankind, incidentally, also depends on this.) Congressmen cut requests for funds for the SDI program from $4.0 billion to $3.1 billion.

The trump card of the widely vaunted U.S. technological superiority and the "competitive strategies" concept based on it was brought into play but did not work in the House of Representatives either. Americans are being required to agree to the development and production of costly state-of-the-art weapons, while being promised in exchange a "long-term advantage over the rival superpower." It is claimed that the B-2 bomber will require the USSR to make an additional investment of many billions of rubles in its air defense systems.

As is well known, our country has frequently made official statements that it will, if necessary, find a fitting response to any military-technological challenge, but this response will not be the ruinous response that those people who want to fuel the arms race would like to see. Presumably the leader of a U.S. aerospace company described the "Stealth" aircraft, on which $15-23 billion have already been spent, as an example of a "mad strategy" in the light of this warning, as Britain's FINANCIAL TIMES reports.

Yet despite everything it is still too early to say that the Pentagon strategists' appetites have been tamed. The fact that the House of Representatives cut appropriations for strategic weapons and SDI does not mean that they will be left without the funds on which they are counting. First, the ceiling for expenditure on Pentagon and Energy Department programs for the next fiscal year has been approved by this chamber largely in the amount requested by the administration—$305.5 billion. Only the priorities have been changed. The funds released by the congressmen's decision are being channeled into the implementation of conventional arms production programs—which the Defense Department itself is prepared to cancel as the "least profitable."

Second, the administration has succeeded in taking some revenge in the upper house of Congress. The Senators also cut the administration's requests for funds for components of the strategic "triad" and SDI, but to a considerably lesser extent than the House of Representatives. These and other differences must be eliminated by the Congressional Conference Committee, which will elaborate the final version of the military budget at the beginning of September.

One must not rule out pressure from the powerful military-industrial corporations, which rely on their extremely influential lobbies in the upper echelons of power, including Congress, and also on the many thousands of Americans engaged in military production. Take, for instance, the B-2 bombers. There are subcontractors working on this program in virtually every state in the country. It is reckoned that the "Stealth" program will hardly be cut ultimately; it is more likely that it will be implemented at a somewhat reduced rate.

Thus, it is hard not to agree with the FINANCIAL TIMES' assessment: "The ball that the Pentagon staged for military companies in the early 1980's with the longest peacetime arms buildup in U.S. history is still not over." It is not over because, in particular, according to Western specialists' forecasts, the United States will produce arms worth more than $1 trillion in the nineties—with all the consequences which that entails for strategic stability in the world.

At a time when international tension is decreasing, it is time to abandon the gamble on force and nuclear deterrence. This is necessary in order to completely rule out the threat of a catastrophe which would greatly exceed the consequences of the Hiroshima bombing 44 years ago in terms of its magnitude.

Powell Appointed Joint Chiefs Chairman

LD1008121789 Moscow TASS in English 1522 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] San Francisco August 10 TASS—Referring to senior administration officials, the NBC TV company reported that President Bush decided to appoint Army

General Colin Powell chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The first black in the country's history will become the nations top military officer.

Now Powell, 52, will be the President's leading adviser on military affairs. Army quarters regard him "a very extraordinary guy". The NBC company pointed out that the four-star general, an excellent officer and highly skilled professional, feels equally confident in military tunic, commanding difficult war games, and in strict civilian clothes at a negotiating table with foreign leaders. Powell gained broad popularity at political quarters in his post of the White House national security adviser during the Reagan administration. He is praised for reforming the scandal-wracked National Security Council after the Iran-contras deal. His next appointment was the head of the U.S. Army Forces Command.

Powell was named to the four-star level only this year. He is the second black officer promoted to the rank of U.S. army general and the fourth in all armed forces of the country. Over a dozen influential American generals hoped to be appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President's choice was unexpected to many. The TV company pointed out that Admiral William Crowe, the present chairman, expressed dissatisfaction with Bush's decision. However, the President knew Powell well during his tenure as vice president and regards him as an outstanding military officer.

China

Tibetan Separatist 'Clique' Assailed

PM1008093789 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 89 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "At Session in Lhasa"]

[Text] Beijing, 3 Aug—"The 40 years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet have shown that only the CPC can make the Tibetans masters of their own land, and only socialism is capable of bringing prosperity to Tibet," Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, vice chairman of the Chinese National People's Congress Standing Committee, stated at a session of the local assembly of people's representatives in Lhasa (the administrative center of China's Tibetan Autonomous Region).

In his speech, the newspaper CHINA DAILY reports, he sharply criticized the attempts made by "external hostile forces" to split China. According to Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, the "mutinies and riots in Tibet since 1987" have been inspired by a "clique of separatists and hostile foreign forces."

As for the dalai lama, the speaker said, he has just one choice—to embark on the path of sincere talks with the Chinese central authorities. Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, who once worked with the dalai lama for a long period, expressed his respect for this leader and the hope that the dalai lama will be able to establish good relations with the Chinese Government. As soon as the dalai lama abandons his position of "Tibetan independence" the PRC Government is "prepared to hold talks with him on any terms."

Soviet Observer on Chinese Workers' Strike

OW0808142689 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 2 Aug 89

[Commentary by station observer Malin]

[Text] I returned home last weekend after attending the Beijing International Exhibition. The other day, I met a neighbor in the courtyard of our building. I asked him if there was any good news. He replied, sarcastically: so strikes come along with reform. What my neighbor referred to was the strike of Soviet miners in July. I wonder what his reaction would be if he had read a report from Khabarovsk carried in IZVESTIYA several days ago; to be precise, the IZVESTIYA report was about Chinese workers staging a strike in Khabarovsk. I think my neighbor would probably have said that reform was the cause of strikes. What happened in Khabarovsk? Last month, some 500 Chinese contract workers stopped work at the construction site in Khabarovsk. What was the cause leading to Chinese workers taking such a step? Judging from the facts reported by the IZVESTIYA reporter, one can assume that the main reasons for Chinese workers resorting to strike action were low wages and poor living conditions. Of course, Chinese construction workers did not forsee the fact that not every Chinese worker gets a job commensurate to his training after arriving in Khabarovsk. Their wages tend to be lower than promised at the time of signing the contract. Also, the Chinese workers did not expect that would they have to live in a cramped and poorly-kept hostel. There, it is impossible to read books and newspapers in their own language; they are also unable to watch Chinese television programs. After understanding the fact from Khabarovsk, I read newspaper accounts of the strikes of miners in some areas of our country. I found that the reasons behind the strikes of our country's miners were identical to the work stoppage by Chinese workers. That is, leaders of employing units and local officials showed little concern for the needs of the workers, nor did they care for the living and working conditions, or leisure activities of the workers. It appears that it will not be easy to overcome the unhealthy phenomenon of giving top priority to the interests of employing units and local departments and of relegating the interests of the laboring masses to lowest priority which marked the period of stagnation.

It is all too clear that the already outdated views and methods described above did not disappear in Khabarovsk. Now, the Soviet Union and China have normalized relations. Relations in other areas have been developing rapidly. Improved relations will create a broad possibility for mutually beneficial cooperation; it will help solve pressing problems encountered by both countries during reform; and it will help promote

exchange of experiences. However, if we want to fully avail ourselves of these possibilities, we must arm ourselves with the spirit of new thinking to cope with this possibility; we must not use obsolete views to handle it. Reform is inevitable. The fact has been driven home by the work stoppage of contract Chinese workers in the Soviet Far East City of Khabarovsk.

PRC Lawyers Leave After Visit to Ukraine

PM0808122189 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 11 Jul 89 p 2

[RATAU report: "PRC Lawyers in Ukraine"]

[Text] The training and improvement of the qualifications of juridical cadres, the prevention of law violations, the organization of legal propaganda and elenentary legal knowledge—these and other questions of the work of the organs and institutions of justice and the courts of our republic were of interest to members of the delegation from the PRC Ministry of Justice headed by Deputy Minister Guo Dezhi.

During their stay in Kiev and Odessa the guests were familiarized with the work of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Ministry of Justice and the justice administrations of the Kiev City Soviet Executive Committee and the Odessa Oblast Soviet Executive Committee.

The delegation was received by Ukrainian SSR Minister of Justice V.I. Zaychuk. The Chinese comrades were acquainted with the activity of the ministry and the organs under its jurisdiction.

Northeast Asia

Further on Denial of Japan-USSR Kuriles Deal

OW0908155989 Tokyo KYODO in English 1524 GMT 9 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, Aug 9 KYODO—A spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry on Wednesday denied a recent U.S. magazine report that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has secretly informed Japan that Moscow would return some Japanese-claimed islands in return for a massive influx of Japanese investment in the Soviet Union.

In a press conference here, First Deputy Chief Vadim Perfilyev of the Ministry's Information Department categorically denied the report by the U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, terming it completely groundless.

The Soviet spokesman stressed that there is no change in the Soviet position that Japan's territorial claim on the islands has no grounds from historical, international and legal viewpoints.

Japan claims the four northern islands east of Hokkaido—Etorofu, Habomais, Shikotan and Kunashiri—are Japanese territory by right.

The U.S. magazine in its "Washington Whispers" column said that in a secret message conveyed to Tokyo, Gorbachev "suggests for the first time that Moscow would be willing to make a deal that would return the Kuril Islands, seized by the Soviets at the end of World War II, to Japanese control."

"In exchange, Gorbachev asked that Tokyo commit to a long-range plan for investing billions of dollars annually to help rebuild the faltering Soviet economy," the magazine reported.

Japanese Prime Minister Election Outcome Noted

OW1108051489 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1010 GMT 10 Aug 89

[From the "World Today" program presented by Igor Kudrin]

[Text] Toshiki Kaifu, president of the Liberal Democratic Party, has become the 48th prime minister of Japan. He is 58. All observers predict that he will not have an easy life as prime minister. The reason for it is not only that Kaifu does not have enough political experience. All the facts concerning the way he was elected as head of the government indicate the complexity of the present political situation in the country.

Indeed, in the separate voting in the two houses of the Japanese parliament, for the first time in the past 40 years the views of the two houses differed on the question of who was to become the prime minister. In the lower house, Kaifu won a majority—294 out of the 512 votes. However, Doi, the leader of the Socialist Party, won in the upper house. According to the constitution, the one who wins in the lower house prevails.

The Japanese press notes that it was a humiliating victory for the Liberal Democrats. Observers write: They managed to push Kaifu through, but his party's position has been shaken in the eyes of the Japanese. They emphasize that Kaifu undermined his prestige even before becoming prime minister. All observers agree that from now on the upper house will be constantly vetoing documents adopted by the lower house. This opposition tactic will inevitably bring about new elections ahead of time.

In any event, Kaifu has already announced the composition of his cabinet after as little as a few hours after his election. For the first time, as many as two women have become members of the government. Through this move, the Liberal Democrats intend to win back the favor of women voters, many of whom rejected the ruling party after the revelation of the not very romantic affairs of former Prime Minister Uno.

Japanese Draft Military Budget Criticized
LD1108030289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1639 GMT 10 Aug 89

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Gennadiy Vedenyapin]

[Text] Reports from Tokyo say articles devoted to the draft military budget of that country for the financial year 1990 have appeared in the Japanese press. It was drawn up by the Japanese National Defense Agency and submitted to the government for consideration. This document makes provisions for an increase in military appropriations by 6.35 per cent in comparison with 1989. As stated by the YOMIURI SHIMBUN, if all the requests of the National Defense Agency are satisfied then yearly expenditures on Japan's military programs will exceed 4 trillion yen for the first time in the post-war period.

According to the rough drafts of the Japanese military department, a considerable part of this astronomical sum will be used to build up naval forces. Nor are the land-based troops and air force forgotten. I ask my colleague, commentator Boris Andrianov, to express his opinion on this matter.

[Andrianov] In my opinion, the Japanese draft military budget in question serves as one more confirmation that so-called creeping militarization is continuing in that country. You know, during recent years this has had highly tangible results: The military spending ceiling that for a long time has been restricted to 1 per cent of the gross national product has been broken. Active cooperation of Japanese and U.S. arms manufacturers has been arranged. Japan has joined Washington's strategic defense initiative program. The chauvinistic and nationalistic upbringing of the Japanese youth has been renewed. Even this far-from-complete list gives a picture of what course Japan is taking. Using the method of slow changes, its strategists have step by step approached their goal—to play a leading role in the international arena in the military field as well. That is the exact policy the Japanese generals are driving at. They are saying one should not worry about petty matters for the sake of fulfilling great tasks. And it is not by chance that Yamasaki, the head of the National Defense Agency, when meeting the leaders of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party, argued that without further growth of the budget appropriations it would be impossible to reach the goals set in the medium-term 5-year program for military construction, which ends in fiscal year 1990. Moreover, he claimed it was necessary for the improvement of the material and technical supply of the troops, especially to renew out-of-date military equipment.

Here, I think, it is apt to make clear that the main clauses of the program currently in force provide for the creation of Japanese military potential by the start of the 1990's that would allow it to independently to repulse a limited, small-scale attack. And for this reason, the strength of the ground force should be increased to 180,000, the Navy should be increased to 60 ships, and the Air Force to 430 aircraft. One should bear in mind that all these items of military hardware are of the latest design.

And it is quite natural that the question arises: Why in the situation of the cessation of the cold war and a turn of international events toward disarmament, is Japan continuing persistently to go against the tide by increasing military expenditures and the might of its armed forces? Not finding any weighty and convincing reasons to account for this bellicose policy—incompatible, by the way, with the peaceful clauses of the Japanese Constitution—the representatives of official Tokyo time and again camouflage their position. They state that Japan should steadily increase its defense capacity, while continuing to support and to use effectively the alliance with the United States to maintain security. They try to justify their calls for the strengthening of their military might by maintaining that the international situation remains complex and changeable, and the tension between East and West, and also global conflicts, still remain.

Moreover, special stress is put on the military situation around Japan allegedly remaining as tense as it was before, and they openly hint at some kind of growth in the Soviet threat. But this does not coincide with reality. Having unilaterally decided to reduce its armed forces by 500,000, the Soviet Union will decrease by 200,000 the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy in the eastern part of the country, and these numbers in the Far East will decrease by 120,000. A total of 16 warships will be removed from the Pacific Fleet, though in the period 1984-1989 this fleet was already been cut by 57 vessels. Even 5 years ago the Soviet Union stopped increasing its ground-based nuclear weapons in the East. For 3 years now it has not increased the number of delivery aircraft there. And finally, according to the treaty on medium- and short-range missiles, our country has eliminated all its missiles of these two classes in the Far East region.

Is it possible that in Tokyo they really can not see that positive changes taking place in the world create favorable conditions for improving the climate in the Asian-Pacific region as well; or do they simply not want to take any notice of this there, as they hatch plans that manifestly do not agree with the spirit of our time?

Soviet Fish Minister on Outcome of Japan Visit
OW1008223089 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 8 Aug 89

[Text] As has been reported, Fish Industry Minister Kotlyar wound up his official visit to Japan on 27 July. While staying in Japan, he met with International Trade and Industry Minister Mitsuzuka; Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Minister Horinouchi; and representatives of fisheries organizations. At the meeting, both he and Japanese Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Minister Horinouchi confirmed their intention to make efforts in

the future to expand cooperation between the two countries in the field of fisheries. He visited Tokyo, Niigata, and Murakami to inspect the aquaculturing farm and fisheries research institutes. In an interview with a Moscow Radio reporter after returning to Moscow, Fish Industry Minister Kotlyar said as follows:

[Kotlyar's recording begins in Russian and fades into Japanese] We paid great attention to the fact that fisheries organizations and fisheries research institutes expressed great interest in developing cooperation and building goodneighborly relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. I was deeply impressed with the efficient systemization of production in enterprises and the meticulous work of Japanese experts for resolving problems involving the issue of recycling fisheries resources. In addition, I want to indicate that the Japanese take an attitute of treasuring nature by taking protective and maintenance measures for it.

After explaining his impressions of Japan, Fish Industry Minister Kotlyar summed up the outcome of his official visit to Japan as follows: [Kotlyar's recording begins in Russian and fades into Japanese] I think that meetings held [word indistinct] in a friendly and working atmosphere in Japan will serve to deepen mutual understanding and this will become an indispensable basis for developing mutually beneficial cooperation between the Soviet Union and Japan in the area of fisheries. I think that the prospects for this cooperation are very bright.

Mongolian Defense Head on Relaxing Asia Tension

PM1008123589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Aug 89 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Mongolian Defense Minister Colonel General J. Yondon by unnamed TASS correspondent: "Victory at Halhaiin Gol"—date and place of interview not specified; first paragraph is introduction]

[Excerpts] This year marks the 50th anniversary of the military operations around the Halhaiin Gol River. On the threshold of this date a TASS correspondent conducted an interview with Mongolian Defense Minister Colonel General J. Yondon at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA'S request. [Passage omitted]

[Correspondent] In your opinion, what is the significance of the socialist countries' recent practical steps to relax tension in the Asia-Pacific region?

[Yondon] I must say that people in Mongolia fully approve of the steps that the Soviet Union is taking to strengthen peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The accords on reductions in the number of troops in the Soviet-Chinese border regions, the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolian territory, and the readiness to withdraw them completely in the future by agreement with the Mongolian Government are of particular importance.

Like other socialist countries, Mongolia is reducing its armed forces in accordance with its defensive military doctrine. It recently adopted a decision on a 13,000-man reduction in army personnel. Eighteen combat aircraft have been removed from the arsenal and 1,000 motor vehicles, 60 tanks, and 30 armored personnel carriers are to be transferred to the national economy after retooling. The Mongolian people welcome these steps. We believe that they are in full accord with the spirit of the time and the positive changes taking place in the world.

We hope that other countries in the region will assess the joint peace-loving actions taken by the USSR and Mongolia in a fitting fashion. They are making a real contribution to creating a situation of stability on the planet, notably the Asia-Pacific region, and are making it possible to dismiss forever the possibility of a repetition of the events of 50 years ago on the Halhaiin Gol River.

Near East & South Asia

Shell Hits Soviet Cultural Center in Beirut

LD1108095789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] A shell hit the roof of the Soviet cultural center in Beirut during artillery fire yesterday and exploded. The living quarters of the building suffered considerable material damage. Fragments of the mortar shell blew out the windows of the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Embassy Club in Lebanon. There were no casualties.

Analyst Interviewed on Resumed Iran-U.S. Relations

NC1008230089 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Interview with analyst Yuriy Andreyev by studio announcer; Andreyev's recorded answers are in Russian, fading into Persian translation]

[Text] Recently many reports were published in the world press about the resumption of Iranian-U.S. relations. We asked Yuriy Andreyev to comment on these reports in more detail.

[Andreyev] Dear listeners, for the first time reports on so-called secret talks between Iran and the United States appeared in Kuwait's AL-SIYASAH. Following this, similar reports were carried by many Western news agencies, too. Tehran denied these reports immediately. The TEHRAN TIMES, which reflects the views of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, described these reports as completely false and baseless.

Nevertheless, State Department Representative Mrs Margaret Tutweiler stated that the White House is preserving its ties with Iran through various means.

[Announcer] What correspondence took place between 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and George Bush?

[Andreyev] This is a complicated story. Some days ago the Iranian Foreign Ministry's official representative stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran refused to receive George Bush's message sent through a third country. This message concerned the Lebanese incidents. Tehran announced that it has nothing to do with these incidents. According to the TEHRAN TIMES Bush asked Iran to prevent the killing of western hostages in Lebanon. At the same time, London's SUNDAY TIMES and the U.S. CBC [as heard] television network reported that Iranian President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani has sent a confidential message to the U.S. President in which he has expressed his aversion over the murder of U.S. Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins. [word indistinct] the representative of the Iranian president's press office described this statement as completely false and confirmed that Iran's policy on the United States has not changed and that Iran will continue Imam Khomeyni's policy very persistently.

[Announcer] Can one speak of some changes in the U.S. Administration's policy on Iran?

[Andreyev] I think not. Actually, Washington has not stopped its hostile campaign against Iran's revolution. The United States has tried to intervene in Iran's domestic affairs several times. It continues economic sanctions against Tehran, and it is trying to harm the Iranian Government's prestige in the world. For many years the U.S. press has been carrying out an obstinate propaganda war against the Islamic Republic of Iran. This propaganda propagates the West's hypocritic stands and its values and principles. An example of these values was seen specifically last year, when the U.S. fighter downed Iran's passenger plane in the Persian Gulf and the White House did not even deem it necessary to apologize officially to Iran.

Meanwhile, Tehran is prepared to normalize its relations with the United States. But Iran is propounding its conditions—conditions which should be accepted by the United States before the first step is taken toward the normalization of Iranian-U.S. relations. Obviously the nature of these relations will never be like those that existed with the past regime. However, Washington does not show any sign of understanding this.

[Announcer] Dear friends, you heard the commentary by our analyst Yuriy Andreyev.

Iranian Budget Priorities Analyzed

NC1108123489 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary]

[Excerpts] Esteemed listeners: On 9 August, Majid Qasemi, the governor of the Central Bank of Iran, briefed reporters on the structure of the country's budget allocations for the current fiscal year. Our commentator Yuriy Andreyev writes:

Iranian spiritual leader Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i had stated a while ago that Iran is not fighting a war with arms but is combating economic difficulties. This statement clearly indicates the present economic condition of the Islamic Republic. Today, 10 years after the fall of the monarchical regime and a year after the announcement of a cease-fire, Iran is in the throes of massive inflation, a spiraling cost of living, and rapidly mounting unemployment. [passage omitted]

Majid Qasemi said that in the current fiscal year, the government has allocated $4.8 billion, which represents 50 percent of the country's total revenues, for importing foodstuffs and consumer goods. Qasemi mentioned that this was decided with the concurrence of Iran's new president, 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and is in fulfillment of his promise to ameliorate the life of the people after the devastating 8-year war. Thus, we can expect that large stocks of Australian meat and Pakistani rice and other foodstuffs which will be imported from abroad will fill Iranian stores. In this regard, it is necessary to recall that at present the shortage of foodstuffs in your country stands at 30 percent. It should also be noted, however, that although there are 16 (?million) hectares of land which can be utilized for agricultural production in Iran, only 6 million to 7 million hectares are actually under cultivation. The Iranian government had earlier announced that it wished to take measures so that Iran could become self-sufficient in the production of meat, milk, rice and wheat. However, the figures for import of foodstuffs made public by the governor of the Central Bank of Iran indicate that this will not occur in the near future. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile, according to experts' figures, Iran's military expenditure for the current year will reach $7 billion, which represents 70 percent of Iran's oil income. [passage omitted]

In general, the structure of the government budget announced is not unexpected. In any case, it is necessary to mention that the Iranian government has allocated a larger amount for meeting the common needs of the people than it has done in the past. Dear listeners, we hope that the priorities established in your country's new budget will achieve the economic objectives set by Iran's leadership for the future.

Soviet Official Meets Afghan Politburo Member

PM1008101989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 4 August A.A. Ananyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, met with N. Kawiani, member of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Central Committee Politburo.

Katushev Receives Afghan Deputy Premier
PM0908093789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Talks were held 1 August between K.F. Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations, and an Afghan delegation headed by S. Mangal, Afghan deputy prime minister, which is in Moscow.

Questions of the further development of Soviet-Afghan economic and trade cooperation were discussed.

No Early Prospect of Afghan Peace
PM0908101589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Aug 89 Second Edition p 4

[Lieutenant General V. Perov article: "Will Peace Dawn Over the Afghan Land"—first paragraph published in boldface]

[Text] The topic of Afghanistan continues to occupy a central position in the chain of current military-political events in the world. It constantly appears as a lead item in news agency reports and is commented on in the world press. It also appears on the agenda of many international forums, meetings, and talks at different levels.

Events in Afghanistan remain acutely perturbing. Blood is still being shed in that country, and as yet it is hard to tell when peace will actually dawn over the Afghan land. However, it is well known why it has not yet dawned and who is sustaining the flames of war there.

It is worth recalling that the Soviet Union was being accused of prolonging the Afghan war just 6 months ago. But there has not been a single Soviet soldier on the friendly country's territory since 15 February. Nonetheless, the process of cranking up the armed aggression against the republic has been going on throughout this time. The republic's authorities are independently and totally successfully repulsing armed onslaughts by the counterrevolution and striking tangible blows against it. The myth of the might of the insurgent forces and the Afghan Army's inability to uphold the revolutionary gains has been dispelled. But the military situation in and around Afghanistan still remains acute and dangerous.

It is well known that the return home of the Soviet troops was preceded by lengthy and hard diplomatic work, as a result of which the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan were prepared and signed. The Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan fully kept their part of the pledges. But the other parties to the agreements—the United States and Pakistan—not only failed to cease their support for the insurgents and their direct interference in the republic's affairs, they actually expanded their scale.

The Geneva agreements came into force 15 May 1988. More than a year has passed since then. Summing up the results of the development of the military-political situation in and around the Republic of Afghanistan during the period in question, you can see how openly and flagrantly the Islamabad authorities and the Washington administration are ignoring their pledges. Outright sabotage by Islamabad and Washington is the main cause of the continuation of the fratricidal war on the land of long-suffering Afghanistan.

So what is the real state of affairs in and around the republic now?

It must be said at the very beginning that there has been no curtailment of the scale of actions by antigovernment forces, both those belonging to the well known "Alliance of Seven" and insurgents from the so-called "Alliance of Eight" representing pro-Iranian Shi'ite groupings. Suffice it to say that the armed grouping of counterrevolutionary forces on Afghan territory numbers between 170,000 and 180,000 men, which is considerably more than in the corresponding period of last year. Each day tens and hundreds of Afghan civilians are killed or maimed as a result of bombardments or sabotage. Damage is still being inflicted upon the country's economy, which is already extremely debilitated. On average, 30-35 detachments and insurgent groups, numbering between 1,200 and 1,500 men, are moved onto the republic's territory every week. Major shipments of weapons and ammunition are delivered with Pakistan's assistance and direct participation.

The counterrevolution's main goals remain unchanged—armed overthrow of the present Afghan Government, elimination of the republican system, and restoration in Afghanistan of feudal customs mixed with the Islamic extremism of counterrevolutionary ringleaders like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, 'Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and others.

At this stage, the targets of the concentration of antigovernment forces' main efforts are the Republic of Afghanistan's capital Kabul, the provincial centers of Jalalabad, Qandahar, and Herat, Khowst, center of the district of that name, and the land communications linking the capital with provincial centers in the republic's southeast, south, west, and north.

The tensest military situation in the last few months has been in Southeast Afghanistan, where insurgents have made a series of attempts to capture the cities of Jalalabad and Khowst, and along the Hayraton-Kabul and Kabul-Jalalabad communications links. The capture of these cities by the counterrevolution would have dealt it a hand containing major military and political trumps. On the military side, this would heave meant creating

favorable starting positions for a strike against Kabul. On the political side, it would have offered an opportunity to transfer to Afghan territory the seat of the so-called "transitional government," which has been stuck in Peshawar for 6 months now and confirms its puppet character with each day it spends on Pakistani territory.

The conduct and nature of the combat actions near Jalalabad and Khowst were reported at length by both the Soviet and foreign press. This is where the front line of the country's defense now runs. Jalalabad became the arena where the Republic of Afghanistan Armed Forces and the counterrevolution tested their combat capability. The outcome of the many months of struggle for this strategic center proved lamentable for the insurgents. They not only failed to fulfill the task of swiftly capturing it, as set by their leadership, but actually suffered a tangible defeat.

The military situation remains complex and tense in other regions in the republic. The counterrevolution has not abandoned its intention of capturing Kabul. It has deployed a large number of armed insurgent detachments along the approaches to the capital and is building up stocks of arms and ammunition.

The situation remains equally tense around Qandahar, one of Afghanistan's important political-administrative and historical centers. Together with Jalalabad, this city also attracts the attention of the "Alliance of Seven" as a possible seat for the counterrevolution's "transitional government."

The defenders of Herat, Gardeyz, Ghazni, Shindand, Feyzabad, and other important centers in the country are in a tense situation. Insurgent activeness along communications lines is showing no decline. The republic's government is forced to divert sizable forces to protect and defend them.

The last few weeks have seen intensified activity by the counterrevolution, which is regrouping its forces, has stepped up the movement of arms and ammunition to Afghan territory, and has intensified its shelling of cities and its sabotage and terrorist actions. All this is directly associated with the counterrevolution's military failures near Jalalabad and, generally, with the antigovernment forces' lack of major military successes since the departure of Soviet troops. The "Alliance of Seven" leaders, mindful of what was for them the unfavorable world reaction to the battle for Jalalabad and also feeling pressured by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries, are clearly in a hurry to demonstrate their ability to continue the struggle against the Afghan Government. This is being done not only to ensure continued political support and military assistance from their patrons, but also to restore the shaken faith of rank and file insurgents and the so-called field commanders in the insurgency's prospects.

Thus the situation in the Republic of Afghanistan may become tenser still in the immediate future. This will mean more victims among the civilian population and more destruction. And all this for the sake of the ambitions of the counterrevolution's ringleaders and the interests of those in the West and the Muslim world who determine their policy. In these conditions, there are no grounds to expect an early peace in Afghanistan.

The Afghan counterrevolution based on Pakistani territory now enjoys the same, if not greater, freedom of action as it did before. Not a single one of the more than 180 centers and stations for the military training of insurgents has been closed down. What is more, new ones have appeared. Weapons for the counterrevolution continue to be channeled through Pakistani territory. Since 15 February this year, bandit formations operating on the republic's territory have received through Pakistan about 400 rocket launchers, more than 530 field artillery guns and mortars, up to 300 recoilless rifles, 140 portable antiaircraft missile launchers, about 700 Degtyarev-Shpagin heavy machineguns [pulemety DSHK], and 900 hand-held antitank grenade launchers. A large quantity of rockets, mortar shells, and bullets has been supplied. About 400,000 rockets have been delivered for the shelling of civilian cities alone.

We are learning of more and more instances of direct participation by Pakistani militia and servicemen, U.S. advisers, and mercenaries from a number of Muslim states in combat operations on the territory of the Republic of Afghanistan; the total number of these people presently exceeds 2,100. Using funds received from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other states, the "Alliance of Seven" is recruiting mercenaries in a number of Arab countries. There is an Arab mercenary center on Pakistani territory which forms and sends to Afghanistan combat groups notable for their special cruelty. This was specifically described to foreign correspondents at a 14 July press conference in Kabul by Egyptian mercenary Husam al-Din Mahmud, who was captured near Jalalabad.

A mass of other examples can be cited to prove that interference by Pakistan, the United States, and other countries in the affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan is now on an unprecedented scale. Let us look no further than the efforts made by Peter Tomsen, U.S. special envoy to the "transitional government" of the "Alliance of Seven," who, obviously embellishing the mujahidin's position, is making his administration and the U.S. taxpayers "fork out" more and more dollars in subsidies to satisfy the needs of those who continue to bring death and suffering to the Afghan people. Islamabad's actions appear no better, and its statements about Pakistan's desire for a political settlement of the Afghan problem are clearly at odds with reality. A number of recent statements by sober-minded Pakistani politicians bluntly point out that the policy of Pakistan's present leadership on the Afghan question hardly differs from the policy of former President Ziaul Haq. The de facto

hardening of Pakistan's policy on the Afghan question shows that the new Pakistani leadership is not free to choose its own policy on Afghan affairs.

Presumably the recent events in and around Afghanistan must make the U.S. Administration assess the situation more soberly. The longer the armed interference in the affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan continues, the greater the losses suffered by the Afghan people, the people about whom Washington, Islamabad, and some other capitals are ostensibly so "concerned," will be. The sooner this is realized by the patrons of the Afghan antigovernment forces, the more swiftly it will be possible to establish peace in Afghanistan.

Soviet-Israeli Medical Project Reported
LD1008213289 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1057 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Kiev, 10 Aug (TASS)—TASS correspondent Dmitriy Kiyanskiy reports:

A Soviet-Israeli project to produce medical apparatus should start work in the near future in Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine. Andrey Serdyuk, the republic's deputy health minister, reported, an accord on this was realized among the leadership of the ministry; David Short, representing the Israeli corporation Elsant; and some Kiev defense industry enterprises, which are being converted to produce goods for popular consumption.

The accord envisions the manufacture of a modern diagnostic system, based on the principle of ultrasound echo ranging [ultrazvokovaya ekholokatsiya]. Andrey Serdyuk said that these instruments were completely effective in the diagnosis of disturbances in the functions of internal organs, above all of the cardiovascular system and of the organs in the abdominal cavity. The method of examination is harmless, which is especially important in cases such as the inspection of the fetus in pregnant women.

Unfortunately, there are not enough such instruments in the USSR, the deputy minister emphasized. It is high quality systems such as those produced by the firm Elsant which are especially lacking. It is supposed that a future joint enterprise will be an assembly plant. Parts for the ultrasound diagnostic systems will arrive here from abroad. The output will go on to both the domestic and the foreign market.

Indian Envoy's Presentation of Credentials Noted
PM1108093189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Aug 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Presentation of Credentials"]

[Text] On 8 August in the Kremlin A.S. Gonsalves, Indian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, presented his credentials to A.I. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

In his speech at the presentation A.S. Gonsalves pointed out that Indian-Soviet cooperation has a long and favorable history. He stressed that people in India value highly the Soviet Union's invariable aid and assistance in the development of various sectors of the economy. The Treaty on Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation is a vitally important element in relations between the two countries. Relying on similarity of views on a number of important problems and common ideals, the two states work constructively together in the international arena for the sake of ensuring peace, disarmament, and development. People in India, as in the Soviet Union, share the conviction of the senselessness of war and the need to destroy nuclear weapons and transfer resources from arms to development purposes. This imparts a truly global character to Soviet-Indian relations. The close personal ties and profound mutual understanding between our countries' leaders also considerably help strengthen these relations. In this connection A.S. Gonsalves underlined the significance of the recent Soviet-Indian summit in Moscow as another important landmark on this path. The ambassador noted particularly that people in India are following the historic process of perestroyka and democratization attentively and with admiration and are aware of its significance for the cause of bilateral cooperation.

Receiving the credentials on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A.I. Lukyanov emphasized that a great deal that is characteristic of the new thinking in world politics appeared for the first time in Soviet-Indian relations. Both sides are steadily making efforts to eliminate the nuclear threat to mankind and establish the principles of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world. Soviet and Indian mutual adherence to the new approaches in international relations took a visible form in the Delhi Declaration adopted by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi in 1986. Soviet-Indian relations, which were founded from the very outset on trust, equality, mutual respect, and consideration for one another's interests, are a graphic illustration that relations can and must be established between states with different social systems in the modern era.

Soviet-Indian cooperation has become a constant constructive factor of tremendous international significance in which one can see the beginnings of an international system where peaceful coexistence and amicable mutually beneficial cooperation will be the universal norm in international life.

Pointing out the dynamic character of the development of bilateral ties in the sphere of trade, the economy, science, technology, and culture, A.I. Lukyanov stressed that despite the successes in various spheres of cooperation, we cannot rest on our laurels. The results of M.S. Gorbachev's recent meeting with Indian Prime Minister R. Gandhi in Moscow illustrate that both sides are full of determination to continue strengthening their cooperation on the basis of the 1971 treaty and the Delhi Declaration.

After the presentation of the credentials A.I. Lukyanov and A.S. Gonsalves had a warm and friendly conversation.

Polisario Founding Member Returns to Morocco

LD0908234389 Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 9 Aug 89

[Excerpt] Mr (Amor Hadhrami), a founding member of the Polisario, arrived here today, 9 August 1989, coming from Washington via New York, where he represented the Polisario in North America.

Mr (Amor Hadhrami) told MAP [Maghreb Arab Press] on his arrival at Casablanca Airport this morning that his return to Morocco comes as a response to the call by His Majesty King Hasan to the misled Saharans in his speech on 6 November 1988 on the 13th anniversary of the Green March. [passage omitted]

Gorbachev Congratulates 'Arafat on Birthday

PM1008123789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Aug 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Congratulations to Y. 'Arafat"]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev has sent congratulations to Y. 'Arafat on his 60th birthday. They were conveyed by the USSR's ambassador in Tunis.

East Europe

Solidarity Tries To Split Polish Coalition

LD1008224889 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2047 GMT 10 Aug 89

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Dmitriy Morozov]

[Text] The Polish United Workers' Party [PZPR] parliamentary floor group noted at a Wednesday [9 August] meeting that recently the political situation in Poland has become more complex. The opposition is striving to take power slowly, and not during parliamentary elections. Moreover, Solidarity, whose representatives possess more than one-third of the seats in the Senate, are trying to split the PZPR from its allies, the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party, and if this were to happen a government would be set up without the participation of the PZPR. Correspondents report that the proposals of opposition leader Lech Walesa amount to precisely this. At the same time the PZPR's allies are not rejecting the proposal of President Wojciech Jaruzelski and Premier Czeslaw Kiszczak to form a government with the participation of all political forces in order to resolve the problems which have come about as soon as possible.

Polish Opposition 'Contradicts' Democracy

LD1108015889 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1639 GMT 10 Aug 89

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Gennadiy Vedenyapin]

[Text] In Poland, Kiszczak, chairman of the Council of Ministers, continues his consultations with a view to forming a cabinet. The parliamentary floor group of the Polish United Workers' Party [PZPR] noted at its session that lately the political situation had become particularly complex in the country. This was principally a consequence of the state of the economy and the market, which are causing concern.

The PZPR deputies noted a change in the strategy of the opposition, which, as is known, is insisting on the creation of a government without its participation. Thus, the members of the opposition are now striving to take power immediately, rather than at the next parliamentary elections. Moreover, one of the elements of its tactics is an attempt to smash the present coalition.

The statements by the opposition contradict the principles of parliamentary democracy that exist in all countries. After all, Kiszczak was appointed to this position by sovereign decision of parliament, and until the results of his endeavors to form a government are known, such moves are inappropriate, to say the least.

Problems With Polish Food Prices Foreseen

PM0908125589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS correspondent A. Pershin dispatch specially for IZVESTIYA: "Poland: Life With Market Prices"]

[Text] Warsaw—The line in front of the meat store near my house on Warsaw's Grojecka Street disappeared on Tuesday morning. A rare event, by Polish standards: For in the last few days when the shelves in food stores were gapingly empty, lines for meat formed during the night.

Literally the day before parliamentary Deputy Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the "Solidarity" trade union press spokesman, made the following complaint during a conversation in the Sejm lobby: He and his wife have no free time, there are four children in the family, so they have to ask a neighbor, an elderly, sick woman, to stand in line for meat. All their hopes are pinned on her... Millions of Poles, not only Sejm deputies—who, incidentally, receive quite a good material allowance as parliamentarians—but also ordinary citizens have found themselves in Onyszkiewicz' position.

The reason for the metamorphosis at the doors of the meat store on Grojecka Street is easy to divine: free market prices for meat and many other types of food.

The state guarantees former prices for milk with 2 percent fat content, skimmed curds, children's dairy products, and one of the most widespread forms of bread.

Thus, the first step has been taken toward transferring the country's food complex to a market basis. This means the abolition of ration cards and the introduction of free prices, which should rectify the food supply and eliminate the vast subsidies from the state budget in the future.

A visit to a nearby general store where many shelves are gapingly empty—the people of Warsaw stocked up with goods in advance in expectation of price increases—indicates that prices have not merely jumped but soared upwards. For instance, the price of croissants has risen from Z10 to Z25, while a 250g plastic packet of kefir has risen from Z22 to Z70. State prices in meat stores have become comparable to market prices: Prices for frankfurters and medium sausage have risen from Z390 to Z1,470 and from Z700 to Z2,400 respectively. We have never seen such gloomy faces before as we see today in Warsaw's meat stores.

The huge price rise will be compensated for with the budget funds that were allocated for subsidies. This will be done in the form of compensation—wage increases and the introduction of indexing, that is, regular wage increases in proportion to price rises. The Sejm adopted a law on indexing on Monday.

It provides for quarterly wage increases of 80 percent of the increase in prices. This step is in line with the accords secured at the "roundtable" and will help maintain the population's living standard in conditions of constant price rises and inflation. None of the parliamentarians harbored any illusions that the new law would resolve all the acute social problems that have arisen in connection with the shift to market prices. However, the idea was that adopting a law on indexing, albeit imperfect, is a lesser evil than preserving the current crisis situation in conditions of an increase in social tension, which is inevitable during the introduction of the new market mechanism.

The introduction of free market prices for food is a double-edged operation that may provoke unforeseeable social consequences at first. Many parliamentarians pointed to this during the Sejm debates, criticizing individual elements in the government program for transferring the food complex to market mechanisms. However, the alternative would be even blacker—the disintegration of agriculture and empty shelves in the stores.

Walesa Rejects 'One-Party Monopoly'

PM1108085989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Aug 89 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Consultations Continue"]

[Text] Warsaw, 8 Aug—Czeslaw Kiszczak, chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers, is continuing consultations with a view to forming the country's new government.

Proposing to create a "grand coalition" government involving the country's main political forces represented in the Sejm, C. Kiszczak had meetings and conversations with the leaders of the United Peasant Party [ZSL], the Democratic Party [SD], secular Catholic and Christian societies, and other people.

He also had meetings with leaders of the citizens' parliamentary club which represents Sejm and Senate deputies elected on the "Solidarity" ticket. After these conversations, Lech Walesa, chairman of the "Solidarity" trade union, published a statement in which he once again categorically objected to C. Kiszczak forming a new government. He justified this by referring to the fact that the decisions adopted by the authorities on the question of appointing a new chairman of the Council of Ministers point to the preservation of the one-party monopoly on power which has existed for the last 45 years. The "Solidarity" leader claimed that this, in conjunction with the socioeconomic system which arose under this monopoly, is the reason for the profound economic, political, and moral crisis in the country.

L. Walesa considers the only political solution to be the creation of a Council of Ministers based on a coalition between "Solidarity," the ZSL, and the SD, which he intends to strive to achieve.

Polish Food Price Hikes Spark Strikes

PM1008135589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Aug 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS dispatch: "Conflicts Continue"]

[Text] Warsaw 7 Aug—There is continuing social tension in Poland. It has intensified as a result of the food price increases after the introduction of market mechanisms in the sphere of foodstuffs as of 1 August. There are reports every day of labor conflicts in support of demands to increase pay because of the increasingly high prices.

The signing of an agreement between the management and the strike committee on Sunday ended the post office, telegraph, and telephone workers' strike in Legnica Voivodship which had been going on for 3 days. Some of the strikers' economic demands which can only be met at government level will be examined later.

Workers in the truck plant in Starachowice have ended their strike action. This was after their demands for pay increases were met.

The situation remains tense in the country's railroad transport enterprises. Workers are carrying out protest action, demanding that rates of pay be revised and other demands met. In connection with the fact that no agreement was reached during talks with the management, railroad traffic was stopped for an hour on Saturday in areas of the Silesian and Lower Silesian departments of the Polish railroad, and repair work on rolling stock was also broken off in the depot and shops. Flags and banners bearing the demands of the railroad workers were put up in a number of stations and the lists of demands were broadcast over the radio. If the demands are not met, more widespread strike action is threatened.

Rakowski Cited on Polish Worker Party Tasks

PM0808102989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Aug 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "M. Rakowski Speech"]

[Text] Warsaw, 5 Aug—The meeting between first secretaries of the voivodship party organizations and the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Central Committee Secretariat which has ended in Warsaw was devoted to the PZPR's tasks under the present complex sociopolitical decisions and to the program for implementing the decisions of the 13th PZPR Central Committee Plenum.

Addressing the meeting, M. Rakowski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, stressed that in the immediate future the party must focus attention in its activity on preparation for the next, 11th, congress and for the forthcoming parliamentary elections. The congress must strengthen the party for a successful struggle to restore its influence in society and to win society's trust and support, he stressed. After all, the PZPR, which is the true vanguard of the changes taking place in the country, is not accepted in this role by the country's population. It is essential to change this idea about it and to rid ourselves of the "guilt complex" for the results of the past 45 years.

Speaking of their attitude toward the opposition, the PZPR Central Committee first secretary urged the party aktiv and members to strengthen faith in their strength and to increase the assertiveness and effectiveness of their activity.

Polish Leaders Thank Leaders for Greetings

PM1008121189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Aug 89 Second Edition p 1

[Polish leaders' message thanking Soviet leaders for Polish national day greetings]

[Text] To Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet

To Comrade Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers

Esteemed Comrades!

Personally and on behalf of the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee, the Polish People's Republic Council of Ministers, and the Polish people we express cordial gratitude to the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the USSR Council of Ministers, and also the entire Soviet people for the congratulations and wishes sent on the occasion of our national holiday—the 45th anniversary of Poland's rebirth.

We perceived with special satisfaction your assessment of the changes taking place in our country, as well as your understanding of the complexity of the political and socioeconomic problems being resolved by the Polish people.

We are profoundly convinced that the all-around allied bonds of friendship and cooperation between our countries, which have acquired a qualitatively new nature in recent years, will continue to develop successfully for the good of both peoples, in the interests of the socialist community and of peace in Europe and throughout the world.

For our part we send you, as well as the entire Soviet people, our very best congratulations and wishes for success in realizing the program of perestroyka in all spheres of the USSR's socioeconomic life.

[Signed] Wojciech Jaruzelski
Mieczyslaw Rakowski

Shalayev Meets Polish Official Trade Union Head

18070725 Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Aug 89 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Meeting in Moscow"]

[Text] On 1 August of this year the chairman of the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], S.A. Shalayev, met with the chairman of the National Trade-Union Federation [of Poland] A. Miodowicz, who was in the Soviet Union by invitation from the AUCCTU.

During the course of the discussion, which took place in an atmosphere of fraternal friendship, candor, and complete mutual understanding, there was an exchange of opinions on crucial issues in the activity of trade unions of the USSR and Poland under conditions of perestroyka and socialist renewal. They discussed the prospects for further deepening and improvement of ties and cooperation between trade unions and workers of the two countries and also certain problems of the international trade union movement.

Poland Decides To Introduce Market Forces
18070344 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 1 Aug 89 p 3

[TASS report datelined Warsaw, 31 July: "Let the Market Principle Work"]

[Text] The Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland has made important decisions in conjunction with introducing market principles in the sphere of production and supply of foodstuffs. As the press bureau of the government has communicated, all restrictions on purchasing and selling agricultural products are canceled. Procurement of these products may now be performed by economic units of all economic sectors involved in their processing and sales. This should bring about the development of healthy competition among the producers, increased efficiency of utilizing agricultural raw materials, reduced losses, and should ensure the profitability of farms, which the peasantry has long been trying to secure.

Effective 1 August, rationing of the sales of meat and meat products is canceled. From now on, they can be purchased without ration cards. At the same time, administrative methods of setting prices are eliminated. State prices remain in effect only for milk with 2-percent fat content, milk formulas for nursing infants, non-fat grades of cottage cheese and the most common kind of bread. Prices for other foodstuffs will be set by retail enterprises depending on the market situation.

Taking into account the fact that the cancellation of rationing and the introduction of free price-setting may bring about substantial price increases, in particular for meat and meat products, compensatory payments with salaries, pensions, and benefits are envisaged.

The resolution also provides for various credit and other preferences giving incentives to enterprises producing foodstuffs.

As the communique stresses, the measures taken represent the beginning of a process of restructuring the food industry profoundly, ensuring a rational goods-and-money mechanism, and adjusting supply and demand taking emerging trends into account. This paves the way for normalizing the situation in a vitally important sphere of the economy.

Hungarian Worker's Party Plenum Reported
PM0808111389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jul 89 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Path of Renewal"]

[Text] Budapest, 30 Jul—The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Central Committee welcomes socialist countries' desire to continue their active foreign policy based on the new political thinking. This is stressed in the information report isued here on the 28 July MSZMP Central Committee Plenum. It points out that the MSZMP Central Committee received with approval the results of the Bucharest conference of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee. In this regard the plenum expresses its conviction that the maintenance of peace and security and the international influence of socialist countries depend in many respects on the renewal of socialism.

The MSZMP Central Committee approved the results of MSZMP leaders' working visit to Moscow and noted that the MSZMP and the CPSU identically assess the main questions concerning the renewal of socialism. Hungary has an interest in the successful continuation of perestroyka. The fact that the CPSU regards with understanding the MSZMP's aspirations and supports them is of great significance. The Central Committee considers it important to continue the effective and intensive exchange of experience between the CPSU and the MSZMP as part of their close collaboration.

The plenum examined the question of preparations for the upcoming MSZMP congress. A decision was adopted to convene the congress on 6 October 1989. The MSZMP Central Committee proposes that the congress discuss the political situation, party tasks, and the MSZMP's program statement and statutes and elect leading party organs.

Shcherbitskiy Receives Croatian Delegation
PM0808114589 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 11 Jul 89 p 1

[RATAU report: "Meeting in Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] Yesterday, 10 July, V.V. Shcherbitskiy, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, received a delegation from the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Croatia headed by A. Runjic, president of the assembly, which has come to the Ukraine on an official visit at the invitation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet.

During the talk which took place V.V. Shcherbitskiy described the dynamics of the processes of perestroyka and the renewal of social life which are taking place in the republic and dwelled on the results of the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the tasks of the transition to the second stage of the reform of the political system. He paid attention to the work which is being done in the republic on preparation for the election of the people's deputies of the Ukrainian SSR and the local soviets and on the implementation of the party's social and nationalities policy. A. Runjic described the program put forward by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia for the renewal of socialism in the country and the conditions under which the economic reform and the reform of the political system and the party are

being implemented. There was an exchange of opinions on the prospects of collaboration between the Ukrainian SSR and the Socialist Republic of Croatia in various fields.

V.S. Shevchenko, member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; A.V. Merkulov, chief of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee foreign relations department; M. Veres, Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR, and members of the delegation from the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Croatia took part in the conversation.

The meeting took place in a warm, comradely atmosphere.

West Europe

Finnish Premier Has Talks With Estonian Leader

LD0408213189 Helsinki International Service in Finnish 1500 GMT 4 Aug 89

[Excerpts] Estonia hopes Finland will increase its consular services in Tallinn. Estonian Premier Indrek Toome, who is holidaying in Finland, has had unofficial discussions on the backlog of consular matters with Premier Harri Holkeri. Premier Toome regards as the autumn's most important event in Estonia the expected parliamentary elections which, Toome believes, will be completely free and democratic. [passage omitted]

Today the Estonian and Finnish premiers, who are both on holiday, had an unofficial meeting at lunch. A little earlier Premier Toome had an unofficial discussion with Minister Christoffer Taxell, who is now acting as the premier's deputy. Toome expressed to Premier Harri Holkeri the wish that Finland would improve slightly the operation in Tallinn of the Leningrad general consulate. Toome assured him that Estonian interest in Finland is great and therefore, in his view, it would be necessary to obtain consular services more easily than at present, without standing in line.

Last week the Soviet parliament took a preliminary decision to allow Estonia to have extensive economic self-determination. During the autumn several new economic laws will be drawn up in Estonia, including an enterprise law, a tax law, and a banking law. Also in the autumn local administration and election law will be reformed. It is expected that at the end of the year elections for the Estonian parliament, or Supreme Soviet, will be held on the basis of the new election law. Premier Toome gave assurances that the draft election law currently under preparation shows that these elections will be completely free and democratic.

However, the development of Estonia depends largely on the development of perestroyka in the Soviet Union. Premier Toome believes that perestroyka will progress.

[Begin Toome recording in Finnish] In my view, perestroyka will develop, without doubt, because perestroyka is a healthy baby. [end recording]

Petrovskiy, Austria's Klestil Meet for Talks

AU0508184689 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 5 Aug 89 p 3

[APA report: "Klestil Met Petrovskiy"]

[Text] Salzburg—USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy and Thomas Klestil, general secretary in the Foreign Ministry, met for bilateral talks at the periphery of the International Diplomatic Seminar in Salzburg.

Petrovskiy told the AUSTRIAN PRESS AGENCY that his exchange of opinions with Klestil on Friday [4 August] was "very satisfactory." They broached a number of international and bilateral questions but did not discuss the question of Austria's desire to join the EC. "Our attitude in this respect is well known," Petrovskiy replied when asked about this issue.

Gorbachev Message to Friendship Festival Published

PM1108094589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 1

[M. Gorbachev greetings message to Seventh USSR and Finnish Youth Friendship Festival]

[Text] To the Seventh USSR and Finnish Youth Friendship Festival

Dear Friends!

I welcome you, representatives of the Finnish younger generation, to the Soviet Union.

Young people are called upon to—and I am sure, will constantly—renew and enrich Soviet-Finnish cooperation, whose historic basis is the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid. Former generations created an original and firm structure for our collaboration. It has stood the test of time. And the main thing in it is confidence. You young people have to preserve our joint asset and fill it with new ideas and deeds.

The future of our countries and our entire continent, and concern to ensure that it becomes a truly common home are in your energetic hands. Soviet-Finnish youth cooperation is a natural and necessary element in the European process. You will have to build a nonnuclear, nonviolent, and ecologically pure world where the security of each individual is a condition for the security of all and where there will be no room for a policy of force or militarism. You will have to create a free and humane community of peoples and states—a common European space for people's creative activity.

The fate of the world is in your hands. Most likely you will have to resolve far more complex and probably more interesting tasks in the next century. Prepare for this, prepare together. I am sure you will cope.

I wish your festival success. May it also serve to develop contacts, friendship, and good-neighborliness between our peoples!
[Signed] M. Gorbachev

Latin America & Caribbean

Shevardnadze Applauds Tela Accords

LD1008193489 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1416 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—An IZVESTIYA correspondent has asked Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to comment on the results of a recent meeting of five Central American presidents.

Follows Shevardnadze's reply:

For many years the world has followed closely the situation in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala.

There have always been enough problems in that region, mostly due to economic backwardness, social injustices, political instability and use of force to suppress popular discontent.

In different forms, struggles were underway in those countries to affirm their national sovereignty and for democracy.

That was to be expected: Peoples decided they did not want to continue to live in poverty, deprived of rights and freedoms.

But the situation was complicated by the region's proximity to the United States. It is known that since the proclamation of the "Monroe doctrine", Washington has viewed the entire western hemisphere as its trust territory and the only changes it allowed and encouraged there were those in line with its ideas of what was good and what was bad.

When in Nicaragua the people toppled the dictatorial regime and began effective social changes in their country, Washington didn't like it. Neither did it like the upsurge of the patriotic movement in El Salvador and emergent new trends in Central America in general.

It must be said that in the United States many realised that processes taking place in the region were a natural result of historical development.

It is interesting that the so-called "Kissinger commission," which prepared a special report to the president on the causes behind the aggravation in Central America, concluded that everything is due to the extreme economic backwardness of the countries of the region, compounded by stark social inequality.

The administration even asked Congress for 350 million dollars in emergency aid to Caribbean nations.

Nevertheless, political intolerance, ideological considerations and a determination to "put things in order" in Central America by its own means prevailed in Washington's reaction to developments.

Pressure began to be applied to Nicaragua, there appeared mercenaries—"contras", and an undeclared war against Nicaragua became a fact of life.

Central America turned into the scene of one of the sharpest regional conflicts.

It must be said that from the very beginning the prevalent opinion in the world has been that Central America's problems must be resolved by the countries of the region themselves.

This approach was supported by many West European countries, the leadership of the Socialist International and, of course, Latin American states.

The Soviet Union invariably championed the idea of solving the region's problems without outside interference.

Let me remind you that a vast amount of work has been done by the Contadora group and the support group, which originated later. They blazed the trail to a series of meetings of the presidents of five Central American countries.

The latest one took place in Tela, Honduras. It adopted a package of documents sealing understandings on the practical aspects of a comprehensive resolution of problems generating tensions in the region.

The Central American five revealed their understanding of the region's problems and wisdom, boldness and realism in addressing them. They were able to find an accurate balance of interests and suggest realistic ways of removing mutual concerns.

The Soviet Union thinks highly of the accord reached by the presidents of the Central American states. We shall make every effort to facilitate its full realisation.

By the way, I would like to note that there are grounds for believing that our diplomatic contacts with the United States—and the issue of a Central American settlement has always been on the agenda of Soviet-American talks and was discussed again only recently in

Paris during a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker—played a certain role in bringing about the atmosphere which made the agreement of the five presidents possible.

What would I like to point out in these understandings?

In our opinion, the most important aspect is the unanimous approval of a package of measures connected with the disbandment of Contra contingents on Honduran territory.

This problem, while unresolved, was the main stumbling block in the way of negotiations. The just-reached understandings can cardinally improve the situation in Central America.

The Tela accords make it also possible, I believe, to resolve the issue of cutting off arms supplies to the region. An agreement between the USSR and the United States that they will both refrain from arms deliveries is most important in this respect.

I would like to remind you that considering the general relaxation of the military-political situation in Central America and after consulting the Nicaraguan leadership, the Soviet Union some time ago suspended the fulfilment of its commitments on such supplies.

We have complete understanding for the five counting on U.N. and O.A.S. assistance and shall hold a most active position in favour of effective U.N. participation in implementing the Honduran agreements of the five presidents.

I would like to note one more positive point: The joint document makes an urgent plea for an end to the civil war in El Salvador through dialogue between the warring sides.

While paying tribute to the responsible attitude of heads of Central American states, based on a realisation of the hopelessness of the use of force in regional settlement, it should be pointed out that Nicaragua's constructive and flexible position at the meeting was crucial for its successful completion. Without fear of making an overstatement, I must say that the Nicaraguan Government is honestly and painstakingly abiding by its obligations as regards democratisation in accordance with the Guatemalan and Salvadoran accords and shows great political courage and true interest in establishing peace.

There is another aspect, which one cannot overlook when analysing the results of the Honduran summit. In the broad international context they correspond to those positive tendencies which are gaining momentum in world politics and reflect the growing awareness in Central America of the need to establish a just balance of interests of all sides involved in the conflict.

It should be also stressed that the first promising steps have been taken towards a real settlement in Central America, which make it incumbent on all members of the international community to support a very fragile process of working out a final solution that will meet the interests of all sides involved. In this context, the position of the United States will have special significance due to well-known circumstances.

We have noticed shifts in accents in the American approach towards settlement in Central America and would like the Washington policy of moving from the use of force to political and diplomatic methods to materialise increasingly more consistently. Normalisation of relations between the U.S. and Nicaragua, which could be initiated by the resumption of direct dialogue between them, could play a positive role.

Our contacts with the representatives of the administration are dominated exactly by this topic.

I think it necessary to point out that, while giving a positive assessment to the decisions taken by the five presidents, we are prepared to render any assistance in their implementation and believe that other states will act in a similar way.

The entire world community is interested in the settlement of regional conflicts. Each of them has its own unique specific features. Nevertheless, tested instruments of settlement already exist. They include ensuring national reconciliation on condition of non-interference from outside, while dialectically permitting active and helpful participation of the international community, primarily the United Nations. The important thing now is for everyone involved to have the political will and observe the balance of interests.

This generally universal approach should be applied to various regional seats of tension, irrespective of whether they are in south western Africa, Central America or Afghanistan. We strive consistently to abide by these principles, which we regard as the best guarantee that there will no longer be areas of tension."

Contra Leaders Request U.S. Political Asylum
LD1108104289 Moscow TASS in English 1011 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] Managua August 11 TASS—By TASS correspondent Igor Pshenichnikov:

Israel Galeano, chief of the "Nicaraguan resistance" General Staff and other contra leaders, have applied for political asylum in the United States on August 10, it is pointed out in the communique of the Nicaraguan Defence Ministry issued here this Thursday [10 August]. This means, the document points out, that forces of the armed anti-Sandinist opposition have been left without leadership.

In view of this, the communique says, the Nicaraguan Government guarantees security to all members of the armed counter-revolutionary formations, wishing to meet representatives of the Nicaraguan authorities and acquaint themselves with the agreement concluded by Central American presidents on the demobilization of contras. All members of the "Nicaraguan resistance", both within Nicaragua and in Honduras, will be amnestied and guaranteed all constitutional rights if they laid down arms and returned to peaceful life. The demobilization process will be controlled by the United Nations and the Organisation of American States.

The communique stresses at the same time that the Sandinist People's Army will rebuff resolutely all terrorist acts of the contras, who, contrary to the agreements concluded by the Central American states, intend to continue hostilities in Nicaragua.

Political & Social

Estonian Supreme Soviet Passes Strike Resolution

LD1008183189 Moscow TASS in English 1824 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Tallinn August 10 ETA-TASS—The presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet today passed a resolution suspending strikes at enterprises, in institutions and organisations in Estonia since the day the resolution is published.

The resolution proceeded from point two of the USSR Supreme Soviet's resolution of August 2, 1989 "on a draft law of the USSR on the order of settling collective labour disputes".

The resolution of the Estonian parliament instructs the Council of Ministers of this Baltic republic to ensure uninterrupted functioning of the Estonian economy and services to the population.

Estonian Leadership Issues Statement on Strikes

LD1008184889 Moscow TASS in English 1812 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Tallinn August 10 ETA-TASS—More than 20 enterprises are on strike in Tallinn and another 13 enterprises in Kokhtla-Yarve, the centre of a shale basin in the republic, joined the walkout, according to the United Council of Work collectives in Kokhtla-Yarve.

At rallies, strikers call for "alternative elections" to soviets of workers' deputies on a production-territorial basis. Preparations for the formation of so-called parallel structures of power have already begun in some places.

The first secretary of the Tallinn Communist Party City Committee, E.A. Sillari, said that life in the city "is proceeding normally but tension has grown."

He said there is a threat of interruptions in the normal functioning of railways and that all possibilities are being explored to prevent such developments.

"The most important thing for normalising the situation in the city and the republic is to preserve tranquility," Sillari said.

The Council of Strike Committees said that the strike had been sparked by the Estonian Supreme Soviet's "unwillingness to take into account the opinion of a minority of deputies" opposing the adoption of a new law on elections to local soviets in Estonia.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Council of Ministers of Estonia and the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party issued a statement on the political situation in the republic, calling on everybody to display common sense and implement the Supreme Soviet's resolution on suspending strikes until the adoption of a corresponding law.

The statement said that the republic's leadership considers it its moral and political duty to create a situation in which genuine democracy and justice would predominate and in which the rights and freedoms of every person, irrespective of nationality, would be reliably protected.

"Promoting perestroika throughout the Soviet Union and using all means at our disposal to prevent steps that may block it is the duty of all of us," the statement said.

Strike Situation in Estonian Republic Detailed

PM1008143989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by "our correspondent" Leonid Levitskiy: "Who Stands To Gain From Alienation?"]

[Text] Tallinn—IZVESTIYA has already reported the strike which has resumed at the big Tallinn enterprises. It is mainly people of nonindigenous nationality who work at them. The plant workers have been joined by construction workers, transport workers, railroad workers from the two stations, and airmen. According to the republican strike committees headquarters, as of 1100 (Moscow time) 20 enterprises in Tallinn and 5 in Kokhtla-Yarve had stopped work.

The life of the republic's capital has been complicated because the vehicles of one branch of the bus association have not turned up for work. The association's administration had asked for aid in advance in Tartu, Pyarnu, and Rakvere. Some 40 drivers have come, but of course they will not get rid of the problem. Airmen have halted mail and freight shipments. Passenger flights are being carried out precisely.

The stoppage of some enterprises has immediately affected others. So it is probably frivolous to divide the economy into the union, republican, and local economy. We are all losing from the disturbances, bad work, and strikes. And not only materially. Alienation is growing between the two groups of the population in Estonia. The mildew of mutual distrust is spreading. The reluctance of the republic's leading organs and the strike committees to conduct a patient dialogue is very alarming.

In the first days of the strike there was not even an attempt to start talking. There is also other alarming news. There has been a telephone call from Narva. Deputies of the republic's Supreme Soviet from that region are assembling there. They will decide how to gain the opportunity to defend the interests of their voters in parliament. The example of other regions convinces us that when there is tension any commonplace conflict can serve as the spark causing an explosion. On the night of

5-6 August a drunken brawl broke out on Ratushnaya Square in central Tallinn. An Estonian man used a bottle as a weapon. A new arrival from Moscow stabbed him with a knife in response. The doctors were unable to save the victim's life. In a public statement, citing the evidence of numerous witnesses, the investigator emphasized the everyday nature of the tragedy. The participants were extremely drunk.

But yesterday, 9 August, a picket appeared on Ratushnaya Square. A portrait of the dead man and lighted candles were displayed. A poster in Estonian, Finnish, and English read: "Om this spot...a drunken Russian from Moscow killed a young Estonian." Republican radio announced that the picket was being organized by the dead man's friends and relations. On hearing this, the dead man's mother travelled to Tallinn and went to Ratushnaya Square. In the presence of television correspondents she told the picketers: "All this is like a farce." She demanded that she and her dead son and their family be left in peace. What is striking? A grief-stricken family had understood someone's blatantly dishonest design. But the city authorities and services seemed not to notice the "picketers" for a whole day. Did they really not understand the danger of passions being stoked at a time when tens and tens of thousands of people were in a state of agitation?

Bashkiriya Workers Threaten Strike Over Pollution

LD1008203389 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 10 Aug 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report from Sterlitamak, Bashkiriya Autonomous Soviet Socialist republic by correspondents M. Gafurov and V. Zhelyabov; correspondent reading the report not identified]

[Text] [Correspondent] Immense chimneys belching out puffs of smoke into the sky and a blue-gray discharge of poisonous smog creeping into the horizon—this is the way the second city of Bashkiriya—in terms of size, a city where 270,000 people live—awakens. The Ministry of the Chemical Industry and the Ministry of the Petrochemical Industry have so crammed Sterlitamak with enterprises that they annually discharge into the city's atmosphere 200,000 tonnes of harmful waste. The citizens have to pay the highest price possible for this large-scale chemical industry: their health. [video shows chemical industry chimneys; caption reads "104 cities in our country have been declared unfavorable in ecological terms"]

This is still another example showing that the attitude of persons in the petrochemical industry is somewhat slack. Petroleum products occupy a significant part of the city's green belt. [sentence as heard] Discharge of the most harmful waste occur as a rule by night. Drivers of trolleybuses who work early in the morning are the first to breathe the fumes. [video shows industrial wasteland, trolleybuses on city streets] They are the ones who gave an ultimatum to the executive committee of the city soviet: If the ecological situation in the city does not improve by the start of August, then trolleybus traffic will be stopped. This is the main form of public transport in Sterlitamak.

[Begin Yu.M. Beloglazov recording] As the chairman of the commission checking the work of the Kaustik Production Association, I saw with my own eyes how discharges of harmful substances took place. The approach roads were inundated several times with oleic acid, caustic [as heard], and organic waste products. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The issue of ending harmful discharges was raised on several occasions before the heads of the ministries and chemical enterprises. But everything remains the same. This is what forced the workers to resort to the most extreme measure.

[Begin Beloglazov recording] Unfortunately, even immediately after those measures were taken, discharges of harmful substances took place every morning. Early this morning, too, there was a gas attack on the city by the Kaustik Production Association. The fumes remain even now. Therefore, the workers warned today that a srike remains the last means of struggle with a bureaucratic apparatus. We are now saying time and again that there is still enough time left before 15 September, that there is time to rectify things and to bring about a normal siuation in the city. [end recording] [video shows Beloglazov being interviewed in front of depot doors]

Kuzbass Workers Initiate Warning Strike 4 Aug

18280266 Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Aug 89 p 2

[Article by TRUD correspondent Yu. Kotlyarov: "Have We Not Had Enough Ultimatums?"]

[Text] Yesterday, TRUD reported that the council of workers' committees of the Kuzbass had called a 2-hour warning strike. What is the reason for this new and, putting it bluntly, unexpected step for most toilers?

At issue is compliance with one of the points of the Protocol on Coordinated Measures—suspending the construction of the Krapivinskiy hydrostation. At the insistence of local party and soviet organs, the government resolved a decade and a half ago to build this facility—a dam, a hydropower station, and a reservoir—in order to supply the oblast with pure water. Meanwhile, the scientists and the general public of Kemerovo and Tomsk Oblasts raised a justified alarm: The implementation of the plan threatens irremediable troubles. In May, in view of these arguments, the Kemerovo Ispolkom [executive committee] resolved to discontinue the work. Pursuant to the Protocol on Coordinated Measures, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov signed an order on discontinuing construction and measures for mothballing the site. However, the

rapacious destruction of nature on the flood plain of the river Tom went on. Then the council of workers' committees of the Kuzbass resolved to call a 2-hour warning strike.

A session of the oblast soviet, in which members of the council of workers' collectives also participated, set up a special commission headed by the USSR People's Deputy, Chairman of the Oblsovprof [oblast trade union council] V.I. Romanov, which immediately departed to the area of construction of the hydrostation. The session resolved to discontinue the construction work immediately, to hold those at fault accountable to the party and administration, and to refer the case to the procuracy.

The council of workers' collectives also agreed with this, but nonetheless decided to...call the 2-hour strike on 3 August anyway. Not only the deputies but chairmen of a number of city workers committees failed to understand such logic.

For the first time, the proceedings of the session were broadcast live on local TV and radio, and an avalanche of phone calls from the enterprises came down on the oblast party committee, the oblast ispolkom, and the oblsovprof: Who needs this "warning" strike? After all, the session had made unambiguous decisions to everyone's satisfaction.

Out of several hundred miners' collectives of the oblast, only 17 supported the decision of the council of workers' collectives. The common opinion is that the efforts of workers' committees, Soviets of People's Deputies, and trade unions should be pooled in order to definitively carry out the coordinated measures and to normalize the situation. Nonetheless, 17 mines did not work for 2 hours yesterday. The statistics of losses increased.

Yesterday, the buro of the CPSU Kemerovo Oblast Party Committee expelled from the party L. Cherentsov, chief of the "Kuzbassgidroenergostroy" Association for his failure to carry out the decisions of the government and oblast ispolkom, and acknowledged that it was impossible for him to retain the post. Director of the hydrostation under construction G. Redozubov received a vote of no confidence. Head of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] unit Major General N. Kachayev and a number of other ranking officials responsible for the execution of government decisions on mothballing the Krapivinskiy Hydrostation were given stern party reprimands.

Correspondent Apportions Blame for Kuzbass Strikes
LD1008191389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] [Announcer] All industrial enterprises in Kemerovo Oblast are now operating, but the situation in the Kuzbass remains complex. Here is our correspondent Vladimir Yuryev:

[Yuryev] The echo of the July storm has rumbled on into August: On the recommendation of the Council of Workers' Committees of Kuzbass, a number of coal enterprises have held a 2-hour warning strike. The whole thing began at a session of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies because of the continuing construction of the Krapinskiy hydrosystem. Specialists have long since concluded that the reservoir will become a cesspool for industrial waste, rather than a place for neutralizing toxic substances, of which more than enough tonnes are discharged by mighty enterprises into the oblast's sole major river. The decision to mothball the site has been made by the USSR Council of Ministers and the oblast party committee, and it was also stipulated in the protocol on measures agreed between the Kuzbass regional strike committee and the commission of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU]. I am not going to enumerate all the documents—there are masses of them—but the work there is going on just as before, as has been established by a commission session that flew out to visit the actual site.

However, this fact is merely the formal reason for the warning strike. The miners are saying that here, on their native soil, the real masters are not the local inhabitants, the executive committees, or the party bodies but, as before, the ministries situated thousands of kilometers away. Neither the will of the people nor the power of the soviets could halt the actions of the hydro-construction project bosses, who, incidentally, were sitting in the hall during the session and remained silent while the deputies were attempting to learn the truth. Was it really necessary, asks Anatoliy Federovich Rutenko, chairman of the Kemerovo Oblast Executive Committee, to have a wave of short-term strikes—not, fortunately, another tidal wave from the July events—in order to finally bring bring the construction work to an end?

[Begin Rutenko recording] Why does every worker in the oblast have to become agitated just because of two organizations? It must be said frankly that some of the bosses there have been undisciplined and have failed to carry out the instructions given and adopted by decision of the executive committee. Indeed, they told lies and provided false information. We just cannot play around with public opinion like this. And this was confirmed yesterday by the actions of the workers' committees in the towns: We were swamped with phone calls from all parts of the oblast asking why a strike was needed. [end recording]

[Yuryev] Everything that Anatoliy Fedorovich says is correct, and in my view there need not have been a 2-hour or even a 1-minute stoppage. Those in charge of construction at the Krapinskiy hydro system have already been punished very strictly: Some have been expelled from the party and some have been strictly admonished. But who is most to blame? The construction bosses, who deceived the executive committee and the whole of Kuzbass, or the executive committee, who

did nothing to ensure they were not deceived? Rights are not granted, they are won. For the moment real power is wielded by the departments rather than the executive committee, and they use it even under threat of strikes. Figuratively speaking, in this instance we are still sitting on a tinderbox, while many others stand around holding flamethrowers. What is worse, it seems that not all of them realize they have fire in their hands, and in the present circumstances this fire might be nothing more than poor work—something the economy can no longer put up with.

Unrest Continues in Abkhaziya, Meetings Held

Efforts To Ease Tension Viewed

PM1008182589 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 11 Aug 89 p 4

[Correspondent A. Mgeladze report: "Through Trust Toward Unity"]

[Text] Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic—Not a day goes by without the leaders of the Abkhaz Georgian Communist Party Oblast Committee [obkom] and the autonomous republic's soviet organs attending a meeting in one labor collective or another. The conversations are by no means always smooth. Complex questions, demands, and complaints are heard. Irritation is sometimes noticeable, and emotions burst forth. But the patience, restraint, and openness with which these conversations are conducted have an effect.

V. Khishba, candidate member of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and first secretary of Abkhaz party obkom, recently met with the collective at the Sukhumi Locomotive Depot. There was an open and confidential discussion of the situation in the republic, of how the investigation into the causes of the tragic events of 15 and 16 July is proceeding, and of how the phased cadre renewal will be continued in the autonomous republic's cities and rayons, ministries and departments. A decision was made recently to dismiss from their post the leaders of the Abkhaz Ministry of Internal Affairs and a number of leading workers of city and rayon internal affairs departments.

The problem of cadre renewal is of particular concern to the inhabitants of Abkhaziya today. And there probably is not a single rayon, enterprise, or farm where it has not been discussed. During the meeting between L. Khaburzaniya, second secretary of Abkhaz party obkom, and Ochamchirskiy Rayon labor collectives, including on the Sakartvelo Collective Farm [kolkhoz] in the village of Kochari, serious complaints were leveled at the local leadership, which had been unable to master the situation and had in effect connived at what happened.

People sincerely want life to return to normal and to believe that the social, organizational, and cadre problems will at last be resolved and that the way will be opened up in the autonomous republic for those democratic processes taking place in the country, whereupon it will certainly be possible to transform life more quickly and to develop Abkhaziya's economy and agricultural production sectors. Party committees and Communists, who are called upon to lead the people shoulder the chief responsibility in the upcoming changes. Much sharp, serious criticism is being leveled at them these days. But at the same time it is to them that people go for advice and assistance. This trust must be valued and strengthened in every possible way.

The leadership of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee is persistently implementing a program to normalize the situation with the participation of the autonomous republic's public. And yet the situation in Abkhaziya must not be oversimplified. The situation remains complex in some places. A number of industrial enterprises are still standing idle, and a particularly complex situation has taken shape in Ochamchirskiy Rayon, where a mixed-feed plant, a vegetable oil extraction plant, several kolkhozes and state farms, and a hothouse combine are not working. In the village of Ilori, 26 citizens are continuing a sit-in strike, demanding a change of leadership in the rayon. Things are also uneasy in the mining city of Tkvarcheli, where a number of enterprises, mines, and establishments and transport are not working. A strike committee has been elected, and it demands the lifting of tension in Abkhaziya.

Purposeful work is being carried out to confiscate firearms stolen from rayon militia departments and nondepartmental guard posts. Every day the trophies include submachineguns, small-bore rifles, hunting rifles, and so forth. Employees of republic internal affairs organs and subunits in western Georgia are acting likewise, confiscating weapons.

The path to peace and quiet between the two peoples today lies in overcoming the mutual mistrust and resolving the many problems which have accumulated over the years—thereby creating convenient grounds for alienation and guardedness—and which have, in the end, pushed people into precipitate steps and rash actions. However—and people are increasingly realizing this—confrontation is not the path to take. It was no coincidence that this appeal was made at a recent Sukhumskiy Rayon aktiv meeting: "People, stop and extend your hands to each other!" And when it was announced that for 2 weeks now stockmen had absented themselves from the livestock unit on the "Abzhakva" Kolkhoz and livestock had begun to die, and that tea had not been picked for almost 20 days on the "Gamardzhveba" Kolkhoz, the meeting participants were really stunned and indignant.

One conclusion was drawn: Strikes must not be used as a form of protest at the extremists' wild outbursts. It is far more necessary and important to persuade the population to act harmoniously. Fewer and fewer reciprocal complaints are being made. The leaders of neighboring

farms in the rayon—Abkhazians and Georgians—have already extended their hands to each other for mutual reconciliation. There is no need to seek arguments for this. Historical, social, and economic ties run deep, and today's goals and tasks are the same too—to do everything for a better life, so that children can look calmly and confidently to the future.

164 People Arrested

LD1008151389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] The temporary press center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in Abkhaziya reports that in the last 24 hours in the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic most of the enterprises, institutions, and organizations have been operating. In Sukhumi, public rail, air and water transportation is operating. At the city's train station 32 trains were dispatched in both directions, including 15 passenger trains. There have been 23 flights from Sukhumi Airport, on which 1,000 passengers have been carried.

At the same time the situation in the autonomous republic remains tense. In Ochamchirskiy Rayon, the labor collectives of 39 enterprises, organizations, sovkhozes, and kolkhozes are not at work, just as before. In the last 24 hours 128 firearms have been confiscated from the population. One hundred and sixty-four people have been arrested for violating the rules regarding movement in conditions of a special behavior regime for citizens. The situation is being monitored.

Commentary on Abkhaziya Situation

LD1008193389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1703 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] It is time to stop. The time has come to think not just of oneself, but of the fate of one's children. This though is shared today by the great majority of the residents of Sukhumi. Reason to think again about the situation is provided by a report from the temporary press center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in Abkhaziya. Three minors found in a dried-up ditch a parcel containing an explosive of unknown composition, and set fire to it. An explosion followed. Two adolescents were killed, and a third, maimed and in a critical condition, has been taken to the republican hospital.

The events that have recently been taking place in the republic have had a negative effect not only on people's lives, but also on the functioning of the national economy. At a number of industrial enterprises, production has been substantially reduced because of strikes and failure to report for work. In agriculture, too, the situation is unfavorable, and is being made worse by a drought without precedent in the region, which has led to the loss of millions of rubles. And this comes at a time when the republic stands on the threshold of the transition to economic autonomy.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to consider that the situation in Georgia's agro-industrial complex is out of control. Specialists have been sent to various regions and are giving practical help on the spot and doing explanatory work. In such an important industry as fodder production, the expected severe shortage of feedstuffs could have led to loss of cattle: but the urgent measures which have been taken have eased the tension. The union republics, too, have come to the rescue. A report by GRUZINFORMTASS says: The time dictates that we should live and work according to civil conscience; the measure of maturity must be the degree of readiness for honest dialogue, renunciation of confrontation, and hard work, day by day, in all areas of production.

Supreme Soviet Commission Reviews Death Sentences

LD1008200889 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 10 Aug 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The Commission on Pardons of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has examined at its regular sittings petitions seeking pardons for people condemned to various terms of deprivation of liberty and also to the ultimate penalty of death by execution.

In accordance with the commission's proposal, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has rejected a pardon for and left in force the death penalty against (Gampansura), (Mirzayev), (Mikhaylov), (Shvetsov), (Shishkhanov), and others condemned for deliberate killing in aggravated circumstances, banditry, and attempts on the life of militiamen.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium accepted the commission's proposal that pardons be granted to more than 40 convicted people who during their terms of punishment have shown by their conscientious attitude to work and their exemplary conduct that they are now reformed.

USSR Law on Legislative Acts Published

PM1008094189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Aug 89 Second Edition pp 1-2

[USSR Law "On Procedure for the Publication and Entry Into Force of USSR Laws and Other Acts Adopted by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Their Organs"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

Article 1. The USSR Laws and other acts adopted by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet are published by the USSR Supreme

Soviet Presidium in VEDOMOSTI SEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOVO SOVETA SSSR no later than 7 days after their adoption and also in the newspaper IZVESTIYA.

Also published in VEDOMOSTI are acts adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet's Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee.

Article 2. The publication of USSR laws and other acts indicated in article 1 of this law in VEDOMOSTI SEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOVO SOVETA SSSR and the newspaper IZVESTIYA is an official publication.

Acts of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and its Presidium can also be published in other press organs, made public on television and radio, transmitted by telegraph, and distributed by the relevant state and public organizations.

Article 3. USSR laws and other acts of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet of a normative nature enter into force simultaneously throughout the territory of the USSR 10 days after their publication in VEDOMOSTI SEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOVO SEZDA SSSR. The same acts published in IZVESTIYA before publication in VEDOMOSTI enter into force 10 days after being published in IZVESTIYA.

The deadlines for acts' entry into force indicated in this article are not applied in cases where, upon adopting an act, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or USSR Supreme Soviet has set a different deadline for putting it into operation.

Article 4. Decrees and resolutions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium with no general significance need not be published and can be sent to the relevant state organs and public organizations to bring to the notice of enterprises, institutions, organizations, and people to whom their operation extends. These acts enter into force from the moment they are received by state organs and public organizations unless the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium sets a different deadline for putting them into operation.

Article 5. Upon a representation from the USSR Foreign Ministry, VEDOMOSTI SEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOVO SOVETA SSSR publishes the international treaties concluded on behalf of the USSR and ratified by the USSR Supreme Soviet which have entered into force for the USSR.

The USSR's international treaties whose authentic texts have been compiled in foreign languages are published in VEDOMOSTI in one of these languages with the official Russian translation.

Article 6. VEDOMOSTI SEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOVO SOVETA SSSR is published every week and consists of three sections.

Published in the first section are:
laws of the USSR and other acts of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet;
resolutions of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities;
international treaties of the USSR;
acts of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee.

Published in the second section are:
decrees and resolutions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium;
rulings of the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman.

The third section publishes information on the activity of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies; the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Supreme Soviet's Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities; the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the permanent commissions, chambers, and other organs of the Congress, the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, the USSR Parliamentary Group, and also the central electoral commission for the election of USSR people's deputies.

By a decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, individual acts, documents, and materials can be published in a supplement to VEDOMOSTI.

Article 7. The acts published in VEDOMOSTI SEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOVO SOVETA SSSR are presented in articles with the relevant ordinal numbers. Supplements to acts are contained in the same articles as the acts themselves.

Article 8. In accordance with the appendix, the following USSR legislative acts are deemed to have lost their force.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Moscow, Kremlin, 31 July 1989.

Appendix to 31 July 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet Law

List of USSR Legislative Acts Which Have Lost Their Force in Full or in Part

1. The 19 June 1958 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree "on the procedure for the publication and entry into force of USSR laws, resolutions and other acts of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and decrees and resolutions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium" as edited by the 6 May 1980 Decree (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOVO SOVETA SSSR 1958, No 14 Article 275; and 1980 No 20, article 374).

2. The 25 December 1958 USSR Law "on the approval of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree 'on the procedure for the publication and entry into force of USSR laws, USSR Supreme Soviet resolutions, and decrees and resolutions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium '" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOVO SOVETA SSSR 1959, No 1, article 22).

3. Article 1 of the 6 May 1980 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree "on the introduction of changes and additions to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree 'on the procedure for the publication and entry into force of USSR laws, USSR Supreme Soviet resolutions, and decrees and resolutions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOVO SOVETA SSSR 1980, No 20, article 374).

4. The 6 May 1980 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution "on the organization of work on the publication of USSR laws, resolutions and other acts of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and decrees and resolutions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOVO SOVETA SSSR 1980, No 20, article 375).

5. The 25 June 1980 USSR Law "on the approval of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees on the introduction of changes and additions to some USSR legislative acts" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOVO SOVETA SSSR 1980, No 27, article 540) with regard to the approval of article 1 of the 6 May 1980 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree "on the introduction of changes and additions to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree 'on the procedure for the publication and entry into force of USSR laws, USSR Supreme Soviet resolutions, and decrees and resolutions of the USSR Supreme Soviet."

Supreme Soviet Body Reviews Capital Construction

18210022 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 30 Jul 89 p 1

[V. Kiosa report: "A Flexible System Is Needed"]

[Text] To look into the complex situation that has taken shape in capital construction: That is the task that the Soviet of the Union's Standing Planning and Budget and Finance Commission set for itself at its 28 July meeting. It is the more important since already by the fall this commission, together with other parliamentary committees and commissions, will consider the state plan and budget for the country in 1990. The representatives of the USSR State Planning Committee [Gosplan], USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, and USSR Industrial and Construction Bank [Promstroybank] invited to the meeting talked about the complexity of the situation in the economic sphere. The essential nature of the problem was formulated briefly: The construction of projects takes a long time, is expensive, and employs obsolete methods. The proof of this is the excessive volumes of incomplete construction: In 1988 this amounted to R150 billion.

Requests from ministries for centralized capital investments are growing rather than declining, which testifies to the old habit of trying to obtain state funding by any means possible.

So what does the country's government intend to do to improve the situation? Gosplan representatives reported that during compilation of the 1990 plan, which, incidentally, is very complicated, several scenarios have been considered for reducing state capital investments in amounts ranging from R8 billion to R26 billion. However, in all the scenarios the planned volumes of investment are retained in development of the social sphere, and the agroindustrial complex, and the industrial sectors operating in it.

Discussion of all these problems was keen and very interesting. The deputies did not limit themselves to listening to the reports from the representatives of the country's central economic departments, but raised new questions for them, trying to get a complete picture of the true state of affairs. And what were their opinions?

I am not totally satisfied with these statements, the commission chairman and Chairman of the Donetsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies Executive Committee V.G. Kucherenko told a TASS correspondent. What we need now is a flexible system in capital construction that can be rapidly modified. The allocation of state capital investments is still done not so much according to priority directions as according to the principle of insuring a work load for the construction organizations.

In the opinion of commission member and general director of the "Rotor" Scientific-Production Association (Cherkassy city) A.I. Chabanov, withdrawing investments from global projects from which there will be no return for some years and allocation of those funds in the agroindustrial complex and the social sphere is a major positive change in USSR Gosplan policy.

500 Moscow Prisoners Stage Hunger Strike

LD1008152789 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] In the Butyrki prison in Moscow, 500 people under investigation have gone on a hunger strike. They still haven't put forward their demands. Earlier the prisoners mutineed and the police had to resort to rubber truncheons and water cannon. A policeman was injured in the head and one of the prisoners suffers from a brain concussion.

Further Reported on Komsomol's 8th Plenum

Agenda Outlined

18001439 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 89 p 1

[Unattributed Report: "The First Day"]

[Text] The work of the 8th Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee Plenum began yesterday in Moscow.

The following issues are included in the Plenum's agenda:

1. On the state of the Komsomol.
2. On the activity of the Komsomol Central Committee Buro and Secretariat since the 20th Komsomol Congress.
3. On the 21st Komsomol Congress.
4. Organizational issues.
5. On the results of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the first results of the activity of the group of USSR people's deputies from the Komsomol.
6. On the 22nd Congress of the Latvian Komsomol.
7. On the current state on the Komsomol Central Committee commissions and the status of the Komsomol Central Committee member.
8. On the regulation of the Komsomol Central Committee Plenum.
9. On the draft of changes and supplements in the Statute on republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city, rayon, and primary review commissions of Komsomol organizations.
10. On the structure and complement of the apparatus of the Komsomol Central Review Commission.

Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary V. Mironenko gave a speech on the first issue.

Then N. Klykov, chairman of the Komsomol Central Review Commission, reported on the restructuring of control.

Ye. Gordeyeva, first secretary of the Ivanovskiy Komsomol Obkom [oblast party committee] gave a report from a group of members of the central electoral organs [TsVO] on the activity of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau and Secretariat, and members of the TsVO.

Komsomol Central Committee Secretary V. Zyukin informed the Plenum participants of how the work on the preparation of changes in the Komsomol model and charter is progressing.

The following people participated in the debates: Yu. Burchakov, first secretary of the Leningrad Komsomol Obkom; V. Miroshinchenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian LKSM [Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee; S. Kuznetsov, first secretary of the Tomsk Komsomol Obkom; V. Kudlash, first secretary of the Belorussian LKSM Central Committee; V. Matiyenko, first secretary of the Irkutsk Komsomol Obkom; M. Sotnikov, committee secretary of the Moscow State University Komsomol; V. Gubin, engineer-technician of the Arkhangelsk Central Library Commission, people's deputy; I. Yefimov, assistant to the chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy for Komsomol work; S. Grinevetskiy, first secretary of the Odessa LKSM Obkom; A. Yakobov, first secretary of the Tajik LKSM Central Committee; V. Delyukin, first secreatry of the Smolensk Komsomol Obkom; D. Glavatskikh, first secretary of the Udmurt Komsomol Obkom; S. Yepifantsev, Komsomol Central Committee secretary; G. Akopyan, first secretary of the Armenian LKSM Central Committee; G. Sharyy, chairman of the "Zapovit Lenina" kolkhoz [collective farm], people's deputy; V. Yermakov, first secretary of the Volgograd Komsomol Obkom; S. Kondybayev, first secretary of the Kazakh LKSM Central Committee; N. Kurzanova, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee; A. Bek, Komsomol committee secretary, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics; V. Yelagin, first secretary of the Orenburg Komsomol Obkom; V. Kopyev, first secretary of the Moscow Komsomol Obkom; A. Morozov, first secretary of the Novosibirsk Komsomol Obkom; I. Ordzhonikidze, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee; M. Shmoylov, chief of culture and sport department of the Komsomol Central Committee.

V.A. Medvedev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, CPSU Central Committee secretary, and G.P. Razumovskiy, CPSU Central Committee candidate-member, CPSU Central Committee secretary, participated in the work of the plenum.

The Komsomol Central Committee Plenum will continue its work today.

In the Komsomol Central Review Commission

The 9th session of the Komsomol Central Review Commission took place in Moscow 27 July.

The Commission considered the concept of restructuring of control in the Komsomol, of the structure and complement of the apparatus of Komsomol TsRK [Central Review Commission], and the draft of the statute of the republic and local Komsomol organizations. Komsomol TsRK Chairman N. Klykov spoke on these issues.

The Commission resolved to introduce for the consideration of the 8th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum the concept of restructuring control in the Komsomol, the structure and complement of the Komsomol TsRK apparatus, the draft of the changed and supplemented Statute on the review committees of republic and local Komsomol organization, taking into consideration the the discussions which took place.

On the Eve of the Plenum

Meetings of the socioeconomic, financial-budget, ecological and special commissions of the Komsomol Central Committee were held on the eve of the plenum.

Current matters of the commissions' work were considered at the meetings; plans were made for their further activities.

Mironenko Describes Komsomol Tasks

18001442 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Aug 89 pp 1,2

[Report of V. Mironenko, first secretary of Komsomol Central Committee: "On the Situation in the Komsomol"]

[Text] Comrades! On instructions from the plenum of the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Young Communist League] the Bureau has formed commissions consisting mainly of members of the Komsomol central electoral organs. Also enlisted in their work were comrades from the local areas who have displayed a desire to deal with the extremely complicated state of affairs and have submitted ideas about ways of rejuvenating our union.

As we agreed when discussing the commission regulations, the representatives report on their conclusions and suggestions to the plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee.

From the materials of all the commissions it is possible to draw the general conclusion that the situation in the Komsomol is characterized by an acute, very acute manifestation of problems and contradictions that have accumulated and an obvious disparity between the traditional ideas about the essence, goals, and structure of the Komsomol and the very rapidly changing situation in the society and among youth.

The active part of the members of the union—I should like to emphasize this—the active part of the members of the union—you know that there is another part—is aware of the need for flexible changes, the need for activity. So far for the most part we are not managing to achieve this. A question that is probably quite natural in this situation arises. But why? It seems to me that this question, in turn, breaks down into three questions. The first of them is what do we call the current situation in the Komsomol? Very many people are inclined to call it a crisis in the Komsomol. Quite frankly, we have become accustomed to such definitions, but that is the way it goes. There is no cause to be afraid of it; what one should be afraid of is the frequent repetition of this word without any attempt to do anything about the situation. It is very important to define the situation, but it is not so much a matter of a definition or a name as of moving from complaints and moans, from appeals, to a new unity and large changes, moving to the real development of the fundamental conditions for this new unity, to practical actions.

The second question that must be answered is how, with this assessment of the situation, to deal with the decisions of the 20th Komsomol Congress. The results of the work of all commissions, when they are attentively and profoundly analyzed, show that no matter how much our last congress was criticized—in many cases fairly, incidentally—the real movement of thought and deed takes place in precisely the direction determined by it. This includes democratization, debureaucratization, and restoration of the lost ties with youth. Apparently there is no need to wonder whether the analysis of critical phenomena in the Komsomol could have been deeper; it is more important to resolve them more precisely and concretely. Both we and society have changed since that time. The significance of the congress should be judged not by what it was unable to do in comparison with our present ideas, but by the new aspects it introduced into our understanding of the further development of the Komsomol. Events are developing and the sociopolitical situation in the country is changing rapidly, this we know, and therefore the convening of the 21st Komsomol Congress, in the opinion of the Central Committee Bureau, and the decision, as it were, ripened considerably before it began to be expressed in the press and the Komsomol organizations that it was necessary to accelerate it. It should be held no later than the second half of this year. Its task is seen not as revising the decisions of the previous congress but in developing and deepening them and reinforcing new ideas about the tasks and structure of the union in the program and regulations of the Komsomol.

The third might be the simplest question. How does one relate to the work of the Central Committee, and the Bureau and Secretariat of the Komsomol Central Committee? Is this not why after the congress, judging from everything, the problems grew more rapidly than they were resolved. If one is to be sincere and self-critical, one must say that this is one of the main reasons for our failure to resolve the contradictions promptly. Does it follow from this that the current composition of the Central Committee, Bureau, and Central Committee Secretariat are incapable of solving the problems facing them? This question is also asked. I do not think this is true. The matter of restructuring and updating the union, the advancement of new ideas, changes in the traditional work methods, and destruction of the ideological and organizational stereotypes which have been firmly ingrained in our minds have turned out to be not as simple and not as rapid an affair as it probably seems to all of us at the 20th Komsomol Congress. In their work the Central Committee Bureau and Secretariat have not deviated from the decisions of the Komsomol congress and have not shrunk from solving the problems. It is another matter that this has not always occurred. They have tried to realize the decisions of the Central Committee plenums as fully as possible. In this connection certain materials were prepared for members of the Komsomol Central Committee so that you would have objective information. Allow me not to comment on them. This would take a lot of time and I do not think

there is any need for it. Everyone can draw his own conclusions and express them here. Incidentally, I do not have a very good idea about the description of the state of affairs in the Komsomol without adding what will be said in the report and the information about the results of the work of the corresponding commission and information from the local areas, to which you have grown unaccustomed recently.

In the work of the Bureau, the secretaries, and the apparatus of the Central Committee there has been inconsistency, indecisiveness, and involvement in particular issues to the detriment of a deep development of the main key problems. The inattention to the state of affairs in the Komsomol organizations is apparently especially blameworthy. Here I see mainly my own guilt as first secretary of the Central Committee, who is supposed to organize the work of the Bureau and the Secretariat.

It is obvious, however, that this reinterpretation, this restructuring of a huge organization from above without movement in its lower cells to meet life halfway or attempts to independently take a position concerning an issue that is disturbing people or to solve at least one crucial problem, be it ever so small or so simple—without this there can be no discussion of restructuring in the Komsomol or emergence from the crisis, we shall accomplish nothing, and the crisis will get deeper. This is the main, disquieting conclusion, but also here is an indication of the way out of the crisis: to set goals that are understood and accepted by the majority of members of the union and to take paths that lie in free thought, discussions, and actions of the organization and members of the Komsomol. To put to work mechanisms of democracy within the union that can provide for movement, protecting the lower levels from dictatorship and sometimes also voluntarism from above, and protecting the upper levels from unsubstantiated accusations from below about what they can and should do. To strive to create everywhere even small but realistic possibilities for the development, self-organization, and self-assertion of young people in life. We must solve this problem if we really want to protect our organization through the sharp turn of history. This is not an easy task. We should not count on quick successes or despair from failures, of which there will be many. It is important simply to see the goal clearly, correct mistakes promptly, and not stray from the path earmarked by the 20th congress.

We should feel a certain amount of optimism by the fact that perhaps for the first time in recent years the critical attitude of members of the Komsomol Central Committee which was manifested at its 7th plenum, during subsequent weeks, and the period of preparation for this plenum actually lasted weeks, was transformed not into confusion, not into mutual complaints and reproaches, although we were not able to avoid these altogether, but primarily into constructive work. This is a good sign. Several variants were developed for the program and regulations and there was an interesting discussion at the regional meetings in Baku, Volgograd, Moscow, Novgorod, Kemorovo, and Sverdlovsk and at the meetings of the commissions that were created by the Central Committee Bureau.

It is important to specify at the outset what we mean by the concept of the crisis in the Komsomol. After all, crises are not new in the Komsomol. The crisis was discussed for the first time at the 3d Congress of the Russian Communist Youth Union in 1920. At the beginning of the New Economic Policy when evaluating the 12th party congress, I quote: "The RKSM [Russian Communist Youth Union] has experienced a severe crisis." A question arose at the 9th Komsomol Congress which might lie at the basis of the union's crisis. The decline of the activity of the masses of youth, the disparity between the leadership and the mass of youth, and the separation of the Komsomol and youth as a whole from the party in the description of the crisis phenomena of the twenties comprise a common modern situation. After the 9th Komsomol Congress, which I mentioned, the question of crises did not come up at all. It was concluded that crises are impossible during a period of entry into socialism. But life has refuted the concept of crisis-free development and we have been witnesses to this. The straight road leading from victory to victory exists only in the minds of people who do not wish to admit their own mistakes.

The current crisis has been revealed now but it began long before this, along with the Stalinization of the Komsomol when it became convenient for the party leadership at the time to consider it a subsidiary implement, an instrument in its hands and not an independent organization. The currently widespread opinion that the Komsomol crisis arose as a result of perestroyka will not hold up under any kind of criticism. The problems of the Komsomol are interwoven with the life of society and with the political and economic situation in it. This situation is fairly well known. Since the Congress of People's Deputies there has probably been no need to describe the socioeconomic and political situation in the country. Just a couple of words. People have been tormented by deficits and pained by more reports of interethnic discord and sometimes simply slaughter. Glasnost opens up these pages of our history, which cannot but have the strongest influence on the world view of an entire generation. The poor social situation of youth casts a dense shadow on the Komsomol as well. A couple of examples from regions of Central Asia and Kazakhstan alone—according to imprecise calculations, there are about 6 million young people who are neither working nor studying anywhere. And not because they do not want to, but simply because they do not have the opportunity.

The real earnings of a young person and a young family are low, prices are increasing, and the situation with respect to housing is characterized by a lack of any for very many young people. Things are a little better with consumer services and public health, and the problem in education is

extremely serious. Central Committee members are aware of this. Hence the disenchantment with the possibilities of a socialist society, a kind of crisis of faith in the traditional political institutions among many young people. Property stratification is also apparent, frequently as a result of unearned incomes. The division of the society into rich and poor and the separation from the means of production can make confirmed cynics even of quite decent young people and it certainly does not add to the authority of the Komsomol.

It turned out that that which we simply must not have—crime, drug addiction, prostitution—not only do we have, but we have them in large quantities and they are even continuing to increase.

According to data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, each year about 1 million crimes are registered in the country in which 3-3.5 million boys and girls participate, and out of the 130,000 who are registered as drug addicts, 80,000 are young people. The events in the hot spots from Alma-Ata in 1986 to Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhaziya, Fergana Oblast, and certain other places have revealed the lack of desire and the inability of many party and state organs as well as Komsomol organizations to actually assess the situation in the youth environment and take any steps at all, not after the events but before them.

It seems to us that society does not yet recognize the full danger of the possible consequences of such a situation in the youth environment, and we do not yet have an understanding of the destructive force that can be created out of angry youth in the skillful hands of people who stand to gain from destabilizing the society. This is, as it were, the background against which the crisis about which we are speaking is developing. Or take the situation that has developed around the Soviet Army. The situation is complicated in the Armed Forces. The decision to reduce them caused confusion and a loss of faith in the future among some youth. The constant dissatisfaction of the military servicemen makes them inclined to do things that are not appropriate for the Army. It is difficult even to imagine the kind of harm that could be caused both to the Army and to the people by a distorted perception which can be formed of the Army as a repressive, antidemocratic organ. The negative attitude toward military servicemen and their families that is deliberately developed when solving social problems, and the insults to their personal dignity are accepted with amazing indifference. Representatives of a number of groups and movements regard a refusal to serve in the Armed Forces almost as a major point in their programs. The Komsomol organizations of the Armed Forces themselves should do considerably more to solve the problems that have accumulated in them and especially to defend the personal dignity of military servicemen who are Komsomol members. This is also obvious.

Finally, perhaps the main thing—the contradiction between the reserves of social energy that lie in youth and the possibilities of applying them, if one can put it that way, for peaceful purposes has not been resolved. The development of the youth policy has not taken a single large step, either upward or downward. There is nowhere we can turn to escape the responsibility for failing to solve the problems that have been enumerated by youth, and also those that have not, and, probably, we should not try to escape responsibility but rather honestly admit that the Komsomol has not yet become the real subject of a policy and has not managed to define a position regarding a number of crucial issues, to suggest alternative paths to solving one problem or another, or to achieve concrete results.

This is the context. But what about in the Komsomol itself? You are well aware that perestroyka in the Komsomol began from above. But today, in my opinion, it is quite obvious that we cannot succeed in carrying it out only from top to bottom. We have reached a point where it is necessary to change not only the forms and methods, but also the essence and the content of the organization's activity. Having started the movement, we stopped in indecisiveness and today we have what we deserve: growing dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the organization. For the sake of fairness one must say, true, that even our Komsomol journalists are stubbornly unwilling to take note of the attempts we have made so far to change the state of affairs, even though there have not been many. Believe me, this is not nostalgia for the dithyrambs addressed to the central Komsomol organizations, the Komsomol committees, or the Komsomol as a whole, but simply a real factor in the formation of public opinion, which we must not fail to take into account. But, of course, it is not a matter of this but of what we have not yet found. We have not yet found ways of bringing the local organizations into the movement, many of which exist only in card files. The imperfection of the concept of the perestroyka of the union has led to a situation where we are blindly feeling our way forward, excuse me, sometimes by the trial and error method. The lack of any clear goal and the tactic of taking small steps irritates young people and makes them support innovations that are not very well thought out, of which there has been such an abundance lately. With the imperfect vision of the future and the lack of a position regarding many key issues, we cannot count on the independence of the lower levels alone. In general this independence presupposes not a facilitation but a complication of the work of the center, the Komsomol Central Committee, or some other center of all levels of our Komsomol structure; it is only the nature of the work that changes radically.

At the 7th plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee life brought all these issues to the center of the discussion. But not all of the reproaches against the Komsomol Central Committee and the other Komsomol committees can or should be accepted. I do not know whether you will agree with this but while previously the center and the Komsomol committees were unceremonious in their dealings with the rank-and-file members, recently they have looked simply fearful.

Frequently, for example, one hears accusations of so-called "economization," of disdain for political methods of work with youth, of some kind of shift in the direction of economic activity. This shift is occurring. But what if it is not economics that is the main field of active social creativity today?

From September 1987 through January 1989 the number of centers for scientific and technical creativity increased from 80 to 500. And the value of the agreements concluded increased from R3.5 to 850 million. By now about 600,000 members of creative collectives have been enlisted in the activity of the centers.

Perhaps this is not the place to speak about this but I shall anyway. The centers make it possible to activate the scientific and technical creativity of youth and they stimulate self-education and growth of technical sophistication. As a result of this many young engineers and scientists have been given an additional opportunity, even if it is not a large one, to augment their budgets and the budgets of their families. Tell me, is this not politics?

Or take this. There are about 700 youth housing complexes in operation or under construction in the country. During the period since the 22d Komsomol Congress more than 17,000 young families have been given separate apartments in youth housing complexes. Of course this is just a drop in the bucket compared to all the families that have not yet received their own housing. But still in a number of youth housing complexes the development of social self-management already makes it possible—and I wish to emphasize this—to transfer some of the functions of the local soviets to the organizing committees. Are these not real beginnings of a new way of life? Is this not political reform from below?

Of course these are only two examples. And far from everything is going smoothly in these areas. Many are not making it. Paying tribute to fashion, many Komsomol committees are taken up in the creation of more and more new economic formations without understanding them or their goals and without taking into account their ability to influence them or at least to help them. Some people consider these enterprises simply as a source of financial means during the difficult times of changing over to new conditions for financial support of Komsomol activity.

Of course there is nothing wrong with that. I do not know what you think, but this question depends more than anything else on personnel. During the years of perestroyka there has been a practically complete change of personnel. And they have probably changed even more than once. They have become much younger. As many Komsomol workers recognize, their preparation for work with youth, the aktiv, and the local organizations, especially under the new conditions, is not very good. Moreover, the lack of understanding between active, inventive Komsomol workers and certain higher Komsomol organs and local party leaders is assuming critical forms.

This is true. Here is our main mistake. When changing over to free Komsomol work they frequently stand to lose both in wages and in the determination of their subsequent path in life, and they also end up in a kind of squeeze between the growing dissatisfaction with the results of their work both from below and from above.

There should be concern for the Komsomol worker not in the sense of achieving any benefits or privileges but in the sense of creating simply normal working conditions, normal coming and going, a professional rehabilitation, if you will, on which the Komsomol worker's faith in the future and this normal departure depend. This is the concern of the Komsomol Central Committee, this is our unpaid duty to those who are honestly fighting for renewing the union in spite of any difficulties and crises.

Now on to the situation in the local organizations.

I am convinced that this is the focus of all our problems. Perestroyka has not made any essential changes here. A considerable number of Komsomol members actually have their own organizations. It is as though they exist and at the same time they do not exist. Such a phenomenon, unfortunately, is far from new. Life flows somewhere alongside and past them, and in many cases even the simple Komsomol camaraderie and human mutual interest and mutual understanding are lost.

The influx of new members has slowed down. In 1988, and I must report these figures to the Central Committee plenum, 58,000 or every eighth one of our cells, including more than 650 tekhnikums and vocational and technical schools and more than 1,000 general educational schools, did not accept a single new Komsomol member. And this in and of itself is important and deserves discussion and our attention, but what is more alarming is that there is an outflow of members from the union, and it does not consist of passive people alone. Frequently the people who leave the union are not the ones who, perhaps, should leave and we would not be very sorry about it, but active young people with ideas and initiative who simply have not received the support of their comrades and the Komsomol members in their organization. We shall not "pull anybody by the ear" into our union, but we must not forget that without attention and without respect for each young person who is already in our union or who might come into our union, our union might not exist. Whether to enter or not to enter, whether to leave or stay—we have argued a lot about this during the past more than 2 years, and there is probably only one conclusion: Everybody must decide for himself. When making such a decision each person proceeds from his own experience in communication with members of the organization and its leaders, and his personal perception of the ideas and moral values on which the organization is based, and we have ignored both; this is one of the sources of the crisis and this is the problem we must solve—not at this plenum, of course, but it must be solved.

Recognizing the depth of the crisis and understanding that half measures will not do, we must admit: We must cast off the old and boldly and broadly enter onto new paths. The understandings of these paths are not all the same, even among members of the Central Committee. Judging from the preparations for our plenum, the range of opinions is extremely wide. We need to do serious work to generalize all suggestions, even those which in our view might seem seditious. We must determine our sequence of actions. The main goal, in our view, is a Komsomol congress which should sum up the result and legitimize the new ideas, goals, and principles of the construction of the union.

With all the diversity of approaches to renovating the Komsomol, the majority of them could be reduced to the following: It should be a youth organization with unified program goals; it unites politically active youth for participation in perestroyka; it contributes to unleashing the country's economic, intellectual, and political potential and to creating a modern, dynamic, democratic, and humane socialist society in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all.

The renovated Komsomol should definitely retain the status of a sociopolitical—I repeat, sociopolitical—organization. The Komsomol is a union of political like-thinkers and a school of political activity.

We should suggest that youth themselves develop the image of the country's renovated socialism in which they would like to live, and we should offer this youth alternative, if you will, to both the party and the state. We must not be like those who for 4 years now have been whimpering about the fact that they do not understand what kind of society we are building or what the goal of perestroyka is.

The Komsomol has potential capabilities of self-development, self-improvement, and self-renewal as well as integration into the social processes of the Soviet society which is developing dynamically during the course of perestroyka. As practice shows, the path of renewal of the Komsomol and attribution of a new quality to its activity, as I have already said, is democratization.

Democratization in the Komsomol should proceed both in breadth and in depth and—I wish to emphasize this—from above and from below. It cannot be carried out from above alone. Only consistent democratization and not the twisting of screws, as some people assume, will halt the decline of Komsomol discipline which is so obvious today and will make it impossible for certain Komsomol leaders, by hiding behind Komsomol members, to avoid defining their own positions and escape the responsibility associated with them.

Bureaucratic centralism still lives and the centralized approach to resolving many issues within the union is breaking through here and there. As before, the center is choking on an attempt to solve an immense number of problems which it should not be solving. The center also needs protection—I must discuss this. Its role should be clearly defined by the regulations and it should be interested in this above all because the boundless, alas, generates boundless complaints, to which it is sometimes very difficult to respond.

The local organization must change as well. Its priority, which we have repeatedly declared, should be insured in reality and it should be protected by the new regulations.

The local organization, in our view, should be able to dispose of all of its funds, exercise control over the higher organs, be autonomous in the selection of forms and methods of work, and have every opportunity to take into account the interests of the young people and the entire collective included in it.

Since all the subsequent levels of leadership within the union are needed for the expression, agreement, and coordination of the interests of the local Komsomol organizations, and we insist on precisely this relationship, it is the local ones who through their leaders should determine the percentage of deduction from membership dues that is transferred to the higher Komsomol committees and evaluate their work right up to the Komsomol Central Committee, and it is their inalienable right to elect and recall their leaders from organs that develop their general political line for them.

Local organizations should be created not only in labor collectives, and—I shall allow myself to express what might be a seditious idea—perhaps not in all labor collectives, although we have become accustomed to boasting about the fact that there is no organization or institution that does not have a local organization. But many of them are the kind about which I said that you cannot tell whether they are there or not.

There are Komsomol members but no organization.

I think they should be created in other places as well. It is the Bureau's opinion that we should proceed in this direction. Of course we must be aware that this will require radical changes in accounting for Komsomol members and, perhaps, in general a rejection of the form of accounting that exists today. Once we have said "a" we must go on to "b" and see all the consequences of the proposed decisions and variants. This idea should probably be tested in practice. And very extensively; not within a narrow experiment, but by giving permission to do it in general. Life itself will show the path, but without violating the territorial production principle of construction of the union of many millions of members. I emphasize that this is a basis, and before the test by life.

Various models of the Komsomol are being proposed today: a federation of the youth organizations of the union republics, a unified Komsomol organization with elements of the federative structure. There are also proposals to create within the Komsomol a federation of unions that

join youth together in social categories, students, trainees, military servicemen, and so forth. Each variant has its proponents and each variant has its system of proofs. The Bureau's position, at least for now, during the preparations for this plenum, is this: The new model of the Komsomol can be formed in real life out of the corresponding experience of all parts of the Komsomol. In reality the monolithic Komsomol is differentiated, dismembered, and its parts are separated from one another or, conversely, are merged together. The ties among these parts and upper and lower levels become complicated like an infinite set of peculiarities and conditions. And this convincingly proves that the Komsomol is not dead; the Komsomol is developing and living.

Any development proceeds through differentiation and through complication. The union is transformed in our imagination from a monolithic clump into a self-controlled, independent whole. It is being transformed with pain and difficulty, but this is a real process. A live interweaving of interests out of which the common idea, the common goal, the common task is formed—this is the main thing. In each republic there should be truly independent communist youth unions which together comprise a unified whole—the Komsomol. This corresponds fully to the transformations that are taking place in our country and to the expansion of the rights of the union republics and also to their aspirations.

At the suggestion of Komsomol organizations of various regions of the Russian Federation, it is necessary to define the position of the plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee concerning the political and organizational formation of the Komsomol organizations of the krays and oblasts of the Russian Federation in the new Komsomol. This issue must be resolved in the general context of the reform with an understanding of the peculiarities and the special historical role. I do not think that any of those who represent the Komsomol from the union republics will be offended with the understanding of the real peculiarities of both the special historical role and the special responsibility of this immense part of our union. A draft resolution has been prepared. It will be discussed at our plenum. I would not like to anticipate this discussion. I wish to say only that the first step could be the creation of a commission of the Komsomol Central Committee for an in-depth study and development of the issue which can convene an all-Russian Komsomol conference with mandatory attendance for all of us. If such a law is adopted we shall have to elect deputies and we shall have to discuss the draft regulations and program in the Russian Federation as well.

The Komsomol Central Committee must resolutely come out against attempts to bring points of separation of youth of various nationalities under the flag of independence.

Esteemed Comrades! In our country, where the interests of all ethnic groups are interconnected, it is the deep conviction of the Bureau of the Komsomol Central Committee that any issue must be resolved by proving itself both by whether or not it works and whether such a decision unites or divides union members of various nationalities. In this light we shall have to discuss the decisions of the 22d Congress of the Lithuanian Komsomol and express our attitude toward it. Yesterday the Bureau spent a long time in discussion and introduced a draft resolution. It will go to the editorial commission and I think that during the course of discussion of the resolution there will be a broad exchange of opinions regarding this issue.

I should also like to discuss another thing. By no means, comrades, should we lose sight of—and this happens very frequently—the obvious advantage produced by the unified, for now the only, all-union youth sociopolitical organization. And it is precisely this organization that can effectively defend the interests of youth at the statewide level. Would any other organization really be capable of providing the example of the election of people's deputies and the solution to such a problem as the creation of the committee of the Supreme Soviet? It is now easier to protect the interests of youth at a statewide level because there is a committee. It is easier to acquire sufficient economic and organizational possibilities and financial means for solving youth problems. But how does one achieve the optimal combination of independence and unity? Before answering this question it is important to emphasize once again that the model of the union, its structure, and the principles for the interaction of individual units should not be sent down from above. The qualitative renovation of the Komsomol should be approached relying on the existing reality; that is, through the renovation of the Komsomol itself and the disclosure and elimination of distortions caused by the administrative-command system. A possible variant: the construction of the All-Union Lenin Young Communist League as a union of communist youth unions operating in the Soviet socialist republics that have declared their readiness for joint work. Each youth union included in it can be seen as a completely independent, self-operating organization. It can have its own program and regulations whose fundamental positions to not differ essentially from the Komsomol program and regulations and are based on these documents.

Or another variant is also possible: Someone does not wish to do this but will be guided by the program and regulations of the Komsomol or will determine its own specific characteristics by some other means. In the Komsomol it is necessary to retain individual membership and the unified Komsomol ticket.

Youth organizations united in the Komsomol independently determine the procedure for forming their elective organs, have their own budget, are corporate bodies, and solve all the problems of the internal structure of their activity except for those which by general agreement will be transferred to an authorized center.

The dialectic of perestroyka has revealed a dialectic formula: "A strong center—strong local organizations." One must be guided by a precise balance on this very

finely perceived edge when determining the strategy and tactics for renovating the Komsomol. A strong center is a center that is intended to solve youth problems on the scale of the entire country, to generate ideas, to coordinate interests, and to develop a common political line. Strong local organizations mean political bodies, initiative, creative research, maximum interest, and accounting for the interests and peculiarities of youth living on the territory where they operate.

It is possible that certain republic youth unions will take the path of improving the traditional Komsomol model while others will decide on creating autonomous branch youth organizations within the framework of the union or school, student, and other organizations. Still others will arrange their work according to principles of self-organization of youth from below to above around political programs. And not only political but also other programs. In other words, broad possibilities are opening up for repeated proliferation of our practical experience and the insurance of unity in diversity. It seems that in the new situation the Komsomol regulations lose some of their current meaning and become more of a document that regulates interrelations between the unified all-union Komsomol center and the Komsomols of the union republics and also the interrelations among the latter. But, if you wish, this is perhaps not a very precise definition; it is a kind of collective agreement; that is, a general agreement about basic principles. It should store and accumulate that experience that is generated in the understanding of the unshakeable, general concerns in the life of a communist youth organization in an immense multinational country, but it is precisely experience that is accumulated and not invented or imposed. Such is our understanding of the role of the document. Is the proposed model of the Komsomol capable of providing for interethnic unity of the organization? There is no doubt that even after offering complete independence to the Komsomols of the union republics the Komsomol will remain unified. This unity is provided in connection with the proposed political goal of all-youth unions, our common history, and the struggle for the achievement of a qualitatively new condition of Soviet society. This unity is provided by the common ideological platform of all the unions. This unity relies on the unity of the CPSU, with which the Komsomol is inseparably linked.

In this connection one begins to see a fairly broad range of problems which require in-depth collective development. We are speaking primarily about the development of a program for the union Komsomol organization.

Second, it is necessary to develop clearcut principles for the interrelations between the newly formed general Komsomol center and the organizations included in the Komsomol.

We must solve the problem of organizational principles of the structure and activity of the renovated Komsomol and the retention of the unified membership in the union.

Does the Komsomol need its own program? Strange as it may be, debates have developed around this question recently. Some say it is necessary and others that it is not. I wish to say, comrades, that since the first steps of its activity the Komsomol has been guided by the collectively developed program principles. They have played an important role in consolidating the country's youth on the platform of socialist construction, they have contributed to overcoming the crisis situation in the youth movement, and they have organizationally and politically strengthened the Komsomol ranks.

The solution to youth problems on the scale of the country and the historical experience of the Komsomol show the need to develop and adopt the union program.

A socialist democracy, in our view, presupposes the existence of program documents in each organization. The organizations themselves decided what they should be. With all the differences in the proposals in the draft programs distributed to participants in the plenum, there is still a real possibility of merging them into an integrated document which must be brought up for discussion by the entire union as early as the forthcoming report and election meetings and conferences, or at least the main principles of this document and its basic ideas. If other, alternative platforms should also appear, at least we have now collected those that have already appeared and in some way formulated that which must be discussed in them.

When speaking about the tasks of the internal development of the Komsomol and its integration into a new, democratic system of democratic relations, we must also fully take into account the new situation that has developed in the youth environment in our country.

A monopoly in any sphere like a Komsomol monopoly in the youth movement is one of the causes of stagnation and an impediment to the renewal of the society. We are not even speaking so much about monopolies as about the desire to jump over stages, the desire to pass off what is desired as real. To make the statement that today all Soviet youth share the ideological and moral values held by the Communist Youth League is a good wish that is far from reality.

Perestroyka has revealed this small deception. Also, probably, it is impossible to divide Soviet youth into those who are aware and are members of the Komsomol and those who are unaware and do not belong to the Komsomol. The Komsomol merely strengthens their positions if they interact with other youth movements, organizations, and associations and solve problems of the younger generation in conjunction with them. Whether we like it or not, that is the reality, and we must deal with it. The Komsomol recognizes the inalienable right of young people to join together into other youth organizations, movements, and organs of social independence. We shall strive to work jointly with all youth formations and movements that speak out in favor of

revolutionary renewal, democratization of society, realization of the rights and interests of youth, and the solution of ecological and other socially significant problems and welcome the participation of Komsomol members in their work.

At the same time we clearly and unequivocally state that we shall take an unambiguous position with respect to organizations with antisocialist or antisocial leanings.

The Bureau suggests speaking out on behalf of the plenum in favor of the most rapid consideration of the draft Law on Voluntary Societies and organs of social independence and independent associations in the USSR Supreme Soviet with its subsequent presentation for nationwide discussion. The plenum could express its position in a special resolution.

In the future, as we said at the 4th plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee, we should create new structures in the youth movement. What they will be called is obviously a matter for the future: the Committee of Youth Organizations, Council of Youth Organizations. Various opinions have been expressed. Incidentally, certain of the proposed drafts of the program and regulations are rather drafts of documents which could be used as a basis for the organizational activity of these structures.

One of the central issues for it is the relationship between the Komsomol and the party. The conviction has developed at all levels of the Komsomol: The previous and current practice of interrelating is unacceptable. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev noted at a recent conference that in relation to other units of the political system and social organizations, and I quote: "...we find unacceptable the old approach whereby the party essentially directly controlled the work of the social organizations, which limited their independence...." We must put an end to this anachronism. The Komsomol is a voluntary, independent sociopolitical youth organization which conducts its activity on the basis of a common platform with the CPSU and independently determines the directions and forms of its activity. The overall future of the party and the Komsomol is possible only on the basis of a common ideological-political platform, mutual respect, and complete confidence. The beginning of perestroyka, the 20th Komsomol Congress, and especially the 19th All-Union Party Conference by their decisions put an end to the old understanding of these relations and revealed new possibilities of their restoration and development in keeping with Leninist traditions of party leadership of the union of youth. But this is "de jure." This is theory, but in practice frequently, especially in the local areas, there are remnants of gross administrative pressure on the Komsomol committees and intervention in their affairs. To act through coercion has turned out to be more traditional and effective than through conviction. The organizational independence we are in favor of does not mean, naturally, a weakening of the bond between the party and the Komsomol. This would be suicide for the Komsomol. We are in favor of strengthening bonds that would be characterized by the Komsomol's participation in the development of CPSU policy, joint consideration of the youth problem and other problems, independence in the selection of ways and means of realizing party policy, and complete freedom to criticize mistakes. There are a number of concrete suggestions directed toward eliminating remnants of the administrative-command methods of party leadership of the youth movement. The party nucleus (a cliche, but we have found nothing better) in the Komsomol today should be formed not so much by assigning young party members to work in it who sometimes, incidentally, have neither the corresponding aspirations nor sometimes even the desire, skills, or capabilities, but above all through bringing into the party selected Komsomol leaders who have proved themselves. And I wish to give one more figure: The number of communists among secretaries of local Komsomol organizations decreased during the past 3 years from 46.7 to 19.3 percent. I mentioned this figure not to call for a return to the old days, but simply to show that processes are taking place here that both we and the party committees should think about. We know Lenin's idea about a party of innovators which youth would be more willing to follow, but it must be read from the other side.

It is youth who bring innovative ideas into the party. Not only youth, but primarily youth, because of our peculiarities.

Party organizations must be interested in providing the broadest possible representation in the Komsomol of working young communists in their electoral organs from below to above.

Documents pertaining to work with youth, their problems, and leadership of the Komsomol should, in our opinion, be adopted jointly by party and Komsomol organs. Perhaps there should also be joint discussion of them. Incidentally, Boryan Grantovich Apresyan has already discussed this twice in his speeches at our plenums. By the way it was also approved from this podium during the first years of Soviet power. Then this practice was abandoned.

We regard the restoration of Lenin's principles of party leadership of the Komsomol as the most important condition for its renovation and the strengthening of the positions of the party itself as the vanguard of perestroyka.

The USSR Congress of People's Deputies. One must mention this extremely large political event. We cannot fail to mention it. It deserves to be a separate question on the plenum's agenda. I should like to note that it marked the beginning—frankly, a difficult beginning—of the real transfer of all power to the soviets. In the Bureau's opinion the plenum should welcome this as a condition for resolving the existing socioeconomic, interethnic,

legal, and other crucial problems of our society. We see in this a restoration of the role of the CPSU as the political vanguard of society.

The formation, at the suggestion of the Komsomol Central Committee, of a Committee for Youth Affairs represents a new possibility both for youth and for the Komsomol. The first result of the joint work is the adoption by the USSR Supreme Soviet of a decision releasing from active duty certain categories of military servicemen in emergency service. You know who I am talking about. I am talking about students. We need practical development of methods for joint activity of Komsomol committees, USSR people's deputies from the Komsomol, and the Committee for Youth Affairs. Here we are faced with two issues: determining the most crucial problems of the younger generation and finding ways of influencing their solutions.

It is a primary task to participate actively in the work of the Supreme Soviet and to accelerate the consideration and adoption by it of laws on youth, voluntary societies, the press, and certain others.

We must draw conclusions from the campaign for the elections of USSR people's deputies, think through our tactics during the period of preparing for and conducting the elections to the local soviets of people's deputies, and form effectively working Komsomol youth groups in them. When preparing and discussing drafts of republic election laws there is the crucial question of quotas of social organizations, including the Komsomol. What should happen here? I do not know, comrades, what you think, but in the present situation we should probably fight for a youth Komsomol quota at the level of the republics, krays, and oblasts as a guarantee of representation of youth in the power organs. And then life will show us what to do with it.

There is one section, one subject, one sphere of our work which we have tried not to touch upon, and if we have touched upon it, it has been with extreme caution. This is the international activity of the Komsomol. Today under the conditions of the ever-greater openness of our society the development of processes of democratization and glasnost we feel the close interconnection between the international and intra-union activity of the Komsomol.

In recent years the Komsomol has maintained its international ties under changing conditions. The fact that under these conditions we have managed to retain and strengthen the positions and authority of the Leninist Komsomol in the international youth movement is primarily the result—and I think you will agree with this—of the active foreign political line of the party and the Soviet state for advancing the ideas of the new political thinking.

The 13th World Festival of Youth and Students in Pyongyang was an important event in the international youth movement. It confirmed the viability of the world festival movement. The results of the festival show the correctness of the line of the Bureau of the Komsomol Central Committee toward the development of extensive international ties and contacts on the basis of the priority of human values and the close interconnection of the processes taking place in the world. In addition to this Pyongyang showed once again the complexity of the perception of the idea of new political thinking by a number of youth organizations and the difficulty with which these ideas make their way through the real contradictions and the layers of outdated prejudices, dogmas, and stereotypes.

The festival became a good school for searching for compromise and accounting for the balance of interests of youth associations that represent various political forces in the international youth movement. For us one of the most important lessons of the 13th World Festival was the understanding of the need to actively promote our political line without fearing the quite possible and understandable disagreements concerning one problem or another when searching for a common platform regarding the main cardinal issues, including those concerning fraternal youth unions of the socialist countries.

Here, as before, our main goal is cooperation with everyone who makes a real contribution to the common efforts directed toward securing the rights of each person to live under conditions of peace, freedom, and respect for human dignity. We are faced with a clear understanding of the need to constantly maintain the status of the Komsomol as one of the most influential youth organizations in the international youth movement, and this is a very difficult task. The previous forms have never managed to do this, and certainly not in periods of such a restructuring of the entire union and its foundations. We must understand this. The pluralism that has appeared in the views of Soviet youth and its various groups was manifested in foreign political problems as well. Independent youth organizations have begun to take the initiative for implementing concrete international programs. A new concept has been introduced into practice: popular diplomacy.

There is the question of restructuring the system of organizations for the international activity of the Komsomol. What do we mainly have in mind here?

Having declared that we refuse to have a monopoly on representation of the interests of youth within the country, it is quite logical that the Komsomol should also recognize this principle in international contacts. This presupposes a readiness to cooperate on an equal rights basis within the framework of any broad structure, for example the updated Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR with all the organizations, movements, funds, and associations that already exist or will arise in the process of democratization of society. We hope that in addition to organizations based on the ideas

of perestroyka, democratization, glasnost, and renovation of socialism, this USSR Committee of Youth Organizations will make it possible to develop a platform for joint actions in the international youth movement. Here, entering into this structure with equal rights with other youth associations and refraining from attempts to impose its will, the Komsomol retains the right to fight actively for political influence. We must express the Komsomol's readiness to render support to all Soviet youth organizations operating within the framework of the Constitution and the socialist prospects for establishing international contacts. We are ready and we wish to see in international meeting along with us representatives of other Soviet youth organizations and to take their position into account when forming the general platform that reflects the entire spectrum of opinions of Soviet youth regarding the most important problems of international life.

Such a concept of the international activity of the Komsomol is impossible without its consistent democratization. It is impossible to carry out the international activity of the Komsomol without the active participation of members of the Central Committee and the rank-and-file Komsomol members. We have taken the first step in this direction, albeit a small one: We have created a commission of the Komsomol Central Committee for international ties. Democratization of international ties directly touches upon the relationship of rights and functions of the center and the local Komsomol organizations in the streamlining of international ties. As the experience of foreign youth organizations shows, the development of a strategy for international cooperation and representation in international structures is always the prerogative of nationwide youth associations and their central organs; we must remember this. At the same time we must take into account the specific nature of our multinational country and the expansion of the independence of the Komsomols of the union republics. The Central Committee Bureau suggests even today delegating them the right to have independent contacts and to work in specific priority areas of the international activity of the Komsomol.

In the event that this proposal finds support it will be necessary to transfer to the republics their corresponding share of the financial funds.

The Komsomol Central Committee supports the activity of republic and local organizations in the area of international cooperation which will fully take into account the historical and ethnic features of the republic. The Central Committee Bureau sees the solution to this problem in more active development of regional cooperation of the Komsomols of the union republics and local Komsomol organizations with youth associations of foreign countries and their participation in the projects and programs of international and regional organizations. Finally, there is the establishment of relations with the corresponding international associations on the basis of existing rules, procedures, and international practice.

Mass youth exchanges should be handled primarily by the local organizations. Here is where we should carry out international Komsomol projects and programs that are intended to help hundreds and thousands of youth groups that are doing anything useful in their country, find like-thinkers abroad with similar interests, and provide for exchange of experience, for example, of cooperators. In this sense one can speak about broad decentralized international ties according to interests.

Frequently Komsomol committees raise this question before the Komsomol Central Committee: "Should the Komsomol be the only one to bear the expenses for the development of interstate youth exchanges?" This question is becoming especially crucial now when we have on the agenda the implementation of the agreement between the Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic concerning friendship and cooperation of youth of the two countries and intergovernmental agreements concerning youth exchanges between the Soviet Union and the FRG and the Soviet Union and France. While maintaining interstate agreements and declaring our readiness to participate in their implementation, the Komsomol Central Committee must admit that up to this point it has not solved the problem of their financing or the creation of mechanisms for their realization.

We are speaking out in favor of state support of programs for broad international cooperation and exchange that are implemented through various channels as is done in practically all countries of Europe. We are working for state organs to accelerate the work for the most rapid inclusion of our country in the system of international transportation privileges, Inter-rail, as follows from the agreements signed in Vienna. For successful development of youth exchanges it is necessary to solve the problem of the right of each Soviet citizen to have an international passport in his hands and to use it for entering other countries without any additional formalities.

We are in favor of immediately bringing our legislation in line with the international commitments signed by the USSR, including the final Vienna document.

It is time finally to resolve the issue of the enforcement in our country of the corresponding articles of the All-Union Human Rights Declaration, which proclaims the right to freely leave and return to one's country.

Today the Komsomol is trying to play a new and more active role in the formation of the USSR foreign political course, enlisting the broad masses of youth in this process. The Komsomol, while remaining in agreement with CPSU strategy, will present its own initiatives based on its interpretation of the principles of the new political thinking. Expanding the interaction with state organs and institutions and social organizations, the Komsomol will make sure that the demands of youth are taken into account more fully in its international activity.

The pioneer organization is faced with new tasks. Having supported the plan for the resumption of the activity of the V.I. Lenin All-Union Industrial association [VPO], Lenin, the 7th plenum of the Central Committee thus took on the responsible role of collective guarantor of future transformations in the youngest communist union in the country. The union is called upon to be truly voluntary, independent, and self-controlled, involving people of various ages, and is much more independent than it was before in solving its own problems. The union is ideologically akin to the party and the Komsomol, the predecessor to the Komsomol.

Naturally all this should be reflected in the drafts of the program and regulations of the Komsomol and the founding documents of the pioneer organization itself and should become a subject of discussion among Komsomol members and pioneers.

I think we can support the proposals to conduct the 10th convention of the V.I. Lenin VPO even next year. We in the Komsomol must take advantage of the period of preparation for the convention to restore our frankly shaky authority as leaders and become real and not temporary friends to young Leninists and all Soviet boys and girls.

And the last thing. About the 21st Komsomol Congress. This has already been discussed and the Bureau's position has been presented. Much that is being said about the Komsomol today from what was said in the report, which will be the subject of lively disputes and discussions, is the prerogative of the highest organ—the Komsomol congress.

There are various opinions about the times for conducting it. I have already related the Bureau's viewpoint regarding this. Apparently this question needs additional study and consideration in the context of the forthcoming intrapolitical events in the country and taking into account the large—I wish to emphasize, large—amount of preparatory work without which the congress will not fulfill its role.

The preparation for the present plenum showed that a critical attitude toward the Komsomol, although it is difficult, gradually grows into a movement for returning to our organization its previously declared position of the real political leader of youth.

I must state the difference in the approaches and viewpoints about how to do this. But we cannot fail to see the common interests and as quickly as possible enlist Komsomol forces in the renewal of the society. Many initiative groups of Komsomol members and youth have gone considerably further with respect to certain positions than the Central Committee, the Bureau, or the Secretariat has, and I do not know about you but it seems to me that there is nothing shameful or offensive in this. We should welcome pluralism of opinions regarding questions of the Komsomol's future in the society and try to weld it into a general understanding of the foundations of the structure and the activity of the union in the new situation to the extent that this is possible. The discussion of the Komsomol is developing one-sidedly so far and the voice of Komsomol members sounds timid in the local Komsomol organizations, at the plants and factories, and on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Speaking about the program and the new regulations and the new model of the Komsomol, we are speaking out in favor of extensive discussion in the local Komsomol organizations regarding these issues and issues related to youth in their labor and training collective. We must also discuss their influence on it directly and with the help of the central electoral organs of the Komsomol.

In conclusion I should like to express my confidence that at this time, which is very difficult for the Komsomol, its Central Committee will be on top of the problems facing it and the very fact that this plenum was conducted shows that we have what is necessary to achieve a decisive and deep renovation of the union and to rise above the particulars and get down to the development of the foundations for a new informal unity of the organizations. I think that our plenum should call all healthy forces of the organization and all members to rally around the Central Committee in its work and help it perform the difficult work it will have to do before the next Komsomol congress.

Chairman Klykov Gives Speech

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[Unattributed report: "The Speech of Chairman of the Komsomol Central Auditing Commission, N. Klykov"]

[Text] I would like to substantiate the need for perestroyka in control in the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] with an analysis of the state of affairs.

First of all I support the conclusions of the report on the status of the Komsomol and on the work of the Bureau and Secretariat since the 20th congress, and I would like to augment them with the conclusions of the Central Auditing Commission, which are based on the checks and audits conducted during the period since the congress. The main materials on our checks have been published in the Central Committee information bulletin and I think that those attending the plenum are familiar with them.

In general, considerable work has been done to restructure the work of the Central Committee and its apparatus. And in this sense the report could be continued. But the purpose of today's debate lies elsewhere, namely, in determining why the processes of perestroyka are moving only slowly and in a contradictory manner and are not being properly supported among members of the Komsomol and workers in the lower wings of the Komsomol structures.

Let me deal with some of the problems that are holding back perestroyka in the Central Committee and its apparatus and affecting these processes in the Komsomol. Today we have been forced to recognize that we are not succeeding in eradicating the negative phenomena that were discussed at the 20th Komsomol Congress, namely, bureaucracy, formalism, and excessive paperwork. As before, there is an enormous load self- generated by the Central Committee apparatus by all-union and international measures and the production of documents. More manpower and financial resources are being spent on this. The internal circulation of documents in the Central Committee alone (the memoranda from the Central Committee departments to the Bureau and Secretariat) has numbered almost 2,000 subjects during the period since the congress, not counting the letters, resolutions, interdepartmental correspondence, and thousands of other documents. Since the 20th congress about 600 Central Committee resolutions have been circulated to the local level, a slight decrease. The dissatisfaction of local Komsomol committees is understandable, for two directives arrive each day from the center. Excessive paperwork weighs down the Central Committee apparatus like chains of penance and prevent it from coming close to the young people. And the switch to spending time on the preparation and discussion of documents has increased in recent years.

During the course of a check conducted this year on the passage of documents in the Central Committee and the Komsomol committees the auditing commissions note that serious shortcomings exist in the procedure for their preparation and circulation from the center to the primary organization. Particular concern is evoked by the fact that in terms of the most important questions affecting the entire league, the Central Committee has no time to discuss those documents with the Komsomol organizations. Thus, only 1 week was set aside for discussion of the provision on monetary assets for the Kazakh Komsomol Central Committee; even less time was allocated for the Komsomol in Komi, the Grodno Obkom [oblast party committee] and the Belorussian Central Committee. Instructions on work with documents have been arriving in the local Komsomol committees only after the period set aside for their discussion and submission of information to the Central Committee has expired. Or take a recent example. Igor Mikhailovich Ilinskiy started his report on the results of the discussion of the draft law on youth before the 7th Central Committee plenum and before its submission to the Supreme Soviet by stating that proposals from the local level were only just beginning to come in and the discussions only just starting. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that the resolution of obviously urgent problems was first postponed for many months, and then discussed and decisions reached in haste. Hence also the dissatisfaction at the local level with the content of many Komsomol Central Committee decisions.

Following the adoption of many decisions, it takes a long time to work on them and there are major delays in passing them down to the local level, into the obkoms and kraykoms [kray party committee] and the central committees of the union republics. And when we take into consideration the fact that the state of technical facilities, mainly rotary duplicators, available to the local Komsomol committees does not enable them to pass on those decisions immediately to the raykoms [rayon party committee] and primary organizations, then we are talking about several months. A number of resolutions have not even ever reached the rayon level but have been detained at the republic or oblast level.

Virtually no materials on the content of decisions reached by the Komsomol Central Committee are carried by the mass media, first and foremost KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. This is the kind of immediacy given to the management of our league and we can scarcely be surprised at why there are constant questions about Komsomol Central Committee decisions from local Komsomol workers, or why the changes are being made so slowly. There is no doubt that measures should include a reduction in the number of resolutions and distribution of documents from the Komsomol Central Committee direct to the rayon level. In my opinion, large amounts of spending could be saved in the expensive international measures and the money used to buy the necessary equipment for facsimile communications, which would enable us to maintain operational links with the structural elements of the Komsomol.

With respect to lively, everyday painstaking work with young people, the activity of the Central Committee and its apparatus is not regarded as paramount here, and simply from an analysis of what has been said above you understand that no time is available for it. And the attitude of the Central Committee and its apparatus toward the problems, anxieties, concerns, and needs that are addressed through letters to the Central Committee, along with the appeals and criticisms and proposals, and toward feedback through this very important channel, is not becoming more receptive.

Information about the work of the Bureau and Secretariat has shown that not many letters, about 120 annually, are improperly examined in the Komsomol Central Committee. But members of the Central Auditing Commission are disturbed that when reviewing the letters that were addressed to the 20th congress, and during the period since the congress, most departments and subdivisions of the Central Committee have been focusing their attention on the formal aspect of the matter, namely, organizing review of the letters within the periods laid down. Stereotype answers have been permitted, and this was the reason for about 300 repeat appeals being sent to the Central Committee in the congress mail alone. There have been instances of red tape and untimely and incomplete adoption of measures, and unjustified delays in their examination.

The results of a check conducted on the work of the Central Committee departments with criticisms and proposals expressed at the 20th congress and during the

period following the congress also indicate the priority of the pro forma approach over the meaningful. The steps proposed to implement them are frequently inadequate and unsound, and are aimed not at achieving a final purpose but rather initial actions or the preparation of yet another document.

Managerial decisions are made not by members and candidate members of the Central Committee but workers in the apparatus. The work done jointly by several departments together has yielded poor results. Not all criticisms and proposals falling within the competence of the party, state, and public organizations are being sent to their proper destinations, including particular comments on the Komsomol 20th Congress.

The Central Committee is not receiving any enormous and, in our view, very important stream of comments and proposals sent to it from training and re-training courses for Komsomol cadres and aktivs, Komsomol measures, and apparatus workers who travel out to the localities, or from the mass media.

The principledness and exactingness in the evaluations made by members of the Central Auditing Commission are based on the premise that behind each appeal, letter, comment, and request they see a specific person with his problems and pains, a comrade who is in the league, who, perhaps for the only time in his life, appeals to the Central Committee and does not receive the attention he deserves. From the results of each check and audit the members of the Central Auditing Commission propose to the Bureau and Secretariat specific measures to improve the activity of the Central Committee and its apparatus, but, as you have understood from the information presented above, the state of affairs is changing little for the better. Concerned about this, the members of the Central Auditing Commission were forced to discuss the existing situation at their own meeting on the eve of the plenum, and, in June of this year, with the Central Committee first secretary Viktor Ivanovich Mironenko. The practice of delaying review of materials form checks and audits and of failing to take the necessary steps, which is now entrenched in the Central Committee Secretariat, was deemed unacceptable. Against the backdrop of a passive attitude toward these materials on the part of the Secretariat we also observe a pro forma attitude toward them by workers in the apparatus, subdivisions, and sections, and this means that many of the shortcomings and violations mentioned above, and also mentioned by Viktor Ivanovich in his report, have not been eliminated.

The impression is being created that in fact in the Central Committee they have forgotten how to control and make demands. Some Bureau and Secretariat decisions are not carried out, not to mention the assignments of the operational meeting and the first secretary. And this is one reason why we are marking time. But the main reason why we are not succeeding in overcoming formalism and bureaucracy in the work of the Komsomol organs and their apparatuses, including the Central Committee, is nevertheless the lack of a mechanism for systematic and comprehensive control from below, from the Komsomol members themselves. Vladimir Ilich Lenin said long ago that without this we shall not overcome bureaucratic distortions, and the historical references made in the report confirm this.

The materials circulated to those attending the plenum provided an analysis of the state of affairs and outlined ways to develop the control system. The essence of our proposals is to make the forms and methods of control from below more diverse. The problem today is to bring the activity of each member of the Komsomol into line with the demands of the leading organs, and to make these demands match the interests of the Komsomol members themselves. The Komsomol organs that have recommended their own representatives for elective organs should have the right to give them instructions, make requests, and regularly hear accountability reports about their work, and have the right of recall. The members of the Komsomol committees and the members of the Central Committee and the commissions should be given a real right to monitor the activity of the apparatus and to some extent the activity of the Bureau and Secretariat, and be able really to influence their work. It is a question of finding the kinds of forms of control from below that would make it possible for the Komsomol member either directly or through his own representatives to exercise control and check the work of the elected organs.

At this plenum a definition of the status of the Central Committee member and a temporary provision on the commissions will be adopted, and I think that here the right of control should be described in a more understandable and more specific way. The forms of control from below should, in our view, also be reinforced in the rules, in the definition of the status of the members of elected organs, the regulations for the work of the Komsomol Central Committee, and the provisions on the Komsomol apparatus and the auditing commissions. All authors of provisions to be included in the Komsomol rules, with which those attending the plenum are familiar, propose that the auditing commissions should be retained as control organs, and today no alternatives are being suggested. But, in our view, for the sake of appearances, the auditing commission nevertheless formally should not be elected at conferences and congresses. We should certainly create for them realistic conditions for the fulfillment of their functions and for their work. Otherwise we should probably decide to disband them. The right of members of the Komsomol to be involved in monitoring the Komsomol organs could be realized in the work of the auditing commission. And also by making full use of feedback: reports, letters, appeals, criticisms, and proposals submitted from below; the auditing commissions could reach specific management decisions for the Komsomol committees, naturally within the limits of their competence.

On the other hand, under the conditions of the extended right of independence for lower elements in the Komsomol structure, the auditing commission could become part of the mechanism of self-monitoring, self-management, and self-purging in the Komsomol organizations, and be a qualified and permanent opponent of the Komsomol committee. But in order to resolve this task, after extending their functions and rights, it is essential to enhance their organizational and financial independence. The need is arising to create new organs—monitor-and-audit commissions. This task was set by the Komsomol Central Committee 4th Plenum, and in line with this proposals were drawn up to restructure the activity of the auditing commissions.

The Central Committee 2nd plenum made a start on new forms for the economic activity of the Komsomol committees. In some places this activity is being distorted and not used for these purposes. Today there is a growing threat that this activity will be discredited, and likewise the Komsomol committees, since questions of monitoring this activity remain unresolved.

Through organizational and financial reinforcement of the auditing commission we could create a mechanism that provides guarantees against violations in the economic work of the Komsomol committees.

In the 2 years since the 20th Komsomol Congress we have in the main transferred the rights of the center to our lower elements, and enhanced their independence, but in my opinion little has been done to enhance their sense of responsibility or strengthen discipline and the unity and cohesion of our league.

Centralization is possible only given preferential development of the control system, but control from below, control by the Komsomol themselves at the local level. Otherwise, as we move away from a central bureaucracy in Moscow we shall, in my view, move toward a bureaucracy at the local level, and history has confirmed that this can be even worse, and more refined.

There can be no mature democracy without firm, aware discipline in our league, and demolition of the command-administrative system need not entail erosion of the principle of democratic centralism but should rather fill it with new content.

And as we move along the path of democratization of control it will acquire increasing importance.

I am convinced that principles of control in the Komsomol as a function of management must be organized right from the start in a basic document rather than being guided by the residual principle and attempts made to setting it up somewhere off on the side. Only in this way shall we be able in the long term to avoid possible distortions and omissions, and in fact realize the tasks facing the Komsomol.

The concept that we have presented does not, of course, answer all questions, and accordingly it is important to consider the proposed concept at the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission and submit it for discussion by members of the Komsomol in the Komsomol organizations. As the main players in the league, it is they who should determine what kind of control there should be. After that, the necessary decisions can be reached at the 21st congress.

Plenum Activities Updated

18001441 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Aug 89 p 1

["Information Report"]

[Text] As has already been reported, the 8th Plenum of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee continued its proceedings on 29 July in Moscow.

At the evening meeting, the issue of the 22d Congress of the Komsomol of Lithuania was considered. The plenum adopted a resolution on this issue calling for the setting up of a commission of members of the Komsomol central elected organs in order to study the issues brought up by the decisions of the 22d Congress of the Komsomol of Lithuania. The commission will submit proposals to the next plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee.

The plenum confirmed the composition of the commission in question.

The plenum adopted Provisional Regulations on the Komsomol Central Committee Commissions, Procedures for the Komsomol Central Committee Plenum, amendments and additions to Regulations on Audit Commissions of the Republic, Kray, Oblast, Okrug, City, Rayon, and Basic Komsomol Organizations.

The plenum adopted a resolution "On Allocating Funds for Establishing the Positions of Paid Chairmen of Audit Commissions in Republic, Kray, and Oblast Komsomol Organizations," as well as a resolution "On the Structure and Staff of the Apparatus of the Komsomol Central Audit Commission."

The plenum adopted a resolution on raising the salaries of paid Komsomol employees and employees of the komsomol press.

The plenum also adopted a resolution on allocating the funds of Komsomol for improving pension services to young handicapped people.

Subsequently, the plenum adopted a resolution "On Procedures for Publishing the Stenographic Record of the 8th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum."

At this point, the 8th Plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee completed its proceedings.

Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee V.A. Medvedev and Candidate Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, CPSU Central Committee Secretary G.P. Razumovskiy took part in the proceedings of the plenum.

Latvian Central Committee Plenum Opens

LD1008214689 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1805 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum that began today is discussing the republic's sociopolitical processes and the Latvian Communist Party's action program. More than 600 representatives of party organizations of various regions of the republic are taking part in its work. It is the first time that the question of choosing a future path in the conditions of deepening the processes of perestroyka has been framed so unambiguously and in such a principled manner.

The plenum was preceded by serious work on creating alternate programs for renewing party activity. Several weeks before the plenum the draft program What the Communist Party of Latvia Is Striving For was published. This document was prepared on the basis of proposals by primary party organizations.

The form in which the plenum is being held is also unusual. Live reportage in Latvian and Russian is being broadcast from the conference hall. The plenum is divided into two stages. During the first stage, which will last for 2 days, it has been decided to give the floor to all those who wish to speak. And more than 400 representatives of the republic's political and social organizations have been invited to attend. It is intended that after the end of the first stage the plenum will take a break for 10-15 days. During this time a specially formed group will draft the final document, after which it will be presented for discussion by the plenum.

Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, presented a report to the plenum.

Vagris Addresses Plenum

LD1008224589 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1327 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Riga, 10 Aug (TASS)—"Any attempts to create political structures aimed at holding back perestroyka or at eliminating the constitutional foundations of socialist society are unacceptable to us," stated Janis Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. He was speaking today at a plenum of the Central Committee devoted to discussing the socio-political processes in the republic and the program of action of the Latvian Communist Party. Question of interethnic relations will also be touched on.

Janis Vagris gave a detailed appraisal of the contemporary political situation in the republic. He particularly noted the importance of consoldating all forces and all national movements in Latvia to implement the most important program tasks of the restructuring of Soviet society.

There is a direct relay—in Latvian and Russian—from the hall of the plenary sessions. In the evening it is possible to watch extracts on television. There is very great interest in the plenum.

A few weeks before the plenum, the draft of the program "What the Communist Party of Latvia is striving for" was published. This document was prepared by the secretariat and by departments of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia on the basis of proposals by primary party organizations. Unlike the practice of previous years, this was not the only version of the plan of action. Readers were able to acquaint themselves also with the draft that was prepared by secretaries, mainly of rural party raykoms. The secretaries of the party committees of major industrial enterprises of Riga published their version. The proposals of the Daugavpils city party committee were published.

The form in which the plenum is being held is also unusual—it is divided into two stages. In the first, which began today, it was decided to give the floor to all who wanted to speak. Over 400 representatives of the republic's political and social forces have been invited to the plenum, including from the Latvian People's Front and the Latvian Working People's Inter-Front.

It is planned that at the end of the first stage, the plenum will take a break for 10-15 days. A working group will be set up that will work out a general platform, and discussion will take place in the primary party organizations.

Only members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia will take part in the second stage of the plenum.

Format, Agenda Cited

PM1008184189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 6

[correspondent Irina Litvinova report under the "Direct Link" rubric: "IZVESTIYA'S Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter: Glasnost Is Total"]

[Text] Riga—On the morning of 10 August, Latvia's inhabitants became "participants" in a Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum. Live reportage was carried from the conference hall—in Latvian and Russian. In the evening one could see highlights on television. There is very great interest in the plenum. Its participants are discussing the sociopolitical processes in the republic and the Latvian Communist Party action program, and questions of interethnic relations will be broached.

A draft program entitled "What the Latvian Communist Party Wants" was published several weeks before the plenum. The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat and departments prepared this document on the basis of proposals put forward by primary party organizations. Unlike the practice of previous years, this was not the action program's only version. Readers were also able to acquaint themselves with a draft prepared by secretaries of, by and large, the party's rural rayon party committees. Party committee secretaries at Riga's major industrial enterprises published their own version. Proposals made by the Daugavpils City party committee have been made public.

The form in which the plenum is being held is also unusual—it has been divided into two stages. For the first stage, which began on 10 August, it was decided to give the floor to anyone who wished to speak. More than 400 representatives of the republic's political and social forces have been invited to the plenum, including representatives of the Latvian People's Front and the International Front of Working People of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic.

It is intended that the plenum will interrupt its work for 10-15 days after the first stage. A working group will be set up which will elaborate a general platform, and a discussion will be held in the primary party organizations. Only members of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee will take part in the plenum's second stage, but the radio and television relay will continue.

Draft Law for Latvian Economic Independence

18001333 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 1 Jul 89 p 2

[Draft Law of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic: "On the Economic Independence of the Latvian SSR"]

[Text] The main meaning of the republic's incipient economic sovereignty is that all local economic possibilities are to be utilized to satisfy the vital needs of the population. On the path to social conversion of the economy it will be necessary to overcome the monopolism of the departments and the collective egoism of the enterprises and to conduct a structural rearrangement of the economy.

The draft law "On the Economic Independence of the Latvian SSR," prepared by the republic Council of Ministers at the instruction of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, determines the general legal foundations for republic economic accountability. Work groups have already begun to develop other draft laws and to rework existing ones which will concretize many norms of the given draft law.

Thus the following draft laws are being developed:

1. Law on local self-management
2. Law on taxes
3. Law on banks
4. Law on monetary circulation
5. Law on commodity production (unified law on the activity of the state, cooperative, and other producer)
6. Law on the protection of nature
7. Law on budget rights
8. Law on state financial inspection
9. Law on wages and social guarantees
10. Law on leasing and monetary relations
11. Law on quality and protection of consumer interests
12. Land code
13. Law on public education
14. Law on resource saving
15. Law on health protection
16. Law on social security
17. Law on culture
18. Law on prices
19. Law on the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers

Suggestions and remarks may be sent to this address: Riga, Lenin St., 36, Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, with the caveat "Economic sovereignty."

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The Latvian SSR is a sovereign state which determines the priority of the right of the people of the Latvian SSR to living space, production resources, and natural wealth. The Latvian SSR has the rights of a national republic to conduct its own socioeconomic policy, coordinating its national state interests with the common interests of the USSR population on the basis of an agreement and commodity relations. The Latvian SSR exercises its economic independence through republic economic accountability. Republic expenditures are covered by the revenue it receives. Control of economic processes on the territory of the Latvian SSR is exercised independently by organs of state authority and state management of the republic on the basis of the laws of economic development. The economic ties between the sovereign Latvian SSR and the state organs of the USSR and other union republics and regions and also with foreign states are regulated by reciprocal agreements and acts of consent.

SECTION I. The Essence of Republic Economic Independence, Basic Goals, and Principles

Article 1. The Essence of the Economic Independence of the Latvian SSR

The essence of the economic independence of the Latvian SSR is based on the sovereignty of the Latvian SSR, the separateness of its property, and the unity of the republic's national economy. The Latvian SSR national economy under the conditions of economic independence cooperates with national economic complexes of other union republics, based on the principles of commodity-monetary relations in keeping with the laws of the Latvian SSR.

Article 2. The Basic Goals of the Economic Independence of the Latvian SSR

Under the conditions of the economic independence of the Latvian SSR priority is given to goals which contribute to raising the standard of living of the people and expand the possibilities of development and self-expression of the population, regardless of nationality or citizenship, and also improve the ecological situation.

The economic activity should provide for the preservation of the basic ethnic group on its historical territory, the development of the social, professional, and spiritual potential of the Lettish ethos, preservation of cultural traditions and expansion of their utilization, and improvement of the demographic situation.

Activity that runs counter to the social, economic, cultural, and ecological goals of the Latvian SSR is curtailed with the help of economic and legal means.

Article 3. The Responsibility of the Latvian SSR Under Conditions of Economic Independence

The economically independent Latvian SSR is fully responsible for the effectiveness and consequences of its economic activity, for the satisfaction of the social, material, and spiritual needs of the population, for efficient utilization of the natural wealth of the Latvian SSR and the condition of the environment, and also for the fulfillment of contractual commitments of organs of state authority and republic management with state organs of the USSR and other union republics, their regions, and foreign states.

Article 4. The Place of the Latvian SSR and the USSR in the International Division of Labor

The Latvian SSR as a sovereign state participates in the division of labor in keeping with its natural, demographic, economic, and cultural circumstances and capabilities both within the framework of the USSR national economy and on the basis of mutually advantageous agreements for the exchange of goods, raw material, financial resources, and services.

Article 5. The Economic Complex of the Latvian SSR

All enterprises, associations, institutions, and organizations located on the territory of the Latvian SSR (with the exception of those involved in USSR defense) are included in the Latvian SSR economic complex, whose activity, in keeping with the laws of the Latvian SSR, is regulated by organs of state authority and management of the Latvian SSR.

In keeping with the laws of the Latvian SSR and with the permission of organs of state authority of the Latvian SSR, enterprises, institutions, and organizations belonging to the union and other union republics, foreign states, and their juridicial and natural persons may also operate on its territory.

Economic formations belonging to the Latvian SSR and its juridicial and natural persons may also be created in other republics of the USSR and in foreign states in keeping with laws and reciprocal agreements that are in force there.

Article 6. The Basic Directions of Economic Activity Under Conditions of Economic Independence

Organs of state authority and management of the Latvian SSR direct the economic activity of the republic's national economic complex mainly with economic levers based on the laws of the Latvian SSR, maintain systems and funds for their implementation, and also realize a differentiated structural policy.

The state creates favorable conditions for the development of the Latvian SSR national economy on the basis of modern production technology and science-intensive products while conducting an economically favorable investment policy, supporting organizations that develop production of products capable of competing on the international market, and providing for international ties and also improvement of the professional qualities of the workers.

Article 7. Basic Principles of the Economic Activity of the Latvian SSR

Economic relations in the sovereign republic are based on the following principles:

1. independence of the activity of juridicial and natural persons based on separation and distribution of the areas of competence of organs of state management, local self-management, and economic management;

2. diversity and equal status of forms of property, legal protection of all these forms of property, and freedom of forms of management on the basis of commodity-monetary relations;

3. increased legal and economic independence of administrative-territorial units of the republic and decentralization of management;

4. complete economic independence and equal partner relations with other state organs of the USSR, other union republics, and foreign states.

Article 8. Insurance of Independence of Economic Activity

The Latvian SSR, developing commodity-monetary relations, provides for independence of the economic activity of juridicial and natural persons and protects their rights and revenues. Organs of state authority and management of the Latvian SSR, with the help of normative acts, create equal opportunities for the creation

of economic formations of various sizes, thus providing for elasticity of the republic economy and competition among enterprises without allowing the development of monopolies.

Direct intervention of the state in the activity of the enterprises is possible only in those cases and through the procedure envisioned in the laws of the Latvian SSR.

Article 9. Property and Diversity of Forms of Property

The property of the Latvian SSR is independent, and economically and legally it is separate from the property of other union republics.

The principle of diversity of property is realized in the Latvian SSR. Property is protected by the law. Damage caused to the owner is reimbursed in keeping with the laws of the Latvian SSR. The state contributes to the integration of various forms of property and provides for their equality in taxation and other duties with respect to the society.

Article 10. Decentralization of Territorial Administration

The development of the administrative-territorial units of the Latvian SSR takes place in the interests of the local residents and on their initiative.

The functions of regulation of the socioeconomic development of the Latvian SSR are distributed among state institutions and self-management organs and juridicial and natural persons in such a way as to both satisfy the interests of individual subjects of management and provide for the effectiveness of all the republic's economic activity.

Local self-management on the territory of the Latvian SSR is provided by local soviets of people's deputies whose competence is determined by the laws of the Latvian SSR on local self-management.

Local soviets of people's deputies guide social and economic life on their territory based on the principles of economic accountability and they have an independent budget.

Article 11. Banks and Monetary Circulation

Banking and monetary circulation fall within the competence of the Latvian SSR, including the introduction of its own money with a determination of the policy for its exchange and the rate with respect to other currencies, including the ruble as the common currency of the USSR.

The system of banks of the Latvian SSR includes the Central Bank of the Latvian SSR (Latvian Bank), commercial banks, foreign trade banks, investment banks, and other specialized credit institutions. The Latvian bank is an independent organization whose status is established by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet.

In keeping with the laws of the Latvian SSR and with the permission of organs of state authority of the Latvian SSR branches of banks of the USSR and foreign states may operate on its territory.

Article 12. State Taxes

The main source for covering expenditures involved in the development of the Latvian SSR national economy and its state regulation, the satisfaction of state (public) social needs, and the performance of state management functions are state taxes. Normatives of state taxes (income tax, leasing of state property, rent payments, and so forth) are established by the highest organ of state authority of the Latvian SSR taking into account the socioeconomic policy conducted in the republic. Taxation of national economic juridicial and natural persons of the Latvian SSR is carried out in keeping with the Latvian SSR law on taxes.

Organs of state authority and management of the Latvian SSR guarantee the implementation of a system of taxes which is directed toward social protection of citizens, control by the society over the distribution of the produced product, and provision of the necessary redistribution, regardless of the form of ownership of the means of production.

Article 13. State and Local Budgets of the Republic

The Latvian SSR has an independent state budget, a republic budget, and budgets of local self-management which are formed from taxes and other payments established for juridicial and natural persons. The general policy for the formation of the state, republic, and local budgets and also their interrelations are determined by the laws of the Latvian SSR concerning taxes, the budget, and self-management.

Mutually coordinated deductions are made from the state budget of the Latvian SSR into the USSR budget in order to cover payments for the performance of functions which organs of state authority of the Latvian SSR, in keeping with an agreement, have turned over to organs of USSR state authority.

Article 14. Partner Relations of the Latvian SSR

The Latvian SSR actively participates in the commodity market of the USSR, carries out mutually advantageous cooperation with foreign countries, and freely enters into the world economic system.

SECTION II. Property

Article 15. Forms of Property in the Latvian SSR

The basis of the economic system of the Latvian SSR is comprised of the following forms of property:
—state property of the Latvian SSR;
—collective property;
—property of natural persons.

Within the framework of the laws of the Latvian SSR on the territory of the republic there can be property of the USSR and other union republics, foreign states, their juridicial and natural persons, international organizations, and also various mixed forms of property.

The state creates the necessary conditions for proliferating all forms of property.

Property relations are regulated by laws of the Latvian SSR.

Article 16. State Property of the Latvian SSR

The land, minerals, forests, internal and territorial waters, and other natural wealth are the exclusive state property of the Latvian SSR.

The property of the Latvian SSR also includes fixed industrial and agricultural production capital acquired with state funds, means of transportation and communications, the basic housing supply, the property of state trade, municipal and other enterprises, and also other property necessary for performance of the tasks of the Latvian SSR as a sovereign state.

The Latvian SSR has exclusive rights with respect to the air space over the territory of the republic, its continental shelf, and the economic zone of the Baltic Sea.

The state property of the Latvian SSR is independently separate from the property of other union republics and also from the general state property of the USSR.

Article 17. Possession, Use, and Disposal of Latvian SSR Property

Questions of possession, use, and disposal of the state property of the Latvian SSR are resolved by organs of state authority and management of the Latvian SSR.

By a decision of the highest organ of state authority of the Latvian SSR some of the republic's state property can be turned over for possession, use, and disposal by soviets of people's deputies. This property is built up with funds from local self-management.

In keeping with the laws of the Latvian SSR, state property and property that has been placed at the disposal of local self-management can be leased, sold, or turned over to juridicial and natural persons or social organizations of the republic, and firms and organizations of other union republics and foreign states.

Article 18. Collective Property

Collective property includes means of production, objects of the infrastructure, financial resources, securities, and other property acquired from social organizations, cooperatives, kolkhozes [collective farms], joint stock companies, and groups of natural persons, or borrowed funds.

Subjects of collective property use their property independently in keeping with the laws of the Latvian SSR and their provisions (statutes).

Article 19. Property of Natural Persons

The property of natural persons and their families can include production capital, objects of the infrastructure, financial resources, securities, and other property acquired with their own funds and also the product of intellectual labor which is the object of patent and license rights regulated by the laws of the Latvian SSR.

Natural persons, in keeping with the laws of the Latvian SSR under the established policy, are granted a plot of land necessary for their work.

Natural persons may sell their property, lease it, turn it over to others' possession, or inherit it in keeping with the laws of the Latvian SSR.

Article 20. Property Outside the Territory of the Latvian SSR

The conditions for the possession, use, and disposal of state and collective property and property of natural persons which is located in other union republics or foreign states are determined by the state on whose territory the property is located and also by reciprocal agreements. The Latvian SSR renders assistance in protecting the aforementioned property.

Article 21. Property of the Union, Union Republics, Foreign States and Their Citizens, and Foreign Firms on the Territory of the Latvian SSR

On the territory of the Latvian SSR there can be enterprises, structures, objects of the infrastructure and objects of the nonproduction sphere, banks, and financial resources which are partially or fully the property of the USSR, other union republics, foreign states and their citizens, and foreign firms.

The activity and functioning of this property are carried out in keeping with the laws of the Latvian SSR and reciprocal agreements.

SECTION III. State Regulation of the Economy

Article 22. State Regulation of the Economy of the Latvian SSR

The high organs of state authority and management of the Latvian SSR with the help of laws and economic levers:

1. regulate interrelations between juridicial and natural persons of the Latvian SSR national economy and the state by establishing quotas for imports and exports and also interrelations with enterprises, institutions, organizations, and other subjects of management;
2. determine the use of the national income and proportions of development of the republic national economy and implement programs for the economic and social development of the national economy;
3. protect the interests of the Latvian SSR with respect to USSR organs of state authority and management, other union republics, and foreign states;
4. in the interests of the republic population, regulate prices and rates for goods and services and take measures against dictatorship of monopolies;
5. regulate processes of migration of the population;
6. provide for efficient utilization of the republic's labor resources, the cleanliness of the environment, and ecological balance, and also safe working conditions;
7. realize guarantees of providing a minimum standard of living for residents of the republic and other necessary guarantees of social security and legal guarantees of insurance.

Article 23. State and Social Control in the Latvian SSR

Only organs of state and social control of the Latvian SSR, in keeping with the laws of the Latvian SSR, can exercise control in all enterprises, institutions, and organizations located on the territory of the Latvian SSR and included in the republic's national economic complex, and also give them appropriate instructions.

Article 24. Economic Legislation of the Latvian SSR and the Application of the Present Law

The economic independence of the Latvian SSR is exercised on the basis of the present law of the Latvian SSR. In addition to the present law, Latvian SSR laws are being developed concerning the unity of the republic's national economic complex, economic activity (of entrepreneurs), the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, local self-management, the budget system and taxation, banks and monetary circulation, foreign economic activity, protection of consumer interests, the formation of prices and rates, and also other laws regulating the economy and the social and cultural spheres in the republic.

Until other laws of the Latvian SSR are coordinated with the present law and other normative acts that provide for the republic's economic independence, previously adopted legislation remains in force in the Latvian SSR as long as it does not contradict the present law.

Article 25. On the Law Going Into Effect

The present law will go into effect on the territory of the Latvian SSR on 1 January 1990.

Latvian Planning Chief on Economic Autonomy

PM0908140989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Miyervald Raman, chairman of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic State Planning Committee, by own correspondent I. Litvinova: "Economy Without Absurdities. M. Raman Reflects on the Principles of the Republics' Economic Independence"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Litvinova] To begin our conversation, Miyervald Leonidovich, let us be sure to stipulate at once that we will raise just a few principles of the Law on the Republic's Economic Independence recently adopted by the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet.

[Raman] What should be the model for the socioeconomic development both of the republic and of the country? For me personally a model that I would call democratic federalism has crystallized. For there were sad absurdities in the economy: The center even used to approve cake recipes. Not to mention the fact that the country's State Planning Committee [Gosplan] planned every square meter of housing, every hospital bed, every spindle in a textile factory.

Under conditions of the union republics' normal state sovereignty and federalism, there must be full equality of rights between the republics and the corresponding organs at the center. Pyramidal relationships no longer suit us. The new model is like this: Interested representatives from the republics meet on a parity basis and resolve questions with due regard for mutual advantage. Of course, a representative of the central organs also participates.

[Litvinova] The greatest fears are aroused precisely by the possible substitution of diktat by the republic for diktat from the center. As one scientist put it: Will we not get "economic independence of the bureaucracy"?

[Raman] I consider the fears groundless. For the pyramid must be abolished in the republic too. We do not intend, for example, to take independence away from enterprises.

[Litvinova] But any economic planner can both create most-favored status and crush it—with taxes. The system of removing state enterprises' funds has prompted many questions from industrialists. There are deductions into the republic budget and the local budget, deductions into the so-called "nonbudget targeted funds," and deductions to the republic departments with jurisdiction over state enterprises. In addition, there is the removal of funds through firmly fixed prices and the bank system. How will these funds be used? Understandably, the people from whom they are removed are not indifferent to this question.

[Raman] Economic pressure is inadmissible, although we will not manage without state regulation either. Clearly, there must be a golden mean: The republic budget must get all it needs to finance cultural and social development, but enterprises too must not be crushed but be able to develop normally and extensively.

[Litvinova] How near ready are the new normatives and tax rates in the republic?

[Raman] They are all functioning today. Republic laws are being drawn up on taxation and commodity producers. It may be said at present that our tax system is extremely primitive. It obliges people to pay but does not give even a hint whether or not this promotes the efficient development of production. For the quality of our life depends, in the final analysis, on the answer to this question. That is, taxes, benefits, and subsidies must encourage and promote initiative, profitmaking, and the production of good, necessary goods.

[Litvinova] Miyervald Leonidovich, in starting its independent economic voyage, the republic undoubtedly must know all the reference points that it needs for this—including full data on its expenditure and earnings, on relations with other regions and with the center. Do you have glasnost on these questions?

[Raman] It remains for me to joke: We have full glasnost but little data. Our statistical service is too poverty-stricken and does not provide the necessary information. The methods used to process certain data also create doubt. Latvia is told that the republic must have R900 million left in commodity exchange. This is the amount by which our exports exceed our imports. We believe these calculations to be wrong. I will name just two particular mistakes. In this exchange no account is taken of those goods taken out of the republic by visitors—those who have come on vacation or on a business trip. According to our calculations, this will amount to approximately half a billion rubles. Nor is account taken of the difference in the prices of livestock products that we supply to the union fund, and this difference is in excess of R300 million. We have discussed this topic at the USSR Gosplan, are now formulating a different method of calculation, and in time we will submit it for discussion, for this question is of interest to other republics too. For the time being we can say that our final indicator—monetary relations through budgets—is fine, and we have a positive balance sheet. The difference between what we give to the center and what we get back amounts to approximately R1 billion (in this connection I should express regret that quite frequently the central press, including IZVESTIYA, publishes inaccurate or erroneous data on the Baltic republics, which misinforms the all-union reader).

[Litvinova] Here we encounter the paradox that has recently come to light: Not a single territory or region considers itself a debtor, but there is a multibillion-ruble "hole" in the union budget. It is possible to recall the speech at the 19th party conference by a representative from the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic who spoke of the republic being done out of its fair share, and now the Kuzbass has demanded that its territory be maintained on a par with its income... The methods are undoubtedly equally wrong for everyone, and it is difficult to make out now who is in debt to whom. But it is possible to understand that everyone has the right to dispose of what he has earned, while taking account of the common interests, of course, but not forgetting his own either.

[Raman] In my opinion, absurd, incongruous prices are one component of our common mistake. Raw materials and fuel are undoubtedly underpriced, and resource-extracting territories and those coal miners, for example, are right to take offense in this connection. The cheapness of raw materials gives rise to an unthrifty attitude toward them. But there has not yet been a price reform, and we are forced to compare everything at existing prices. At the same time it must be borne in mind that the quality of these raw materials leaves something to be desired.

[Litvinova] As I understand it, many industrialists are concerned about the possible economic changes in the republic precisely because they have very close ties with other regions, whether it is a question of raw materials, fuel, subassemblies, and so forth. They are afraid that if a certain republican economic egotism is displayed, it will cause a backlash. Let us say we establish a contract price for some product—for electric trains, for example. But in that case hardly anyone will supply us with metal—to his own detriment—at the former, fixed prices. An endless rise in prices around the country is inevitable in that case.

[Raman] It seems to me that our industrialists have proposed a good way out of this situation. They have designated it as the transitional period of economic reform. A market mechanism will take shape, making it possible to narrow the sphere of administrative-edict management, and enterprise self-management will expand. But in order to prevent economic chaos, the economic ties of the majority of enterprises should be

"frozen." Reciprocal deliveries must be guaranteed legislatively. The consumer alone may adopt refusals. All additional output and output from freed capacities passes to the sphere of free sale.

Material and technical supply, reciprocal deliveries, and product sales are very important questions for us. For we have always been slaves to some shortage, and there are still no grounds for having illusions about the future. The alarm felt by enterprise collectives is understandable, for if the rhythm of deliveries is disrupted, the normal functioning of the production process will become impossible. We propose a treaty with the union as an addition to the association's proposal for a "freeze." We have already submitted our own preliminary draft treaty between the country's Gosplan and the republic's Gosplan. It speaks, in particular, of deliveries of the scarcest ranges of material and technical resources.

[Litvinova] But what if a region or a republic whose resources the center shares out is opposed to such a distribution?

[Raman] Yes, such a thing is possible. The Kuzbass showed this. In that case it is necessary to sit around the negotiating table on a parity basis and find mutually acceptable variants. This is a generally accepted method.

[Litvinova] A few months ago the chairman of our republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium advanced these arguments: "Let us suppose that Tajikistan is not interested in selling cotton to Latvia but wants to sell it at half price, for example, on the world market, where there is quite a demand for it. It is possible to understand Tajikistan's interests. A ruble obtained from Latvia does not counterbalance a half-dollar obtained from Iran... Kazakhstan too has calculated that the currency that the union obtains by selling rare minerals found in the republic could be used differently." Territories are beginning to pay attention to their own advantage—clearly a natural process.

[Raman] The Baltic republics have set a good example—to investigate their own small economy. But this has also made other regions carry out "stocktaking" and think about their own advantage. Well, this has to be taken into account, and there is nothing bad about this. In addition, Tajikistan might need Latvian ports to export cotton, and Kazakhstan to export nonferrous metals. And everything will balance out.

[Litvinova] Criticism is also leveled at the fact that the concept of the republic's economic independence proceeds from the primacy of Latvian SSR economic legislation over USSR economic legislation—in taxation, the budget, the bank system, and price formation. In the opinion of a number of economists, such an approach narrows the market—which is at variance with the established all-union division of labor.

[Raman] We are all closely integrated. That is a fact. Latvia too obtains raw materials, energy, and subassemblies from other republics. But we export approximately 45 percent of finished products. Ties are so strong and vitally important that our laws must, of course, link up within a certain framework. The principle of reciprocity is an elementary economic requirement.

[Litvinova] The republic does not yet have a raw material and commodity market other than the union one. This is a reality with which not everyone wants to reckon.

[Raman] There is a market, but at present we have almost nothing to sell there at good prices—the goods are uncompetitive.

[Litvinova] A few words about currency: How much does the republic earn, and how much does it spend?

[Raman] Such data do exist, although they are not very accurate. We spend more than we earn—approximately twice as much. And this is natural, for we know the structure of all-union currency receipts—they are mainly "petrodollars." And we spend them together. "Petrodollars" support all other sectors. At the same time we get nothing of the more than $200 million earned by the Latvian Marine Shipping Company alone. And I believe that this too is a flaw in our economy.

[Litvinova] I would like to hear your opinion of one contradictory problem. The republic states a demand for full economic independence. On the other hand, every day brings complaints: Why are we not given plenty of feed, why are we not provided with sufficient gasoline and paper?...

[Raman] The basis must be equivalency of exchange, and then mutual suspicions and reproaches will be removed. Science has to work on the criteria for this equivalency. Because the principle "you scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours" is too primitive to be a yardstick of economic relations.

[Litvinova] Distortions of broad economic thinking evidently proceed from our poverty. For people throughout the world are glad when they find a sales market, but we use throwbacks to the times of subsistence farming: to produce everything oneself and consume it oneself. According to such logic, Zhigulis must remain in Tolyatti, mandarins in the Transcaucasus, and so forth.

[Raman] Market relations must be introduced immediately and gradually. But they must be introduced. For this it is necessary, let us say, to reduce the state order. So that the republic can sell its surplus, deriving real lessons, and not just verbal ones, in independence, market risk, and commercial enterprise. Our latest proposal is this—some 25 percent of all the goods produced on the republic's territory under the state order must be left at the republic's disposal.

[Litvinova] What is your attitude toward the widespread conviction about the "golden rain" of Western investments that might pour down upon our republic? The opposite view is this: The Baltic market is of interest to Western businessmen as a springboard to the capacious all-union market.

[Raman] Will we perhaps attract the Western investor with the good labor traditions that we have preserved? With regard to the latest technology, which it will be possible to introduce in the republic, this will make it possible to produce high-quality output. Although, of course, we cannot rely only on "golden rain."

[Litvinova] Is it proposed to create free economic zones in Latvia?

[Raman] We are thinking about this. Above all, we are considering our port cities from this viewpoint—Riga, Ventspils, Liyepaya. But such a zone needs a very solid infrastructure, so that specialists for Western firms feel "at home." The infrastructure will require great additional capital investments. We have not yet gotten any further than these reflections. At first we may create a free customs zone.

[Litvinova] Are any structural changes envisaged in the republic's economic management organs?

[Raman] Of course. For example, the Ministry of Industry, let us say, will be able to deal with the affairs of industry. True, the ministry's functions will change, and it must on no account carry out the republican diktat of which we have spoken. On the contrary, its task is to create the very best conditions for enterprises to work by participating in the elaboration of laws, normatives, and so forth.

[Litvinova] But all this is in the future. And for now... "Visiting cards" are being introduced in the republic as of 1 August under which a number of goods will be sold only to inhabitants of Latvia. Why has this been done?

[Raman] We want to protect the republic's market to a tiny extent. The counters are empty and there is a shortage of goods, but visitors carry them off.

[Litvinova] What do you think, Miyervald Leonidovich—will the realization of the idea of the republic's economic independence strengthen the federation, or is this the basis for a switch to confederative relations inside the USSR?

[Raman] You have asked a fundamental question. The answer will depend both on the interim results and on the final result. If we start living better, this will undoubtedly strengthen the federation. If the changes are minimal, discontent will be inevitable and the conclusions unpredictable.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize that the new model of full economic independence imposes a tremendous responsibility on the republics and adds to work but, at the same time, it creates conditions for good results. It is necessary to ensure them and make clever use of them.

Report Issued on 9 Apr Tbilisi Events

PM0408114289 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 22 Jul 89 p 4

["Findings of the Investigation Subcommission of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Commission To Investigate the Circumstances of the 9 April 1989 Tbilisi Events on the Legality of the Decision To Stop the Rally in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989"]

[Text] From 4 through 9 April 1989, a rally was continuously in progress in front of Government House in Tbilisi City, organized by informal associations and involving many thousands of people. At the rally a demand was put forward for Georgia's secession from the USSR.

The factual circumstances and an assessment of the nature of the rally and the situation prevailing in the capital at that time are given in the preliminary findings of the investigation subcommission, approved by the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Commission on 2 June of this year (see the newspaper KOMUNISTI, 7 June 1989). We will draw attention to only two points:

1. The rally was unauthorized, which led to interruptions in the work of transport and of certain state and public organizations and to the disruption of public order.

2. The rally was peaceful in nature and did not involve violence endangering citizens' lives and health or the threat of violence with a view to the overthrow of Soviet power.

On the basis of analysis of documents available at the republic's party, soviet, and law enforcement organs, explanations given to the commission by a whole series of officials, and materials published in the press and other mass media on the stopping of the rally, the following circumstances emerged:

The Georgian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] (Sh. Gorgodze) and the Tbilisi City Internal Affairs Administration (R. Gventsadze), which, in accordance with the law, are directly responsible for ensuring the protection of public order, raised with the republic leadership the question of stopping the rally taking place in front of Government House and restoring normality in the capital by means of the forces at their disposal. Under their proposal, the rally was to be stopped at dawn, when the smallest number of demonstrators (100-200 people) was present, after which the square was to be guarded and a further rally prevented. The internal

affairs organs, they explained, had the necessary forces to do this. This proposal was not supported by the republic leadership, for the reason that stopping the rally would intensify the population's dissatisfaction, which would lead to mass demonstrations. In these conditions the protection of public order in the capital and throughout the republic would have been impossible, since the main MVD forces had been sent to Abkhazia, while the subunits of internal troops stationed in Georgian were outside the republic.

Therefore the Georgian SSR MVD (Sh. Gorgodze) put a request to the USSR MVD for the return of the internal troops to Georgia with a view to ensuring the protection of public order, and the republic leadership (Dzh. Patiashvili) raised with union organs the question of allocating additional forces for the protection of public order. On 7-8 April subumits of militia and internal troops, including the Dzerzhinskiy Division—2,089 men in all—were sent to Tbilisi. It must be noted at this point that the USSR MVD did not give the order for the internal troops to participate in stopping the rally, and the decision to stop the rally was not coordinated with it.

On the initiative of former Georgian Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary Dzh. Patiashvili, as well as former Second Secretary B. Nikolskiy, who insistently demanded that Soviet Army subunits be brought in to stop the rally, and on the basis of a USSR Defense Ministry instruction, a paratroop regiment stationed in the Transcaucasus Military Dictrict marched into Tbilisi during the night of 7 April. On the instructions of USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov, I. Rodionov, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, returned to Tbilis from Leninakan on 7 April. USSR First Deputy Defense Minister K. Kochetov arrived in the capital with him, to give assistance. According to I. Rodionov's explanation, he received instructions from the defense minister to study the state of affairs prevailing in the republican capital and act in acordance with the situation. At the same time, Soviet Army troops were to be used only to protect very important sites. Official documents confirm that prior to 8 April I. Rodionov was opposed to the participation of the Soviet Army in stopping the rally.

On 7 and 8 April, meetings of members and candidate members of the Central Committee Bureau were held at the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee to discuss the situation and measures to normalize it. Minutes were not recorded at these meetings. The former chief of the Central Committee General Department (K. Abuladze), whose duties included record keeping, was not invited to these meetings. The General Department embarked on a record of the points put forward at these meetings in the form of Central Committee Bureau resolutions on the instructions of Dzh. Patiashvili and B. Nikolskiy only after 9 April, although they never reached a finalized form. The Bureau resolutions lack features necessary for official documents (the date has been corrected, the number and paragraph of the minutes are not specified). Most importantly, the minutes were not appended to the resolutions, as a result of which it is impossible to establish in documentary form who participated in the discussion of the question and what position he adopted. Questioning of Bureau members and candidate members established that the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee leadership adopted a decision on 7 April to impose a "state of emergency" in the capital in case of necessity. At the same time the specific time and forms of implementation of this measure were not specified. This was because the imposition of an emergency measure (the curfew) could become necessary in the event of a tense sociopolitical situation arising after the stopping of the rally.

On the same day there was a meeting with representatives of the intelligentsia at the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee. Former Central Committee First Secretary Dzh. Patiashvili assessed the existing situation as disastrous. The participants in the conference (A. Dzhavakhishvili, R. Chkheidze, E. Gugushvili, N. Kikvadze) noted that the republic leadership should meet with leaders of informal organizations and have a dialogue with them. Despite the willingness of the republic leaders, this meeting did not take place, because the leaders of informal organizations expressed a lack of confidence in them.

At 2035 on 7 April a telegram signed by Dzh. Patiashvili was sent to the CPSU Central Committee, the text of which was prepared by B. Nikolskiy. It says: "The situation in the republic has deteriorated sharply recently. It is virtually getting out of control. Extremist elements are fanning nationalist sentiments, calling for strikes and insubordination to the authorities, organizing disturbances, and discrediting party and soviet organs. In this situaiton, emergency measures must be adopted. We consider it necessary:

"1. Immediately to take criminal and administrative proceedings against extremists who put forward anti-Soviet, antisocialist, antiparty slogans and appeals (the legal basis exists for this);

"2. With the involvement of additional forces of the MVD and the Transcaucasus Military District, to impose a special situation (curfew) in Tbilisi;

"3. By the efforts of the party, soviet, and economic aktiv, to implement a range of political, organizational, and administrative measures to stabilize the situation;

"4. To exclude from the union and republican mass media items that could complicate the situation."

The telegram ends with the following proposal: "We request consent to points 1, 2, and 4." This aspect is of particular significance, since at the First Congress of People's Deputies that part of the text of the telegram

was not read, creating the impression that all the measures to normalize the situation in the Georgian capital were carried out without the knowledge of the center and without coordination with it.

In the evening of 7 April, B. Nikolskiy raised the question of the expediency of a show of military strength, as a result of which, in his opinion, the participants in the rally would be deterred and their numbers in front of Government House would fall. On I. Rodionov's instructions, this action was indeed carried out on 8 April at approximately 1300. Military hardware was allowed through the ranks of demonstrators on Rustaveli Prospekt, and military helicopters appeared over Tbilisi. This action was counterproductive. The number of participants in the rally increased considerably.

On 8 April there was a meeting of the Georgian party aktiv, which examined the question of the party organization's tasks in normalizing the political situation in the republic. V. Lobko, chief of a CPSU Central Committee sector, and K. Kochetov, USSR first deputy defense minister and member of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, took part in the meeting. It must be noted that after his arrival in Tbilisi, K. Kochetov took part in every stage of the adoption of the decision to stop the rally.

Dzh. Patiashvili delivered a report at the aktiv meeting. He noted that an extremely tense and explosive political atmosphere has arisen in the republic. Leaders with extremist inclinations are calling for the overthrow of soviet power and the socialist system. In order to bring about a relaxation of the atmosphere it is necessary to use every political method, but not to show political weakness or make unjustified concessions and compromises.

Those taking part in the discussion of the question (Sh. Shioshvili, S. Gogiberidze, and others) deemed it necessary to conduct an open dialogue and give the demonstrators the opportunity to express themselves in the newspapers, on television, and so forth.

The meeting approved an urgent political and organizational plan of measures to normalize the situation in the republic which Central Committee Secretary N. Popkhadze presented to the aktiv. The plan of measures made provision for the following points, among others:

—to set up groups in every year group at educational establishments and the senior grades of schools to come out against pupils and students with extremist views (Point 17);

—to take criminal and administrative proceedings against leaders and activists of informal associations who put forward unlawful slogans and organize illegal actions (Point 20);

—with a view to stopping negative phenomena, to formulate a concrete special plan for the activity of law enforcement organs and military subunits (Point 21);

—in order to ensure public order, to implement where necessary measures to impose a state of emergency, with the involvement of troops of the Transcaucasus Military District (Point 23).

The content of the plan of measures was not known to the vast majority of Central Committee Bureau members. Yet this document was presented to the aktiv meeting as if it had been discussed and approved beforehand by the Central Committee Bureau. At the same time it must also be noted that Points 17 and 21 of the plan of measures were not read out at the aktiv meeting, while Points 20 and 23 met with particular support from the participants in the aktiv meeting. An opposing view was expressed only by the poet Dzh. Charkviani.

The aktiv meeting also approved an Appeal from the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers to the republic's Communists, working people, and young people, the text of which was presented to the meeting by Central Committee Secretary N. Chitanava. It says, in particular: "There is still time to prevent a dramatic turn of events... Our people have already experienced so many troubles that another should not be added to their number."

This appeal was published in the republican newspapers on 9 April, when the tragedy had already happened.

In his concluding speech Dzh. Patiashvili asked the aktiv participants to go to the rally after the meeting and speak as they saw fit. "And if it proves impossible to calm people down," he said, "then the necessary legally justified 'machinery of state' will be brought into play, which exists in every normal rule-of-law state."

The participants in the party aktiv meeting did not address the rally.

During the meeting Dzh. Patiashvili spoke with Moscow. Dzh. Patiashvili reported that the Politburo had proposed to send Comrades Shevardnadze and Razumovskiy to Tbilisi to give assistance. Dzh. Patiashvili did not consider this necessary, as a result of which an additional opportunity to resolve the situation that had developed in the republic by political means was not exploited.

After the party aktiv meeting the republic leaders held a session, with the participation of military leaders. In some people's opinion, this was a session of the Defense Council, but no official document exists to confirm this. At the same time, the legal status of the republic Defense Council, the limits of its competence, and the regulations governing its work are not clear.

From questioning of officials and comparison of the information they gave the commission, it was possible to establish only certain facts. In particular, on 8 April, after the end of the party aktiv meeting, there was a session attended by Dzh. Patiashvili, B. Nikolskiy, Z. Chkheidze, O. Cherkeziya, K. Kochetov, and I. Rodionov. Sh. Gorgodze, Georgian SSR minister of internal affairs, A. Karanadze, chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Court, N. Shoshiashvili, acting republic prosecutor, and V. Sharashenidze, Georgian SSR minister of justice, were invited to the session, since the question under discussion was the extent to which there were adequate legal grounds for taking proceedings against the leaders of informal associations and isolating them from society. After the information given by the leaders of the law enforcement organs had been heard, they were dismissed, so a final decision was not taken on this question.

Later at the same session it was decided to clear demonstrators from the square in front of Government House, using the forces of the Georgian SSR MVD, the USSR MVD internal troops, and the Soviet Army. I. Rodionov assumed leadership of the operation to stop the rally. The commender explained this decision on the grounds that it would have been inappropriate to entrust leadership of Soviet Army troops to the minister of internal affairs, and moreover that he had more experience in this matter and was senior in military rank to all those present.

I. Rodionov appointed his aides: For the Soviet Army—I. Kuznetsov, first deputy commander of the Transcaucasus Military District; for the internal troops—I. Yefimov, chief of the internal troops staff directorate; and for the militia—Sh. Gorgodze, Georgian SSR minister of internal affairs.

The drawing up of the plan for the operation was entrusted to I. Rodionov. At the same time it was stipulated that the operation would be carried out when the minimum number of demonstrators was present in front of Government House.

Sh. Gorgodze asked the republic government for the appropriate legal act to carry out the operation. In the evening of 8 April the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers adopted a directive signed by former Council of Ministers Chairman Z. Chkheidze. The directive says: "...in connection with the situation that has arisen in the city, the Georgian SSR MVD, with the participation of servicemen of the internal troops and Soviet Army troops, is to adopt additional measures to protect public order:

"—to remove all citizens participating in unauthorized mass actions from the territory adjacent to the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers building;

"—to close free access by citizens to the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers building;

"—to adopt measures stipulated by law against the organizers of and active participants in unauthorized mass actions.

"Similar action is to be taken on the territory adjacent to the republican television and radio center building, and if necessary at other sites in the city."

In order to execute the above directive of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers and with a view to ensuring law and order during the operation, Georgian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs Sh. Gorgodze issued an order that same evening under which the relevant subunits of the Georgian SSR MVD and the Tbilisi City Internal Affairs Administration, using the republic's militia, were charged with the protection of Government House and the transfer of the hunger strikers from the territories located in front of Government House and the Television and Radio Broadcasting Committee to medical institutions, as well as the detention of the organizers of and active participants in the unauthorized rally.

The plan of operations to stop the rally was not examined at any session. I. Rodionov told the commission that the detailed plan for the operation was to be drawn up by I. Yefimov. He himself only had a general outline of the operation. The time for the start of the operation—0400 on 9 April—was decided on, I. Rodionov and members of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau explain, by a small group of officials (Dzh. Patiashvili, B. Nikolskiy, I. Rodionov, K. Kochetov).

Another fact is worthy of attention, namely that at 2050 on 8 April, that is, when the question of stopping the rally had already been decided, a telegram signed by Dzh. Patiashvili was sent to the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow, the text of which was drafted by B. Nikolskiy. The telegram notes that "the situation in Tbilisi remains tense. A rally involving many thousands of people is in progress outside Government House, and its main slogans remain the same: secession from the USSR, the creation of an independent Georgia, the abolition of the autonomous formations, and others.

"In general the Georgian CPSU Central Committee, the government, and local party and soviet organs are in control of the situation and are adopting the necessary measures to stabilize the situation. In conjunction with the MVD and the Transcaucasus Military District, concrete plans ahve been drawn up and are being implemented to preserve law and order and take exhaustive measures, where necessary, to prevent unlawful actions. The entire apparatus of the Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, Tbilisi City Party Committee [gorkom], and Tbilisi City Soviet Executive Committee [gorispolkom] is fulfilling its functions

efficiently and conducting active work among the population and the demonstrators. At the moment no further measures are required from the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Government in addition to those adopted earlier."

After this telegram was sent, no changes of a significant nature form the viewpoint of the further exacerbation of the situation occurred at the rally or in the capital in general. Nor were there any attempts to attack or occupy government institutions. The only thing that happened was that the number of participants in the rally increased. It was on the strength of these circumstances, before the stopping of the rally, that Internal Affairs Minister Sh. Gorgodze came out against the operation and submitted a request to the republic leadership (Dzh. Patiashvili) to postpone it. As a result of talks on this question between Dzh. Patiashvili and I. Rodionov, which took place approximately half an hour before the start of the operation, this proposal was not supported.

The operation to stop the rally began at 0400 hours on 9 April and ended tragically.

A telegram sent to the CPSU Central Committee by Dzh. Patiashvili at 1025 on that day said: "After 2100 on 8 April, despite all the measures adopted by party, soviet, and law enforcement organs, the situation at the rally outside the republic Government House, involving some 15,000 people, and also in other parts of the city began to be whipped up by extremists to the breaking point and to the point of getting out of control. The leaders of the so-called national liberation movement began to announce plans to seize power in the republic. In this situation, with a view to ensuring public safety and preventing unpredictable consequences, a decision was adopted at 0400 to use force to clear the demonstrators from the square outside the Government House building... In accordance with a plan worked out beforehand by the responsible parties, subunits of the republic MVD and the Transcaucasus Military District... As a result of the crush that developed, 16 people died: 13 young women and 3 men. More than 100 people received various injuries... The square outside Government House is now clear of demonstrators and is under the protection of troops." (The text of the telegram was drafted by B. Nikolskiy.)

Those are the factual circumstances surrounding the adoption of the decision to stop the rally in Tbilisi on 9 April. A legal assessment of these circumstances in the light of the requirements of the USSR and Georgian SSR Constitutions and union and republican legislation gives us grounds to draw the following conclusions about the legality of the adoption of the decision to stop the rally:

1. The adoption of the decision to stop the rally in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989 by the use of force was determined by an erroneous assessment by the republic leadership of the sociopolitical processes taking place in Georgia recently and the formation of a politically incorrect attitude to those processes.

The activation of the movement of broad people's masses, primarily young people and intelligentsia, for the strengthening of the republic's sovereignty and the resolution of acute socioeconommic and national cultural problems accumulated during the period of stagnation, a movement which was proceeding primarily on the basis of the institutions of direct democracy (marches, demonstrations, rallies, and so forth), was assessed by the republic leadership (Dzh. Patiashvili) as an attempt by informal associations and extremist groups to destabilize the general situation and take political power into their own hands, as anti-Soviet, antisocialist actions.

Because of the weakness and impotence of ideological work (N. Popkhadze) in normalizing the existing situation, the republic party organization and organs of power and administration were unable to regulate the processes taking place in society by political methods, and therefore had recourse to the policy of the use of force.

2. Inasmuch as the rally that took place outside Government House from 4 through 9 April was peaceful in nature and did not involve the use of violence with a view to overthrowing the Soviet system or any actions endangering people's life and health, the appropriate legal grounds and necessity for the decision to stop the rally with the use of Soviet Army subunits therefore did not exist.

The decision to stop the rally adopted by the republic leadership and USSR Armed Forces officials (Dzh. Patiashvili, B. Nikolskiy, O. Cherkeziya, Z. Chkheidze, K. Kochetov, I. Rodionov) was an unlawful act, for which they should be called to account.

3. The decision to stop the rally was adopted in gross violation of Article 119, Point 14, of the USSR Constitution, since it was decided to use Soviet Army troops to stop the rally without a declaration of martial law or a state of emergency in the Georgian capital by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

4. Inasmuch as prior to the stopping of the rally the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium had not issued a decree on the imposition of martial law or a state of emergency in Tbilisi, and the USSR Defense Minister had not issued a corresponding order, I. Rodionov, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, had no legal grounds to appoint himself leader of the operation to stop the rally.

Contrary to established procedure, I. Rodionov assumed power on his own authority, as a result of which he patently exceeded the bounds of the rights granted to him by law.

5. As a result of the fact that the republic leadership and USSR Armed Forces officials decided to use the internal troops to stop the rally, there was a gross violation of the requirements of Point 3 of the 28 July 1988 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree, in accordance with

which, during the use of internal troops to prevent violations of public order, "it is forbidden to place units and subunits of the internal troops in subordination to local organs of power and administration."

The abovementioned officials exceeded their powers, while I. Yefimov, commander of the internal troops in Tbilisi, was negligent in respect of his official duties.

6. The Georgian SSR Council of Ministers directive of 8 April 1989 (Z. Chkheidze), in accordance with which internal troops and Soviet Army troops were instructed to clear the demonstrators from the square in front of Government House and carry out other measures to protect public order, is an unlawful act, since existing constitutional legislation and other normative acts do not give the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers such powers.

In accordance with Article 73, Point 8, of the USSR Constitution, leadership of the USSR Armed Forces falls within the special competence of the union state, while under the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree on the internal troops, during the execution of duties to prevent violations of public order the internal troops are subordinate to their immediate leadership, not to the republic government.

The former chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers exceeded his power and patently went beyond the bounds of the rights granted to him by law.

7. The resolution of the question of instituting criminal proceedings against the leaders of informal associations in accordance with the plan of measures drawn up by the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and the examination of this question at the party aktiv meeting constitute a gross violation of legality.

Under existing legislation the question of criminal proceedings against individuals is decided by the competent organ that is invested with the appropriate powers, and not by a meeting of the party aktiv.

The fact that the party aktiv meeting approved this point in the plan for measures indicates the inadequate level of legal awareness on the part of representatives of the party aktiv, and also confirms the unconcealed use of methods characteristic of an authoritarian regime even at the present stage.

8. Inasmuch as the decision by the republic leadership and USSR Armed Forces officials to stop the rally was adopted in gross violation of existing legislation and is therefore an unlawful act, and also in view of the fact that the execution of this decision entailed particularly grave consequences, the Georgian SSR Prosecutor's Office and the USSR Military Prosecutor's Office should examine and resolve the question of the responsibility of the abovementioned officials in accordance with the procedure laid down by law.

9. With a view to stopping cases of USSR Armed Forces officials acting arbitrarily and exceeding their powers and of the Soviet Army being endowed with functions that do not properly belong to it in the sphere of the country's internal affairs, it is necessary to revise the declarative provision cited in Chapter 5 of the USSR Constitution, in order clearly to define the duties and limits of competence of the Armed Forces.

Legislative acts on the procedure for holding rallies and demonstrations and the powers of the internal troops should also be revised, since their application in practice has not confirmed the effectiveness of these acts. At the same time they contain norms that are not in accordance with the existing Constitution.

D.G. Khetsuriani,
Deputy chairman of the investigation subcommission and candidate of legal sciences.
11 July 1989

The findings have been examined and approved by the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission To Investigate the Circumstances of the 9 April 1989 Tbilisi Events (Protocol No. 14, 12 July 1989).

We ask readers to send in their own views and comments, which will be taken into account during the compilation of the final and complete findings of the Commission.

Natadze on People's Front Structure, Aims

PM1008130089 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 23 Jul 89 p 3

[Interview with Nodar Natadze, leader of the Georgian People's Front, by ZARYA VOSTOKA correspondent Aleksey Sinelnikov, under the rubric "Standpoint": "Thoughts on Freedom and the Lack of It"—date, place of interview not stated]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Politics

[Natadze] I am now chairman of the Georgian People's Front board. The People's Front is the cell from which a healthy society must develop. We must make our contribution to the sacred cause of restoring Georgia's national independence. The work consists of studying legal questions and influencing the republic's economic situation. The struggle for ecological rebirth plays a part. It is necessary to ensure the countryside is not deserted, and radical reform is needed in the education system.

[Sinelnikov] What concrete approaches have already been formulated?

[Natadze] We have a general principle: We must strive to ensure that the individual feels free and independent. One cannot live without this minimum of independence.

The individual must know that he can feed himself and protect himself—that is the minimum dose of independence without which neither the individual nor society can function normally... Today the extent of our independence is far lower than the permissible norm. If a person receives no wages for a couple of weeks, he cannot live. Consequently the person is dependent: on the girl at the cash desk, on the director, on whatever you want to call it. In that situation a person cannot walk tall and live to the full. He is doomed to aggressive passivity. He knows that if someone comparatively strong decides to humiliate him, they will succeed. The worst feeling of all is the feeling that your existence is not guaranteed. This feeling of oppression is very strong in society today, and this deforms everyone's life. Certain animal species will not breed in captivity. The external conditions are all as they should be: you have a male, you have a female, you have food and bedding, but the natural process is disrupted, something is broken. Even biological functions can be disrupted by the lack of freedom. This applies even more to specifically human functions—and for the most part they are much more fragile—and creative functions. The creative principle is of enormous significance in labor, especially in our world today.

[Sinelnikov] How do you envisage the Georgia of the future?

[Natadze] It is hard to say, our future is not only up to us—it also depends on the situation in the world in general. But some features can be mentioned: A free Georgia must feed itself, provide itself with elementary food products. An economy must develop here which consumes a large quantity of skilled labor, and furthermore, I think Georgians could do some work for mankind outside Georgia. That is, they could work in other countries—naturally on the basis of free choice, not as forced labor—as doctors, engineers. And thereby benefit their motherland, Georgia. As for the political future, I think it can be said with every confidence today that mankind's future lies not in an empire, but in coexistence in the form of a community of independent and sovereign nations. That is, the kind of existence that is regulated not by natural laws, but by right, where the strong are not omnipotent with regard to the weak. That is the future, and Georgia could take its proper place in such a society of nations.

Unfortunately, at the moment another viewpoint prevails, backed up by mythical theories. Such as, for instance, the theory of the existence of the "Soviet people." This is what logicians call the "fourth term." Or in other words, a covert distortion, a sophistry. The USSR Constitution states that the land, air, and so forth are the common property of the "Soviet people." And because that term expresses nothing that actually exists, it turns out that the owner of everything is the all-union state, and not the Georgian people, the Armenian people, and the other peoples.

[Sinelnikov] How does the People's Front operate, what is its structure?

[Natadze] First, it must be said that the struggle for the Georgian people's national interests is one instance of the struggle for common human and humanist ideals as such. Everyone, whatever his nationality, can participate in our movement, and we consider such participation desirable. Economic and ecological tasks, the tasks of defending human rights—these are common to all who live in Georgia. The basic working organs of the Front are the sector commissions.

First, let me speak about the ecology commission. It is prepared to cooperate with all organizations that wish to contribute to improving the ecological situation. We are not worried about priorities and are prepared to accept any help.

We have a land use commission, which is very important to us. The commission is at present engaged in studying the influence of incorrect forms of land use on the social sphere, morality, demography, and ecology. It is a question of rectifying all the distortions that have arisen as a result of the removal of the land from the peasants in the course of collectivization. The peasants were deprived of their land precisely in order to deprive them of independence, although people need independence like the air they breathe. The lease relations now being introduced will largely be defined not by their general form, but by the actual content that the lease system acquires for us. If the individual receives the main bulk of what he produces and the land is leased for 100 years, then the independent proprietor [khozyain] will emerge here. If not, it will all degenerate into just another campaign. The lease system is not a radical transformation of relations in the countryside, it is a purely economic measure. Taxation should be constant, otherwise, under the legal mechanism of the lease system, it could be turned into the same old expropriation and requisitioning by means of tax increases.

We have a commission on national rights. Georgian sociologists and philosophers can do what no one has ever done before. Define a nation's rights, define why and how a national right is a component of individual human rights. Ours is a unique situation: a high standard of philosophical thought, plus an urgent need to define such rights. Such conditions have never previously coincided everywhere.

[Sinelnikov] No doubt much could be clarified in this respect by the CPSU Central Committee plenum on nationalities problems?

[Natadze] To be frank, I am afraid of that plenum. It could adopt decisions that will have negative consequences. Why this fear, is it well founded? Yes, unfortunately, it is well founded. The CPSU Central Committee's main adviser is the Miklukho-Maklay Ethnography Institute. I am familiar with some documents they have

drawn up for the plenum. Their recommendations, and I say this quite definitely, amount to a denial of the nations' rights to self-determination. Let me remind you that this was the institute which, in 1956, recommended that the population census should record not "Georgians," but "Gurians, Kakhetians, Imeretians, and so forth."

[Sinelnikov] And what decisions should the plenum adopt, in your opinion, to ensure that peace between nationalities prevails in the country?

[Natadze] It should recommend a radical expansion of the rights of nations and the rights of union republics. The article on the "Soviet people" should be deleted from the Constitution. It should be established clearly and constitutionally that no department can build facilities on a republic's territory without paying for the land, still less without the consent of the republic. All-union departments, such as the Committee on Education and the Ministry of Culture, should be abolished. The very existence of these supranationality ministries is absurd. Of course, the ministries of defense and communications could be shared.

[Sinelnikov] Speaking of nationalities policy, I must say this: Some people think that one of the People's Front's objectives is the deportation or assimilation of the non-Georgian population.

[Natadze] That is absurd, it is one of the vilest insinuations I can imagine. A large number of non-Georgians have always lived in Georgia. And there has never been any interethnic strife in Georgia. I can say confidently that Georgians are the most tolerant nation in the world. The very fact that Jews have never been persecuted in Georgia speaks for itself.

[Sinelnikov] Today, however, the picture is different. National disputes have turned into open conflict. And blood is flowing. This is all happening at the very time when perestroyka is teetering on the brink and survives only through the people's determination, without the support of any great material achievements. In this situation every conflict, let us be honest, could lead to terrible consequences.

[Natadze] You know, I look at these events in a rather different way. It seems to me that these actions have been inspired, that a show is being put on specifically in response to the development of our national movement. All provocations are detrimental to the national movement in Georgia and are directed against it. Those who wish to can compare the statistics relating to the national movement with the statistics on anti-Georgian provocative actions. The relationship is not accidental.

[Sinelnikov] What do you mean by the terms federation and confederation?

[Natadze] It is no secret that I regard a completely independent Georgia as the ideal, those are my convictions. But this independence could be achieved by stages—through federation and confederation. Under a federation, you begin by defining the rights of the republics. Everything else is the right of the federal organs. Under a confederation, it is the other way round—it is the rights of the central organs that have to be defined, the rights that the republics delegate to them. The undelegated rights are naturally the rights of the republics. Our proposals and amendments to the USSR Constitution are aimed specifically at achieving a confederative structure of the Union. I believe that in a confederation the rights of the "center" should be limited to foreign policy and defense. Unfortunately, I cannot yet give a specific time scale for achieving a given stage in the political reform of society.

[Sinelnikov] A question on an urgent problem. The situation in Abkhaziya has deteriorated. What is the People's Front going to do about it?

[Natadze] It is necessary to use the revealing force of words. First of all, to expose disinformation. Objectively speaking, in this so-called "interethnic conflict" the Georgian side is only the victim of attack. And to accuse both sides equally, as Central Television did, is a slander.

I do not think central television deliberately presented a distorted assessment of events. The main reason is, once again, the lack of complete and authentic information, and perhaps stereotyped thinking, which leads people to draw conclusions before studying the facts thoroughly.

Saratov Oblast Party Official Relieved of Post

LD1008205689 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 10 Aug 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A plenum of the Saratov Oblast Party Committee met today and considered organizational issues. The plenum relieved Comrade Khomyakov from the duties of first secretary and member of the Oblast Party Committee Bureau in connection with his confirmation as deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the RSFSR State Planning Committee.

Comrade (Mureynin), who worked as a Party Oblast Committee secretary, was elected first secretary of the Saratov Oblast Party Committee.

Lithuanian Deputy Criticizes PRAVDA

LD1008131489 Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS in Lithuanian No 30, 27 Jul-2 Aug 89 p 2

[Editorial by Algimantas Cekuolis, chief editor and USSR Supreme Soviet deputy: "Defense of Stalinism in PRAVDA = Stalinism]

[Text] One does not mention the noose in the home of an individual who has been hanged. This is especially true in cases where the execution was carried out in a cruel

fashion, without the presence of guilt, and without the benefit of a trial. Even the Zulus instinctively sense this type of elementary ethical requirement.

The Lithuanian press has tactfully ignored 21 July. The memorial board was removed from the theatre in Kaunas where the voting farce had taken place, and the tank that had brought "Stalin's sun" was removed from its pedestal; this was the extent of it. We do not desire emotions, that might turn into provocations. We have a holiday—16 February, the day of rekindling of Lithuania's statehood. July 21st, which had buried our statehood, is an anti-holiday. We are aware of the reality, understand the Baltic countries' unique position in the world, and, concurrently, we are absolutely certain our statehood will be reconstructed and a law-based nation will be founded. The guarantee: Lithuanian nation's ironclad unity, and the real interests of the USSR and the question of its prestige.

PRAVDA, the most conservative USSR newspaper (only KRASNAYA ZVEZDA can compete), has failed to use the opportunity to also ignore 21 July, or better yet, to write the truth. It is interesting to note that it did not publish a commentary on this. Apparently it is difficult to find an author now who could meet the gaze of millions and be resolute enough to talk about the "Balts voluntary union with the USSR." This author would be hard-pressed in his choice of arguments. No nation would, after all, castrate itself, no nation would voluntarily send its women and children to the icy islands of the Laptev Sea, subjecting every sixth citizen to repression; no nation would allow someone else, especially the likes of Stalin, to decide its fate.

In its 21 July issue, PRAVDA published the Lithuanian "People's Sejm" and the Estonian "Duma" declarations requesting incorporation of these states into the USSR. One is to derive the impression "why are these Balts causing such a commotion? This is what they themselves wrote in 1940." Readers from Kaliningrad to Kamchatka are provided a sort of an explanation. A few may even believe it.

There are hundreds of tons of such declarations and statements in the Moscow Archives' basements. Among them can be found confessions by Bukharin, Blyucher, Rykov, Zinovyev, a million of the members of the military, scientists and party members, admitting to service in Japanese, German and Zanzibar intelligence services, blowing up mines, poisoning wells, and organizing citizens' starvation plans. Not only in writing. They repeated the lie about themselves from tribunals and some of them begged before the firing squads. Thus, PRAVDA, should you not perhaps begin publishing copies of these?

The Lithuanian nation, in similar fashion as its sons Putna and Uborevicius—with tied hands and shackled feet and Dekanozov's Nagant revolver at its temple, (in Estonia, it was Zhdanov's)—was brought to its knees in 1940. This is how much documents that have been obtained under such circumstances are worth. In the Baltic region, the year 1940 meant Kurpatai, Cervene, Katyne and Rainiai. There is no other version, nor can there be any other. The sooner we acknowledge this, the easier we can find accord and arrive at constructive decisions.

The short-sightedness of the conservatives is astounding. August will soon be upon us, after all.

The Soviet parliamentary commission has already established the authenticity of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its subsequent protocols, documents that paved the way for the 21 July guillotine. You will have to publish this, PRAVDA. How will you appear then?

The lack of professionalism is also astounding. If the "Lithuania's Declaration" text in Russian, as repeated again in print, is begging to be accepted into the USSR, then the copy's Lithuanian text not only varies from it but is totally different: "To declare the land as property of the whole nation, i.e. state property," but nothing appears there concerning joining. There is an interesting paragraph: "All attempts to threaten people's private property, or to force kolhoz organization against the will of the people will be severely punished for harming the people's and state interests." Some incompetents are working for you in the PRAVDA offices.

All in all, so much for the PRAVDA concepts.

If this is the union newspaper, and we would like to consider it as such (by the way, the portion earmarked for Lithuania, is printed in Vilnius), we should have the equivalent of 1/15th of the amount of influence in PRAVDA. Afterall, the RSFSR has its own party newspaper, and Moscow has several more. PRAVDA must be the organ of 15 republic Communist Parties as well as its central union organ, but not the center's whip to be brandished over the republics. Unfortunately, the republics' opinion toward the center is not reflected in it, if we subtract an occasional tepid criticism addressed to individual departments.

The restructuring process in Lithuania is stormy, constructive, and is already showing good results, with people's eyes already sparkling with enthusiasm and already reaching the limit, drawn by Gorbachev, beyond which the process becomes irreversible. In the face of this, PRAVDA is either keeping silent about the Baltics, or in its infrequent publications it strains through gritted teeth, its disinformation accented, while consistently creating the image of an enemy. Yes, we are guilty. We have made several years' progress along the path of restructuring. We do not have national massacres here and Lithuanian Russians want to learn the Lithuanian language, with a third of them already wishing to become Lithuanian citizens.

Is this perhaps the reason why, for the past 6 months, there has not been a PRAVDA correspondent in Lithuania? The young, dynamic journalist, who had successfully worked as an editor and had been recommended by the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, was deemed unacceptable by Comrade V. Afanasiyev because the candidate had declared that he will have to be Lithuania's representative in PRAVDA. The editor replied that he wished to have a PRAVDA representative in Lithuania. However, we are not Belgium or Indonesia. We are, you know, a member of the Union.

Comrade V. Afanasiyev, do not fan the separatist tendencies in Lithuania. This work is already being seen to by the union ministries and departments—it is being done conscientiously, thoroughly, and constantly. More and more frequently, one hears some responsible Republic leader, even a Russian, who was born and is working here, say: "If only we could obtain sovereignty sooner! Nothing succeeds and, apparently will not succeed, without it." Also, when you are publishing historical papers, we strongly implore you, on behalf of all Lithuanians and all nationalities living in Lithuania, to consider if they are Stalinist falsifications.

Sacred lies do not exist, just as sacred murder does not exist.

(P.S. This article and its Russian translation have been sent to USSR Central Committee Secretary A. Yakovlev and PRAVDA Editor V. Afanasiyev, along with the Deputy [Cekuolis'] demand to have it published in PRAVDA soon and without any abbreviations or corrections.)

PRAVDA Article on Baltics Scored

LD1008130889 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 14 Jul 89 p 3

[Article by Vilius Kavaliauskas: "Who Signed Union Agreement?"]

[Text] Soon it will be six months since PRAVDA has not had a correspondent in Lithuania. Perhaps the fault rests with us journalists. We are currently encountering a strange phenomenon—not many people are interested in working for central union newspapers. The agreement to have union republic journalists prepare articles on union republics has also not yet been implemented.

Professor N. Mikhalyova, of the Union Institute for Correspondent [?Neakivaizdine] Law, and S. Papidze, rector at the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Marxism-Leninism Institute, wrote an article on the processes now taking place in the Baltics in Wednesday's [12 July] PRAVDA. One a jurist, the other a philosopher. From the article, entitled "Federative Union," I was not able to establish that the authors had visited the Baltics and were themselves explaining in an unbiased manner the tendencies manifesting themselves here, and their causes. At the same time they were making serious accusations.

The Baltic Republics and their popular movements are practically accused of an attempt to destroy the Federation, to leave the USSR, and to re-establish bourgeois regimes. This is how the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet 18 May decisions, Republic Constitutional amendments, and the corresponding earlier Soviet Estonian Parliamentary Declarations, were, in essence, referred to.

Authors of the article are especially shocked by the proposal to base republic relations on an agreement. They assert that such an agreement had already been signed, in 1922, and there exists no legal basis for signing it again. However, if this were the case, a total of nine republics would have been illegally included in the Union, since they were founded, or were incorporated, considerably later. Moreover, no one had signed any agreement with Lithuania, either. It is as if the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, which is not even mentioned in the article, does not replace this document... In addition, the authors also fail to mention the historical realities of 1940. Is it because those do not support the article's chosen idea?

Finally, are the Georgian people familiar with the text of the 1922 agreement, which was signed, on their behalf, by the then leaders of the Transcaucasian Federation? Could it be that one must be afraid to renew and adapt to the times those documents that concern the interests of many nations? How can the Leninist principle of free self-determination be implemented then? What is needed then—a state for the nations, or nations for the state?

By basing themselves on obsolete categorical assertions, the authors propose, on the spot, to practically take away from the republics the possibility of leaving the USSR by adopting a special federation law, which would "provide a mechanism for compensating the union budget for expenditures on republic development, state subsidies, union jurisdiction enterprise disassembling" etc. There looms an immediate threat of relocating large groups of people, as well as that of compulsory migration.

It is asserted that "only the USSR has total and unlimited sovereignty." The authors further propose to decrease republic rights if the USSR Constitution is accepted. Centralized administration is here referred to as "the Union state sovereignty material base."

The publication that appeared under the rubric "As the CPSU CC Plenum Approaches" is discussed there. International relations are an important subject in our country. For this reason we must value every objective opinion. It appears, however, that this only serves to cover the name of "our expert from the Transcaucasus." After all, the article does not even mention the most

important fact—Soviet republics reached this stage of USSR political and economic reform with varied degress of readiness. Is it appropriate to see evil designs everywhere—even in attempts to live better and more abundantly?

For instance, should plans to fight inflation by instituting republic currency be labeled "absurd?" After all, no one is proposing other measures for halting the drastic devaluation of the ruble.

N. Mikhalyova and Sh. Papidze make an assertion that is insulting to many republics: "Along with Belorussia and the Ukraine, Russia is carrying on its shoulders the main union budget burden." Ah, but all those others—simply dependents and nothing more... It becomes apparent that because of this unbearable burden and obligations to other republics, the Russian Federal Republic's social indicators are the worst in the country. If this is true, why don't the authors rejoice at the draft proposal, made by Baltic economists, to improve every republic's standard of living? No logic can be found, however, in their other assertions, either.

The article suggests the Baltic Republics should look to the West, where integration processes are taking place and doors are opened, not shut. The processes taking place in the Baltics are labeled "isolationist" here. Once again, is it necessary to attach labels without first becoming well-versed in the essence of the situation?

This party central newspaper article strikes a disonant chord, especially in view of the fact that our deputies' proposals at the USSR Soviet congress were rather well-received throughout the entire country. Only the concluding sentence fails to raise any doubts: "We must not relinquish the friendship among our nations into the hands of nationalism and chauvinism."

"Lituanica" Club Members Explain Goals

LD2507140589 Vilnius KOMJAUNIMO TIESA 13 May 89 pp 1, 2

[Interview with "Lituanica" club Members Romas Trumpa and Audrys Antanaitis by Gintare Adomaityte: "Charming Evenings, Belorussia's Borders and 'Lituanica'"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Adomaityte] What is "Lituanica" and why do you need it?

[Antanaitis] "It can not be explained in one word. It is apparently necessary because it enables me to bring my ideas to fruition. In the final analysis, this saves me from sequestering myself at home, in everyday existence, or simply in school matters. Initially, "Lituanica" was established to be entirely different from that which we have now. The initiave group tried to establish a world association of Lithuanians, which was to include Lithuania's residents, emigres, deportees, and Lithuanians from ethnographic border areas. Naturally, everyone was mostly drawn to the emigres."

[Trumpa] "All others were like camouflage."

[Antanaitis] "Thus, if the emigres would be included, travel would be the result. The idea was changed quickly, because the people also changed. You see, the idea of an association was conceived by those who did nothing and only observed events, while the work was begun by others. The direction changed: not Lithuanians from the West, but from the East, not a world association (the West has one like that already), but ties with their fatherland for those who live abroad. Lithuania—the moral and historical world center. In other words, what is our goal? To have as many as possible come here and also to clear a window to the world for the greatest number of our youth. How did I get here? I happen to be a specialist in classic philology, I write about Latin poetry. How difficult the literary situation in the Soviet Union is! There is no library locator system and a multitude of the books I am interested in, are in the West. I came to the association because of my scientific interests, to obtain a book, to meet with emigre Latin scholars. In brief, to associate."

[Adomaityte] Let us phrase it this way: beneficial egotism!

[Antanaitis] "Beneficial. Not to enjoy myself by going abroad, but to open a window to the world. Later, however, it became apparent, the association was crumbling, that the idea was not to become an actuality. I felt an obligation to do everything, in order to develop my ideas, but this time, the ideas are taken in their broadest sense. Lithuania... Lithuanistics. These ideas have always been alive for me, and now with the help fo "Lituanica," I can carry them out. I am concerned about Belorussia and the Lithuanian villages. I have visited there for the past eight years. Now I can go there with "Lituanica" friends, ensembles and concerts. Little Lithuania is a source of concern for me—I can go there."

[Trumpa] "This is how I came to join 'Lituanica.' Last fall, I organized a tour. Every fall we used to visit some republic or another. We decided to go to Belorussia and invited an ethnographic ensemble to accompany us. I was aware of the fact some obstacles might await us and we may experience certain confrontations with local officials, in Belorussia. We prepared for this trip with great care, we planned almost every step. When I saw the moods of Belorussian officials, closeup, I was overwhelmed by a sports like enthusiasm. It was interesting to see how matters would further progress there."

[Adomaityte] It seems the enthusiasm has matured into...love?

[Trumpa] "Yes, I became aware of the fact, we would not accomplish much, by tourism alone. An organization is necessary, which would constantly be concerned with Belorussia's Lithuanians. In Belorussia I accidentally ran into and talked with "Lituanica" representatives from Kaunas. They explained this was their first serious undertaking of associating with Lithuanians throughout the world and of preserving Lithuanianism, but rather than starting with far away Lithuanians, they began with those nearby. I was very pleased to learn of such an organization's existence.

"Some time later, I chanced upon the initiative meeting of 'Lituanica's' Vilnius group. When the subject of Belorussian and Siberian Lithuanians came up, one of the young ladies ventured to say that no one was going to pay them a visit. Everyone had supposedly assembled there to pay their membership dues, in order to be afforded the pleasure of joining some action in the charming West. I could not contain myself. I interjected with my remarks. I did not remain unnoticed. I found myself in the group's council. Why can I not manage without Belorussia? The youth there is perhaps somewhat denationalized, and perhaps there exists a need to show them some concern. However, nowhere in Lithuania will you encounter people who are as good as those in these Lithuanian islands. I visited the Lazdunai island. There are about 30 or 40 Lithuanians there in several villages. The youngest among them that speak Lithuanian are about 60 years old. The women know how to say good evening, can count up to ten and can sing "Bitute Pilkoji" [Little Gray Bee]. One becomes convinced that if nothing is done, Gerveciai and Pelesa will become like that, in 20 years' time. Perhaps those islands we care for will also disappear. If we do nothing, however, will we be able to be at peace with ourselves? All conditions for maintaining Lithuanianism are good—starting with tourist occasions, and ending with a book drive."

[Adomaityte] Perhaps you can now discuss the forum organized by the association?

[Antanaitis] "What the forum idea was? It is being organized by 'Lituanica.' However, it is not a forum that deals with 'Lituanica's' internal affairs, but is a East European Youth Forum. People have joined who do not belong to 'Lituanica' but to other organizations, or who do not belong to any organizations. Let us say it was a forum of Lithuanians scattered throughout the world."

[Trumpa] "We are delinquent, somewhat. We could not invite the deportees. Because of financial difficulties, to be exact..."

[Antanaitis] "We exchanged information about by whom and where our assistance is needed, but in writing. It is as if the forum is to draw us into yet another organization, duplicating the activities of the others."

[Trumpa] "The information available concerning Lithuanians living in East Europe is catastrophically insufficient. Currently we criticize CZERVONY SZTANDAR. Is it not carelessness on the part of our press that no one has shown serious interest in Estonian Lithuanians? CZERVONY SZTANDAR, however, has shown interest in them. They also wrote about Poland's Lithuanians. The Belorussian Lithuanians do get more attention from our press, KOMJAUNIMO TIESA. However, we would like to see more interest shown to students. Thus, ATZALYNAS did not neglect them, but the others? zHow many Lithuanians are students in Pskov? Eighty. Has anyone writen about them? Quite a lot has been written about deportees, but only sporadically about the third generation. Little Lithuania, cultural monuments, place names—it is good that it is of interest. However, how about the people? Who is going to draw up maps to indicate where the Lithuanians are and how many of them are there? Finally, how are we going to learn what their problems are? Our forum provided the best meeting opportunity for Lithuanian students from Leningrad with Lithuanian students from Tartu. The forum is a rehearsal, in preparation for further action."

[Antanaitis] "It is of the essence for Lithuanians to meet in Lithuania, rather than in Riga, or someplace outside USSR boundaries."

[Trumpa] "We, also, have committed some errors in our newspaper LIETAVELE. Once we announced, perhaps somewhat tactlessly, a certain organization was planning to join in our action.

"As you know, all organizations are very sensitive to any takeover attempt. We realized there could be no joining of ranks. There can only be cooperation. Someday, perhaps, we can become coordinators?"

[Adomaityte] "Lituanica" not only assists Lithuanians, but also forms the opinion of local residents about them. You probably receive all sorts of questions?

[Trumpa] "Yes. The most naive among them: Why do these Belorussian Lithuanians not come to Lithuania? Young people come and gladly so. However...if all of them leave? Their forefathers bones are resting there. Will only the graves remain?"

[Antanaitis] "That is right! That is their fatherland. If we can talk about the return of the deportees, we can not consider leaving one's fatherland, the places they have inhabited for centuries, their farms? No."

[Adomaityte] Who are "Lituanica's" members? Is the membership limited?

[Antanaitis] "Membership is not limited. We expect permanent comittment from our members. Their convictions do not have any significance."

[Adomaityte] Can "Lituanica" members participate in other organizations, if they have the time.

[Antanaitis] "If they have the time, of course, they can. They do not have enough time, however. We have 23 groups; the Kaunas, Vilnius, Marijampole, and Klaipeda groups are the most active. We had an evening outing to Salcininkai; a group was established there right away. It looks as if they are prepared to work well. Can you imagine that in Salcininkai?"

[Adomaityte] I can imagine that, for they are in the best position to observe what is happening. I would have more difficulty visualizing their establishing it in mid-Lithuania, where they barely experience that which Salcininkai residents have to contend with everyday; it is easy to discern who needs "Lituanica" more, especially since considerable complications arise.

[Trumpa] "Let us also keep in mind that competition is quite strong—the young people have what to choose from. Our name may not appeal to everyone, and it might be, perhaps, an actual source of confusion. There are those who think if it is "Lituanica," it must have a definite connection with aviation, also, a shoe factory and a rock club. There were even impostors, who had the audacity to sign as president of the world youth "Lituanica," association. We are not going to change our name, however. It connotes Lithuanianism also outside Lithuania's boundaries. People regard it as we would like it to be viewed—they came from Lithuania to spread Lithuanianism. Perhaps not to spread it, but to guard it."

[Adomaityte] In wishing you good luck, not only in the West but also in the mysterious neighboring East, I would like to ask you what activities you plan for the nearest future.

[Trumpa] "Well, we may as well take the opportunity to thank all the participants in our book drive. First, we extend our thanks to the book palace, which assisted us in organizing the drive. During the first three weeks, people sent in about 4,000 books. Following the television request, 1,500 books were collected in a week and a half. Of course, we did not expect that much. We were somewhat uncomfortable in front of Deputy Director Blazaitiene, who had allowed us the use of her office. Don't worry, the books are being stamped and delivered where they are needed the most. Some individuals have earmarked the books, in advance, indicating where they are to go—that will be where they will be delivered."

[Adomaityte] Well, did the deputy director become angry?

[Trumpa] "She said in the name of Lithuania."

[Adomaityte] It seems to me, also, in the name of "Lituanica." Good luck.

Draft Election Laws Discussed in Ukraine

LD1008085289 Moscow TASS in English 0808 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Kiev August 10 TASS—By TASS correspondent Alexey Petrunya:

The working people of the Ukraine are actively discussing the draft laws on amendments and supplements to the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, on elections of people's deputies and local soviets of the republic. The documents, which were published in the press, reflect the democratic changes now occurring in the Ukraine.

Discussion of the drafts will last two months and only then they will be submitted for endorsement to the republic's Supreme Soviet with due account, of course, for the advanced amendments, suggestions and wishes, Nikolay Khomenko, secretry of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine, has noted here.

He stressed that the drafts, submitted for public discussion, were not drawn up behind closed office doors. They were elaborated on the basis of public opinion, consultations with lawyers and scientists. The preliminary outlines were discussed with many work collectives. As a result, chapters regulating the system and principles of the work of soviets of people's deputies and the election procedures in general, have been radically revised.

The published drafts contain some basically different provisions compared with the union laws, according to which elections of people's deputies of the USSR were held this spring. Thus, they reflect the view of the majority of voters, who come out against the holding of regional pro-election meetings, which, as shown by practical experience, have not always expressed the will of the electorate.

It is envisaged to reduce the representation of public organisations as compared to the country's parliament from one third to one quarter. However, many people believe already now that this proposal is a half-measure and that it is necessary to rule out elections from public organisations altogether. The range of collectives, vested with the right to nominate candidates to soviets, has been expanded.

It is envisaged that the congress of people's deputies will be the supreme soviet annually renewed by one-fifth through rotation.

Nikolay Khomenko noted that a working team has been set up under the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet, which includes scientists and executives. They will study and sum up all the suggestions and remarks, received from voters during the discussion of the first draft laws of this kind in history of the country. By October 1st, when the discussion ends, the team will

hand the results over to the legislative proposals' commission and then the Presidium will submit the final versions of the new laws for endorsement to a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine.

Azerbaijan Names Light Industry Minister

NC0908065989 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0340 GMT 9 Aug 89

[From the republican press review]

[Text] A decree issued by the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium has announced that Almaz Mirza Oglu Mustafayev has been appointed as the republic's minister of light industry. The newspaper have published a short biography of the new minister.

Editor of Revolutionary Party Paper Visits Armenia

NC0108191089 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 30 jul 89

[From the republican press review]

[Text] Hamo Bztikyan, editor of the ASBAREZ newspaper published in the United States, is currently in Armenia. ASBAREZ is the official newspaper and regional organ of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Party of North America. It was established in 1908 in Fresno by Armenian refugees, remaining there until 1970. It then moved to Los Angeles when that city's Armenian population increased for various political reasons. At first AZBAREZ was a weekly, then it appeared three times a week, and it is now a daily. Speaking with the correspondent of the youth newspaper AVANGARD on issues tormenting our people, Bztikyan said in particular: The spirit which has been guiding our people for the last 1 ½ years or more and the atmosphere which has imbued the Armenian youth are phenomena difficult for me to assess at present. However, I am pleased to see all these things. I am especially impressed by the members of the organization leading the popular movement. Also, the official recognition of the pan-national Armenian movement is the reiteration of the truth that the popular movement is being guided solely by a healthy national consciousness, by people who are integrated and aligned with the people.

Belorussian Official Views Perestroyka Process

PM0808152389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Aug 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by N. Igrunov, second secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee: "Burden of Political Leadership, Or Another View of Perestroyka in Belorussia"]

[Text] There are directly opposing views of perestroyka in our republic.

The advocates of one viewpoint believe that the process of renewal has still not begun and that everything here is as old as the hills. They claim amid fiery polemics that Minsk represents the antiperestroyka Vendee and ask the following question: Has perestroyka reached Vitebsk? Since present-day life with its fast pace does not spare us negative and sometimes even dramatic events. The consequences of the Chernobyl accident in Mogilev and Gomel Oblasts are slowly being eliminated. The problem of the Belorussian language has come to light. There are holdups in the supply of essential commodities. All this is happening while many leaders are still clinging to the old ideas, relying on administrative fiat and strong-arm pressure.

The other side is equally categorical in its opinions. One of our leading workers expressed its standpoint in the central press with almost aphoristic finality: "...a stable social and economic situation has taken shape in the republic, and the government is implementing the course of perestroyka in a correct, timely, and efficient fashion." A different kind of logic is in operation here. Say an enterprise or sector manages the plan successfully—that means perestroyka is under way. Delegations from various parts of the country have become more frequent, seeking experience of economic management as the shelves of food stores here are fuller than in neighboring cities in the Non-Chernozem Zone—you cannot avoid a touch of pride here. Even the fact that the republic was headed by respectable and totally untarnished leaders during the years of stagnation is regarded as somewhat supernatural. There are people who are not averse to presenting all this as the "Belorussian phenomenon."

Of course, various opinions must be taken into consideration in practical work. But one cannot fail to see that both these positions—the aggressively denunciatory and the exclusively defensive, which justifies everyone and everything—are essentially unconstructive. By diverting attention to themselves, they are blocking the vital business of perestroyka. Only a sober view of things, which makes it possible to take into consideration the fact that the republic's life is much fuller and contradictory and concentrate on the sorest and most acute points in its development, bears fruit.

Take the party's task of effecting a breakthrough in the sphere of labor productivity and accelerating scientific and technical progress. The inspiring idea met with a keen response from Minsk's automobile plant workers. By abandoning the routine technological rut, they have succeeded in a creating a fundamentally new and highly-productive towing vehicle called "Perestroyka," which has won the high opinion of Western specialists. The machine builders have also shone with first-rate models of certain types of machine tools and equipment. However, radical changes are a long way off. The main bulk of the output produced in the republic is still, as in the past, unable to compete on world markets. Taking the most

important indicators of Japanese, FRG, and U.S. economic development as a guideline, we are catching up with them very slowly. Many collectives have both been using and are using what has been achieved as a point of reference. The picture is the same in the countryside. A large group of progressive collective farms and state farms [sovkhoz] have secured quite high economic results. However, there has been no major increase here in the last few years. So, we must tackle the introduction of economic reform and all its elements more thoroughly. Especially since the republic is preparing to begin a new way of life—and switch to the principles of territorial self-financing and self-management.

Or, for instance, the process of democratization. There have been changes here. Enterprises' leading cadres are now being renewed by elections, and labor collective councils have been set up everywhere. Elective party organs are formed increasingly often on a multiple-candidate basis. A number of important decisions have been adopted in the light of public opinion—construction of a nuclear-powered heat and electric power station near the capital has been halted, prospecting work for the construction of a nuclear electric power station in the north of the republic has been curtailed, and preparations are under way to build a memorial to the victims of the Stalinist repressions in the area of Kuropaty. Nonetheless the democratization process is developing with difficulty and painfully. What is impeding it? I often recall Academician P.L. Kapitsa's perspicacious idea: "...The desire to act must arise from dissatisfaction with the status quo; that is, you have to be a dissenter."

Unfortunately, many leading officials, and even the communist masses, have still not realized that this represents the inexhaustible source of scientific and technical and spiritual progress. For some reason there is no effective stimulus for the creative initiatives spawned among the technical-engineering and scientific intelligentsia and in workers' collectives. Cadres sometimes succumb easily to the temptation to interpret some disagreement with various directives as political speculation. Especially since life supplies the fuel for this. Turbid scum is rising up on the steep wave of perestroyka—extremist elements have reached the point of talking about the barrenness of the Belorussian people's future and a "republic without Communists." A different opinion is also making itself felt: that discipline has crumbled at many enterprises "owing to democracy." You will hear people saying the following from time to time: Have we not gone too far with democracy, should we not moderate our zeal? Although as far as zeal is concerned we still have some way to go.

The Communist Party Central Committee and the government have mapped out a whole series of measures to develop the Belorussian language, national schooling, and academic science. Nonetheless the spiritual sphere has still by and large been little affected by perestroyka.

The recent Communist Party Central Committee plenum, which discussed the question of reinforcing party organizations' influence on the sociopolitical situation, pointed out that perestroyka processes lack the requisite dynamism and Communists must above all assume responsibility for this.

It can be said without bragging that there are party organizations in each of the six oblasts which, being fully aware of the acuteness of the prevailing situation, are creatively seeking ways to eliminate the difficulties and contradictions that have arisen. The experience of one such primary party organization—the "Volkovysskiy" Sovkhoz—was approved by the Communist Party Central Committee Bureau.

Over the last few months party meetings have been held throughout the republic on perhaps the most topical issue: reinforcing party organizations' influence on collectives and boosting Communists' activeness in political work. I recalled a meeting at the Minsk Computer Equipment Plant chief technologist's department because of the trenchancy with which the problems were raised and the keen attitude to the cause. Even after it ended, people did not disperse for more than 2 hours, continuing the discussion of the sorest points and matters that are impeding perestroyka. We hope that these meetings along with the plenums due to be held by many rayon and city party committees with the same agenda and the current seminars discussing the practical work of political leadership will gear party organizations to urgent concerns.

Nonetheless, it must be frankly acknowledged that perestroyka is being retarded because a considerable proportion of party committees and primary party organizations are continuing to act in the old way and are afraid to radically renew the content and style of their work. However, sad as this may be, it is a fact that by no means everyone is utilizing their unique opportunity—the first in many years—to assume a truly vanguard aspect. Political methods are being assimilated extremely slowly. Party committee bureaus, plenums, and commissions are working in the same old way, and boosting of their collective responsibility is lax. A great deal is being said about developing intraparty democracy, but the practical changes are insignificant. The renewed apparatus has hitherto failed to find its feet in the changing atmosphere.

Some party committees—especially in the capital center—are having some difficulty in developing relations with the majority of the creative intelligentsia. A great deal here needs to be revised and reappraised. What happened before? Creative workers did not make a particular fuss. Writers wrote books, moviemakers made movies, and artists painted pictures, while party committees and organs of power presented people celebrating anniversaries with titles and awards. We grew accustomed to this. This procedure seemed unshakable.

Although the calm, especially among writers, was relative. Staunch as a frontline soldier who has fought in the front line of the war, Vasil Bykov did not yield to the temptation to depict it in rosy hues, despite the orders and prohibitions, but spoke at the top of his voice of the need to preserve human dignity under any circumstances. Pimen Panchenko, the doyen of Belorussian poetry, irreconcilably denounced moral turpitude and sanctimoniousness. Vladimir Korotekevich warned that the loss of historical roots and national cultural traditions may lead to lack of culture. The young prose writer Viktor Kozko warned about the thoughtless subjugation of nature. Dramatist Aleksey Dudarev was one of the first people in the republic to speak publicly about the social danger of drunkenness.

Of course, critics have read their books, seen their plays, and argued about them. But there were few party workers who pondered how subtly and accurately the writers reflected the processes of social life.

What is the way out? The only way out is to convince the party aktiv and all Communists that with the help of the creative and scientific intelligentsia we will more rapidly implement the revolutionary turnaround in public awareness and psychology that we need so much and overcome the prejudice of some people against certain ideas of perestroyka. And this will undoubtedly help party work itself.

We currently have plenty of reserves in our work with the intelligentsia. We will be take pains to ensure that gifted young writers, artists, and performers become better established not only in the capital but in oblast centers too. We will look into why among the full members of the republic's Academy of Sciences there is still not a single scientist working in areas that are so necessary for perestroyka such as sociology, the law, CPSU history, the theory of scientific communism, psychology, and ethics. I think that we will learn to raise the events held in the republic devoted to highly important landmarks and widely known figures in national history to the level of major sociopolitical and cultural events.

As we can see, life again and again draws our attention to work with cadres and the form of their thinking, actions, and behavior. I read with interest the PRAVDA article by V. Legostayev entitled "The Party's Intellectual Worth." The author struck a chord: Many people are now arguing that by gearing party committees mainly to cadres with engineering and agricultural qualifications we are narrowing the range of party committees' political influence. This is a vital observation: Many people are unable to overcome the lure of their own profession, and they are more willing to work on economic tasks than to work with people. However, I do not think we should go from one extreme to the other by trying to mechanically impose on party committees cadres trained in the humanities. Would that really solve the problem? The people at the helm of political leadership should be well-educated, receptive to restructuring ideas, and able to analyze real life and to organize matters in the new way.

We cannot fail to note that currently nothing in a leader is more greatly valued than accessibility, the ability to win people over, and sincerity in relationships. I would go so far as to claim that we ourselves are to a considerable extent to blame for having created the opinion that we are angry and inaccessible people. "The facial expression is like a resolution," as Konstantin Simonov sarcastically put it. After all, some of us are seen most often on presidiums. And, let's make no bones about it, our vocabulary is sometimes littered with imperious words such as "instruct," "request," and "demand." This means that for us perestroyka should start with the tone and manner of our discourses.

Perhaps it is only now, in the years of perestroyka, that we are actually realizing that not just leading cadres but the entire party should be made up of individuals. Clearly, life itself has brought about a situation whereby the composition of the party and the nomination of people for leading posts is done really openly and publicly. Unfortunately, we are still doing this rather unwillingly and timidly. This is a paradox. By starting perestroyka we have shown ourselves to be decisive people and genuinely revolutionary Leninists. Yet when it comes to ordinary, everyday matters we are inordinately cautious. We accept someone into the party, but we are afraid to consult the collective or ask its opinion. We nominate a Communist for the party apparatus, but we often keep it a secret from the party organization and his colleagues.

And there is one other problem, which, I dare say, perestroyka is encountering not only in our republic.

I once visited a book store in the center of Minsk and, meeting a distinguished local scientist, sensed his surprise. "What are you doing here?" he asked. It was only later that the question made sense. A party worker in a plant shop or livestock unit is a normal occurrence. But in a book store it is discouragingly rare sight. Yet the sphere of culture and education is becoming a priority issue.

We call perestroyka a revolution. But we should remember how the Bolsheviks started. They started by assimilating advanced theory and studying the general laws of social progress, without a knowledge of which it is impossible—and our entire life has confirmed this—to tackle the resolution of individual tasks.

We can cite the fact that we have a ramified system whereby various categories of economic, soviet, and party cadres can improve their qualifications and training. But it is well known that this grew up over decades and is held strongly together by obsolete dogma. We were able to see for ourselves just what this means

when we examined the work of the Minsk Higher Party School at the Communist Party Central Committee Bureau recently. The amendments to its curriculums and plans have so far been minimal. Students are poorly taught how to translate the conceptual ideas of perestroyka into activity by party organizations. They do not receive in-depth knowledge and habits or learn how to organize party committees' work on the basis of political methods, how to build relationships with labor collectives, social organizations and informal associations under the new conditions, and how to rely on the mass media and cultural organs.

Needless to say, we are striving to take account of this position. We are developing local training in every possible way. In recent years we have comprehensively examined new approaches to the improvement of economic relations and the shaping of a social infrastructure in the countryside using the example of the best farms in Brest and Grodno Oblasts. Practical science conferences have been held in the republic on the problems of renewing socialism and building up society's spiritual potential. Another—on legal backing for perestroyka—is in the pipeline. And these are just the first steps.

The republic is currently celebrating the 45th anniversary of its liberation from fascism. We are not just remembering those difficult years but are trying to draw object lessons from them. Back then the party organization and Belorussian leaders set an example of innovative approaches toward mobilizing the masses for victory. Through their efforts a genuinely popular partisan resistance movement was organized. Today times have changed and tasks have changed. But we too can only resolve them using imaginative methods and approaching matters in a creative way. Otherwise the burden of political leadership may prove too heavy to carry.

Uzbek Language Law Highlights Problems

PM2507132589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 3

[A. Orlov report: "Without Translators"]

[Text] A debate has begun in Uzbekistan on the republican draft Law on Languages, which was published in the local press.

Strictly speaking, the debate began a long time ago; the subject arose in the papers and in lecture halls long before the law was published...

At first it was not entirely clear where such an acute language problem had suddenly appeared from. After all, two or three years ago there was no question of granting Uzbek the status of a state language. But in practice, for education purposes and for daily use, everyone simply chose whichever language they found more accessible and comprehensible.

And uniformity reigned on the official "level": all the republican "kurultays," as the meetings and conferences were called to give them local color, took place in Russian, as a rule. Many Uzbeks, looking ahead, sent their children to Russian schools, and even in daily life the Uzbek language was becoming gradually weaker.

I was surprised a few days ago, on a bus, to hear a young man in jeans say: "If you want to speak Russian, go to Moscow." This is the opposite swing of the pendulum, a reaction to the previous foolish practice. Because until recently in Tashkent you could not send a telegram or even call an ambulance in Uzbek.

Let me note that, in the kishlaks and rayon centers where Uzbek always was and still is spoken fluently, the appearance of the draft Law on Languages did not cause any waves of emotion, and in fact more considered opinions are being expressed on the subject.

I will take the liberty of affirming that in the heart of Uzbekistan there is no nationalism. Nor is there any nationalism in the really cultured national milieu of the intelligentsia. Erkin Yusupov, vice president of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Sciences, believes that "there is a need to raise the prestige of the Uzbek language, but not at the expense of Russian."

The demand to "Uzbekicize" Uzbekistan arises from the urban demimonde and ill-informed people. The hostility to enforced russification is being extended to the Russian language itself and its native speakers. And therefore the draft Law on Languages, where it firmly and quite specifically stipulates that "the state ensures that all citizens have the possibility of using both Uzbek and Russian and other languages..." does not please everyone. This view was voiced on a republican television program: Why is it a Law on Languages? We need a law on the language, just the one, the state Uzbek language.

No one whom we have talked to recently doubts that Uzbek can and should be a state language in Uzbekistan. But how can it be done so that the swinging pendulum does not hit the Kazakhs and Koreans, the Ukrainians and Germans, the Greeks and Jews—all the thousands of people from dozens of nationalities for whom Russian has become a real interethnic bridge and a means of mutual understanding.

This question is far from irrelevant, because today the level of Uzbek teaching in Russian schools, just like that of Russian in Uzbek schools, is such that few school-leavers can speak the second language fluently. And even the quality of teaching of the native language in Uzbek schools leaves much to be desired.

In Syrdaryinskaya Oblast, for example, they started to remedy the situation and began with a major inspection of all the schools. A depressing picture emerged. A total of 84 native language teachers and 109 Russian teachers

do not meet the requirements of the posts. And they cannot be dismissed at present, because there is an overall shortage of 1,900 teachers in the oblast. But the question arises: What can a person who has not mastered his subject pass on to the children?

Uzbek language courses have now been opened in many cities in the republic. But, first, you have to pay for most of them and not everyone can afford the required amount. Second, the teachers organize the lessons each in his own way, using whatever textbooks and handbooks they can get hold of. Neither the school nor the higher education program is suited to the rapid teaching of the spoken language to adults. Special methods are necessary.

The shortage of dictionaries, good phrasebooks, and textbooks for study at home is acute. The rather mediocre phrasebook that the Main Editorial Office of the Uzbek Soviet Encyclopedia brought out twice in 1988 sold out in a flash. Unaccountably it tripled in price in the next edition.

As we can see, there are many problems and the task ahead is enormous, and that is why it is no accident that while the draft stipulates that the law will be implemented in stages, it does not give specific dates for the stages.

There are similar processes in varying degrees of acuteness taking place in many other union republics. It is vital that the very process of discussing such laws helps to clarify our general understanding of the importance of languages in mutual relations between peoples so that the law, while it is still at the discussion stage, becomes a means of consolidation and not an instrument of separation.

New Radio Program for Kazakhstan Germans

LD1008060289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0000 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Excerpt] The first radio program in their native language has been broadcast for Germans residing in northern Kazakhstan. This 35-minute program will be broadcast on the third Friday of every month. It is devoted to the language, traditions, and culture of Soviet Germans. [passage omitted]

Chairman Shalayev Interviewed on Unions' Role

PM0808162789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jul 89 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, by V. Lyubitskiy under the rubric "PRAVDA's Mailbag: We Read It Together": "In Defense of People"; date and place of interview not given; first three paragraphs are an introduction]

[Text] The editorial mailbag yields an immense wealth and variety of human passions, ideas, and observations. But from time to time public opinion concentrates on a particular issue or phenomenon or around particular points on the map. And the need then arises to compare different opinions, to discuss the worry, and to ponder it in company with a competent person. The new rubric "PRAVDA's Mailbag: We Read It Together" is designed to meet this requirement.

Readers' letters will serve as food for thought for current affairs writers, cultural luminaries, ministers, public figures, economists, sociologists, party workers, people's deputies, and prominent managers and educators.... Write to say exactly whom you would like to see as your interlocutor. Write—and we will try together to get to the bottom of the difficult problems of our turbulent times and find ways of consolidating our efforts to make perestroyka a success.

Today we read PRAVDA's mail with S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU] and USSR people's deputy.

[Lyubitskiy] Stepan Alekseyevich, in the course of recent events, bearing in mind the mass strikes in mining cities, workers have given far from flattering descriptions of trade unions, which, together with the administration, are responsible for many of the accumulated problems. Readers bluntly write that the "colonialist" policy of ministries and departments regarding many regions has been pursued with the blessing, that is, the complicity, of sector trade unions....

[Shalayev] On arriving in the Kuzbass in connection with the miners' strikes, we visited 13 cities in the oblast and met with workers at rallies, in labor collectives, and at talks with members of strike committees. It is clear that people's acute dissatisfaction with the neglect of the social sphere and the increasing difficulties in the supply of foodstuffs and consumer goods of late primarily underlie what has happened. The demands of the working people are not those of freeloaders. The miners want economic autonomy and the chance, through better economic management, to earn more for themselves and the state and to resolve the most acute problems more quickly. And the newspaper's readers are right: It is not only the diktat of management organs that is to blame for the prevailing situation. The trade unions, too, bear responsibility for the outstanding problems that drove the workers to these extreme measures. This also applies to many Kuzbass mines' trade union committees, which were inconsistent and lacking in principle in their conduct.

Why did the trade unions not raise their voices in defense of working people's interests in time? First, their thinking was dominated first and foremost by state needs, when it seemed that progress was impossible without accelerated, priority development of production. On the other hand, we did not always, I would say, "storm the barricades" when social tasks were tackled according to the leftover principle.

But there is another reason why people get the impression that trade unions stay mum or are merely yes-men. One can cite numerous examples where we argued a case, raised objections, or demanded something from the government, the State Planning Committee, or ministries—but, for some reason, this was not usually talked about.

But there is now understanding that as the trade unions' stance directly affects working people's interests, we should state it publicly and frankly. Take the sector with which we began our discussion. Everyone knows how many years the miners have been denied having the same day off.

[Lyubitskiy] That, incidentally, occurred with the blessing of the sector trade union....

[Shalayev] Yes. And throughout those years the miners demanded that this misguided practice be stopped. But they ran into a wall of incomprehension: They were told switching to the new work regime would entail a fall in output. We trade unionists then put the question more simply: Let the mine collectives themselves decide as and when they are ready to switch over to a normal work regime, that will encourage miners to mobilize their production reserves. Again we heard countless excuses from Minister Shchadov: Wait, let's investigate and examine it carefully, and so forth. But for how long can one "examine carefully"? And in June the trade union central committee categorically demanded that the ministry settle this issue. The AUCCTU Presidium supported it and this was reported in the newspaper. But who would have known about this stance of ours earlier?

[Lyubitskiy] Yes, in our country good decisions are often anonymous—they sail under the customary flag of the "concerns of party and government...."

[Shalayev] In exactly the same way the trade union submitted a demand for night shift supplements to the ministry. The leaders of the mine associations tried to prove that they were incorporated in the actual coal rates. But that was not the case. That is why the trade union central committee demanded that the supplements be introduced.

[Lyubitskiy] And where was the money for this found?

[Shalayev] That, excuse me, is the concern of the sector leaders. Former Light Industry Minister Klyuyev also tried to prove that he lacked the necessary resources. However, we gave him a clear deadline and reported on the situation prevailing in the sector at a sitting of the Council of Ministers Presidium. After that the supplements were introduced.

[Lyubitskiy] But what if the minister does nevertheless ignore the trade union's demands or tries to put the brake on them? You can't compalin to the government every time....

[Shalayev] I asked Srebnyy, chairman of the miners' trade union central committee, the same question. Mikhail Aleksandrovich said that the minister's report would be examined at the trade union plenum. And the consequences there could be very diverse, going so far as a vote of no confidence. Trade unions possess such a right.

[Lyubitskiy] Okay, trade unions are clearly issuing a warning to ministers. But readers want to know about the AUCCTU Presidium's position when statewide decisions are involved.

[Shalayev] Here again the lack of glasnost has its effect. When we have a dissenting opinion, we firmly uphold it irrespective of the authorities or officials. Do you recall G. Popov in his speech at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies rebuking the trade unions for lack of principle concerning a letter from four economic organs on the normative correlations between increase in wages and labor productivity? But I will tell you something that few people know: The letter was not signed by the AUCCTU. The question arises whether such a letter is legitimate if it does not bear trade unions' signatures. I consider it quite illegitimate. That is why the AUCCTU registered a strong protest to the country's government against such strong-arm methods. Two sittings of the Council of Ministers Presidium were devoted to this written protest. And despite the fact that the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Finance, and the other authors of the document defended their positions, many of our comments were ultimately taken on board. But, I repeat, few people are aware of this.

[Lyubitskiy] And yet, Stepan Alekseyevich, the trade unions are criticized not just for insufficient glasnost. If the state of affairs does not change, no other illustrations are needed. How many years, for example, have workers been writing to us about the unfair length of leave!...

[Shalayev] Yes, more than 22 million Soviet people have 15 days' leave. We lag behind even a number of developing countries in terms of the average holiday allocation. To be frank, this is shameful for our state. Therefore the AUCCTU, together with the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, has prepared and submitted a new draft Law on Leave. At the same time we have proposed granting labor collectives themselves the immediate right to tackle the question of extra leave, without waiting for the law. We are told that it is impossible and would produce undesirable consequences. Yet today any director has the right without asking anyone to grant unpaid leave on application by a working person and at the same time provide him material assistance. So he need only sign a two-paragraph order and the question is solved. There are also instances of illegal extra leave allegedly granted for working in bad conditions. Who needs these circuitous, degrading ploys?

[Lyubitskiy] Such a stance on the AUCCTU's part does, of course, induce respect. But the grassroots trade union organizations, N. Mitik from Kharkov says in his letter, "are made painfully aware of the bureaucracy of the unjustifiably inflated trade union management apparatus." And he adds: "the arbitrary, command-based style has become deeply ingrained in trade unions and penetrated their every pore."

[Shalayev] I find the comments well founded. For many years the structure of trade unions was formed, as in state departments, in line with the schema established within the administrative-command system. And with the same division of rights according to "rank": The AUCCTU has all the rights granted trade unions, the oblast council of trade unions only some of the rights, and the enterprise trade union committee even fewer.

I think this practice has done enormous damage to our organization and determined perhaps to an even greater extent than other reasons the loss of trade unions' authority and their divorce from the masses. The structure of trade unions is now, in the course of the political reform, changing. We are particularly seeking to extend primary organizations' rights: Let them operate independently and rid themselves of the long-established habit of agreeing to everything. If you make mistakes, the workers and trade union members will correct you. For its part the AUCCTU should not issue orders to, for example, central committees or councils of trade unions, it must help solve fundamental questions concerning the defense of working people's interests. For example, a number of letters justifiably comment that our legislation deprives many people of the right to seek judicial remedy in respect of labor rights. This concerns the notorious lists one and two, whereby dismissal disputes are examined by the department involved [po podchinennosti] and the administration's decision can only be appealed in a higher body.

[Lyubitskiy] Virtually outside the law.

[Shalayev] Yes, and sometimes when receiving citizens in my capacity as AUCCTU chairman even I do not know how to help someone: From the legal standpoint he appears to have been correctly dismissed, whereas it is in fact a mockery. The trade unions' position is that every Soviet citizen has the right to judicial defense.

[Lyubitskiy] And how real are your efforts?

[Shalayev] We have found support among lawyers, but the ministries are reluctant to abandon the dictatorship of the lists. And yet in those sectors where internal regulations operate (on the railroad and in civil aviation), this applies even to workers. It also embraces teachers and higher educational institution lecturers, since certification exists there. We are not, of course, against regulations and certifcation, but they must not be allowed to conflict with constitutional rights. The chairman of the council of ministers recently supported our proposal to revoke the "lists." It is now up to the Supreme Soviet.

[Lyubitskiy] Stepan Alekseyevich, this is the right time to talk about about another acute problem. Here are some lines from a letter: "The trade unions would be able to defend working people's legitimate interests if they had a little more autonomy and a little less party interference in their internal affairs." That is, people are writing frankly that trade unions' subordination to the party is one of the reasons for the "crisis of confidence" in them.

[Shalayev] I want to answer frankly, too. Since V.I. Lenin's death trade unions have gradually turned into an organization virtually subordinate to the party. The party has decided trade unions' cadre questions and issued instructions on particular issues, disregarding the autonomous and public nature of the organization. But there is already real movement toward change.

We recognize the party's leading role in society, but it should not interfere in our practical affairs, should not issue orders. Moreover, the party itself has an interest in strong trade unions—after all, there are 142 million working people!

[Lyubitskiy] But in the letters there are quite a few examples of party workers who cling to the old style, thinking that trade unions should agree every step with them. "Strong trade unions" clearly means "strongly supportive"...to such workers.

[Shalayev] You come across these recrudescences of the old ways even at a pretty high level. At the beginning of the year at the plenum of the Kazakh republic trade union council E. Zhakselekov, its chairman, expressed the idea that we need legal regulation of strikes, that trade unions should have the right to halt work when the administration disregards their opinion. He essentially repeated what had been said just before at the AUCCTU plenum. But I had to staunchly support him before the leaders of the republic Communist Party Central Committee. They were indignant and even tried to insist that it was impossible to continue to entrust him with work in the trade unions. And yet the problem had not arisen suddenly. We had raised it immediately after the 19th party conference. We are not in favor of stopping enterprises for any old reason. A strike is an extreme and very responsible measure with many adverse consequences. But there should be a procedure whereby collective labor disputes can be promptly examined. If, however, the administration seeks to avoid this, the trade union organization should have the means to insist that the workers' legitimate demands be met.

[Lyubitskiy] But if a strike has already begun, what, in your opinion, shouild be the trade union committee's stance?

[Shalayev] Article 29 of the draft Law on the Rights of Trade Unions enshrines the right to strike. At the next AUCCTU plenum we will again discuss this draft. If you want to know my opinion, the trade union committee should always represent working people's interests. If, however, the collective sets up a strike committee without the trade union's participation, that signifies lack of confidence in the trade union committee, which, consequently, does not reflect the interests of the collective and has to be reelected. In general I want to say that the lessons of the miners' strikes will be be most carefully analyzed in trade unions at all levels.

[Lyubitskiy] The following reader's question is also no doubt legitimate: What is your attitude to the idea of alternative trade unions, which has been aired in the press?

[Shalayev] There is a trend toward unity in the trade union movement worldwide. In some countries there are alternative trade unions, but nowhere has their parallel existence strengthened working people's position. As for our country, I see no point in this at all in conditions of democratization and perestroyka. If in some labor collective the trade union committee carries out its obligations badly and does not defend working people's interests, that means it has to be stripped of its powers and people whom the trade union members want to see head their organization have to be elected.

[Lyubitskiy] But what if the administration does not allow this? After all, there is still alive in everyone a sense of what I would call professional self-preservation....

[Shalayev] During the recent reports and elections more than half the trade union committee chairmen were elected at assemblies themselves, and, as a rule, from alternative candidates. Therefore if a collective has an informal leader who expresses his comrades' interests best it is necessary to elect such a person as leader of the trade union organization more quickly. When I was in the Kuzbass I met with many real worker leaders among strike committee members. Why not involve them in trade union work? Such measures are now being planned in the oblast.

[Lyubitskiy] M. Rostrovskaya from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk writes, in particular, about the need for this. She also speaks about the unseemly practice of trade in "scarce goods" via the trade unions....

[Shalayev] I think that this is one of a multitude of extrinsic functions with which the trade unions have been "saddled" in different years. This, incidentally, is one of the roots of the formalism for which we are rightly rebuked. If something requires to be allocated, a special commission of trusted people should be elected by the collective. The trade union committee should get on with its own business and have no truck with distributing coupons for soap, footwear, and in places even vodka....

[Lyubitskiy] Readers write that access to the "feeding trough" corrupts trade union committees and "tames" them. Can a trade union committee chairman instill order in the workers' canteen if he himself eats in a separate "directors'" dining room?

[Shalayev] I encountered such a situation in Murmansk Oblast toward the end of last year at the "Apatity" Association. Workers described over lunch how badly they were fed. While at the same time there was a first-rate canteen for directors, where specialists and party and trade union organization leaders ate. That is a disgrace, of course. Trade union committees should take the initiative of shutting down all "exclusive" canteens at enterprises in the interests of social justice. Enterprises now have the right to take over the budget of works canteens. And trade union committees must instill order in them.

[Lyubitskiy] And the final group of letters—they concern the so-called trade union faction at the Congress of People's Deputies. The congress, for example, had instructions from trade unions submitted to it. Was there not here the kind of finagling of previous years when "instructions" to deputies were always agreed to in advance with the apparatus? And how independent are deputies from trade unions, given their natural subordination to corporate interests?

[Shalayev] The instructions from trade unions are ideas and proposals which we have received at workers' assemblies, plenums, and meetings with voters. They are no longer agreed with anyone anywhere. And these instructions do, as you put it, form the basis of the corporate interests of our group of deputies. But, for all this, the trade unions' envoys are quite independent in their actions. I acknowledge that in a number of instances I voted at the congress not at all in the way the presidium did, for example. In general I would say that Soviet power is the power of the people and we respect it, but trade unions should enjoy relations of equal partnership with it at all levels. That is how Lenin saw them. Neither more, nor less! [Shalayev ends]

Letters by the following were used in the conversation: V. Baranov (Leningrad), L. Bessmertnyy (Minsk), E. Kasparyanets (Saratov), V. Konstantinov (Vishnevaya Polyana settlement, Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR]), A. Korneyev, (Voronezh), A. Mingazov (Davlekanovo, Bashkir ASSR), N. Mitin (Kharkov), V. Nikolskiy (Dmitrov, Moscow Oblast), M. Rostovskaya (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), V. Sokolov (Cherepovets, Vologda Oblast), V. Strinzhi (Kizlyar, Dagestan ASSR), I. Tarasenko (Zholymbet settlement, Tselinograd Oblast), G. Udeykov (Sevastopol), A. Shapovalov (Pavlovo, Gorkiy Oblast), B. Shevelev (Rostov-na-Donu), and other PRAVDA readers.

Deputy Interviewed on Status of Judges

LD0808223189 Moscow World Service in English 2010 GMT 8 Aug 89

[Report on interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, doctor of law and USSR people's deputy, by commentator Boris Markovinikov; date and place not given—read by announcer; Yakovlev speaks in Russian, fading to announcer's superimposed English translation]

[Text] The first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which ended last week, has passed a law on the status of judges. This act has been highly evaluated here. Our commentator, Boris Markovnikov, has interviewed People's Deputy Yakovlev, doctor of law, and who participated in preparing the new law. The law is believed to be a real step toward creating independent and impartial law courts in this country.

How would you evaluate the present position of judicial authorities in the USSR?

[Begin Yakovlev recording] Aleksandr Yakovlev says that so far, or at least until the beginning of restructuring, the courts of law had been no more than part of the punitive system. They may have had a more independent policy in industrial disputes, but even then they were not free from pressure on the part of administration and communist party authorities. But when it came to crime, particularly with political connotations, judges' independence was nonexistent and all the other criminal cases were tried with low standard of proof presented by the prosecution. All too often courts of law rubberstamped the prejudged decisions by the investigation.

On guarantees for the judges' independence in the new law, Aleksandr Yakovlev said there is a new principle, so far absent in our law system, of responsibility for contempt of court. Attempts to bring pressure to bear in courts, or failure to carry out the courts' rulings, or refusal to give pertinent information shall be punishable by law. Another guarantee lies in the fact that the judges will be elected, not by the local people, as before, but by the councils of a higher level than the judge in question, that is a district judge is to be elected by the regional council, for instance. That should free the judges from local pressures. It's also important that the judges' term of office has been doubled to reach 10 years. There is a set procedure for impeaching the judge or arresting him or her. That should now require an approval by the Supreme Soviet of the union republic. So far, such a requirement has been absent. This is a procedure unknown in the West, but in our conditions it's of vital importance as a necessary guarantee of genuine independence of judges. [end recording]

Soviet society wishes to have full confidence in the judges' professional competence. It's been all too common practice here for incompetent people to take the judge's chair. On that problem Aleksandr Yakovlev said:

[Begin Yakovlev recording] The requirements toward prospective judges have been sharply raised, explains Aleksandr Yakovlev. We are returning to the age-hallowed rule that professionals should be judged for promotion by their peers. So far, they have been rather selected by the political structure of this country; now a judge will be recommended or promoted only with approval from the legal qualificationary college. That will entail a stiff examination. This is also a new procedure in our legal system. [end recording]

Committee Appeals for Funds To Combat AIDS

PM1008133189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Aug 89 Second Edition p 3

[Feature comprising appeal from USSR Health Ministry Committee To Combat AIDS followed by interview with USSR Deputy Health Minister A. Kondrusev by N. Gogol: "The 'Syndrome' Must Be Attacked"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text]

Appeal by the USSR Health Ministry Committee To Combat AIDS to All Ministries, Departments, and Public Organizations of the Country

The world is in the grip of an epidemic of a dangerous new infectious disease—the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). According to WHO figures, by the end of June this year, 164,000 cases of AIDS had been registered in 149 countries. In our country, since the first person suffering from AIDS was discovered in March 1987, the number of registered cases rose to 11 in July 1989 and the number of people infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) has increased from 32 in 1987 to the present figure of 312.

Scientists' prognoses are not comforting: In the United States peak morbidity for this infection is expected in 1991-1992, the number of virus-carriers will reach 10-15 million, and there will be 4 million patients, half of whom will die.

In the USSR, according to the prognoses, the peak will come somewhat later, toward 1997. But the most vigorous measures to combat this sinister virus are extremely necessary right now.

All this demands very considerable expenditure. For example, the expenditure on anti-epidemic and treatment measures in eliminating the outbreak of HIV infection inside the hospital in just one center cost around R1.5 million.

At the present time the medical profession possesses neither medicines nor vaccine to combat this dreadful infection. Preventing infection, including during medical interventions, therefore plays a specially important role. For this medical establishments need adequate supplies of special medical instruments.

However, an extremely unsatisfactory situation exists regarding the provision of medical establishments with syringes, needles, scarifiers, capillary tubes for taking samples, blood-transfusion systems, rubber gloves, and sterilizing equipment. The lack of disposable syringes is felt particularly acutely.

The directive bodies are taking measures to rectify the prevailing situation, but this will take time. The USSR Health Ministry, for its part, is purchasing syringes and other instruments, however, our opportunities are limited.

Given this, concerted efforts alone can help end this mortal threat to the population's health. People are terrified of AIDS. It is time for concrete action to replace terror.

The USSR Health Ministry Committee To Combat AIDS appeals to all ministries, departments, and public organaizations to allocate currency to combat this dreadful infection. That will make it possible to purchase disposable syringes and blood-transfusion systems. The USSR Health Ministry guarantees that the AIDS-prevention equipment acquired will be assigned as a priority to the needs of workers in public organizations and those sectors, ministries, and departments which allocate currency.

Our bank account is No 680001111, Foreign Economic Bank, Moscow.

[Signed] USSR Health Ministry Committee To Combat AIDS.

We asked A. Kondrusev, USSR chief state public health physician and USSR deputy minister of health, to comment on the appeal by the USSR Health Ministry Committee To Combat AIDS:

[Kondrusev] I do not want to dramatize the situation, but it is really critical. Just look: In some 2 years the number of sick and infected persons has increased by a factor of 10. The geographical distribution of this dangerous infection has also expanded. It is now found in 8 of the 15 union republics. The largest number of infected persons has been revealed in the following localities: 80 in the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; 38 in Moscow; 35 in Volograd; 19 in Odessa; 13 in Rostov-na-Donu....

This list alone reminds us of the tragedies caused by the criminal neglect of duty by doctors that led to the infection of children inside hospital. I will not seek to justify the culprits, but let us remember that if the hospitals had had the necessary syringes and other disposable equipment, the tragedies could have been avoided.

We, that is, the health care service, are catastrophically short of all the necessary components for AIDS prevention. That lies behind the appeal to departments and public organizations, the point of which is that we should work together and, most importantly, quickly. Misfortune spurs us on.

[Gogol] Aleksandr Ivanovich, the committee appeals to ministries and promises priority allocation to workers in sectors which respond to the appeal for currency. But what is to be done for old people who no longer work? How do you protect children, who experience the problems of our health care service the most?

[Kondrusev] You asked the question correctly. But let us not forget that the anticipated help from the departments is far from being our sole source of material provision concerning this problem. We have already purchased diagnostic equipment from the Finnish firm Labsistem out of government-allocated funds for 22 new centers for the prevention and combating of AIDS. Imported production lines manufacturing disposable syringes are operating, albeit not effectively enough as yet....

It is a matter of supplementing what we have, which can only benefit everyone. For example, the Health Ministry Collegium, which backs the appeal by the Committee To Combat AIDS, has adopted a decision to reallocate existing funds for disposable syringes and systems to establishments treating children. Their requests for sterilizing equipment, cleansing and disinfecting facilities, and disposable medical instruments should also be fully met.

We are in no doubt either that the departments and public organizations which wish to contribute to the fight against AIDS will not object if some of the funds allocated by them go to the broad network, particularly to establishments dealing with obstetrics and children.

Legal Recourse for Fired Strikers Viewed

18280162 Moscow TRUD in Russian 29 Jul 89 p 1

[Interview with V.V. Kleptsov, chief of the Legal Work Department of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, by V. Konstantinov, TRUD correspondent: "Department in the Role of a Judge?"; date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] **A number of miner's collectives that took part in strikes have demanded the right of legal defense for all workers, regardless of category, who were discharged. A TRUD correspondent asked V.V. Kleptsov, manager of the Legal Work Department of the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], to explain what position the trade unions of the country take on this question.**

[Konstantinov] Vasiliy Vasilyevich, the majority of our citizens can make an appeal in court against an administrative order that discharges them from their jobs. But

millions of workers are deprived of such a right, and in the event of a labor dispute they can only complain to the superior offices of their department. How did this situation come about?

[Kleptsov] Originally a number of officials, whose organization's labor disputes were reviewed by the next highest offices, were small and included only managerial workers who were enumerated on a special list. However, at the request of ministries and departments, the list of categories of workers who did not have the right of legal defense was repeatedly supplemented. The adoption of regulations about discipline in a number of industries of the national economy led to a further expansion of the non-judicial system of examining labor disputes in enterprises of the railroad, maritime and river transport, civil aviation, communications, coal, power, oil, and gas industries.

As a result, not only managers of enterprises, institutions, and organizations and their deputies fell under the effect of list No 1, but also the chiefs of departments and services, foremen, and many ordinary workers as well. Today there is no right of legal defense in disputes concerning discharge for workers in research projects and project design organizations, and for creative workers of theaters, ensembles, and orchestras, if they are discharged from work in connection with efficiency ratings that are not appropriate for the positions they occupy. These and some other categories of workers are listed in list No 2. As a rule their discharge does not even require the concurrence of the trade union committee.

[Konstantinov] How is a labor dispute about reinstatement in a job reviewed—for example, the chief of a shop—if the enterprise where he worked is located thousands of kilometers from the superiors of the next highest organ?

[Kleptsov] Materials are requested that provide the reason for the discharge, or examiners are sent to the location.

[Konstantinov] And that is the way the red tape emerges...

[Kleptsov] Of course. I know many cases where, at the persistent complaints of individual workers, dozens of brigades from various organs were dispatched to a location. It should also be noted that none of those who check on complaints has the right to resolve the question of reinstating a claimant to his job, even if he is unjustly discharged. It would seem that logic and justice demand that each person who does not agree with a discharge should be given the right to file a complaint in a court. However, the ministries do not in any way want to agree with this and do not want to give up the role of judge, contending that this would lead to a break in production discipline—although, in fact, the opposite is the case. Strengthening legality in the sphere of labor relations would certainly promote the strengthening of discipline.

[Konstantinov] What is being done to resolve this problem?

[Kleptsov] The position of the trade unions and the AUCCTU on this question is absolutely unambiguous: All workers and employees, regardless of the position they occupy and the grounds for the discharge, must have the right to file a suit in court for job reinstatement. There must be no exceptions to the general rule according to which a discharge on an administration's initiative is not allowed without the concurrence of the trade union committee.

In our opinion, the existing situation is not normal, especially now in a period of expanding democracy, the formation of a rule-of-law state, and the strengthening of the protective role of trade unions. Unquestionably, the legislative acts that restrict the rights of workers and employees in legal defense must be annulled. Several years back the AUCCTU jointly with the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems] and the legal protection organs developed and submitted for review by the legislative organs draft documents that provide for a substantial reduction in the list of categories of workers and labor disputes that are resolved by the next highest superior organ.

Our proposals were repeatedly reviewed at various levels, but they were still not approved, essentially because of the negative, routine position of ministries, especially of those that had enterprises where discipline regulations were in force. Nonetheless, the AUCCTU persistently raises the question about resolving this problem in the near future. Now the draft document that we prepared is under review in the USSR Council of Ministers. We raise the question in this draft about a total abrogation of lists No 1 and No 2 so that each worker, regardless of the position he occupies, will have the right to legal and trade union protection.

[Konstantinov] And the last question, Vasiliy Vasilyevich. The mail to TRUD frequently includes letters with criticism of the existing procedure for reviewing labor disputes at enterprises...

[Kleptsov] Today, labor disputes at enterprises are reviewed by two authorities: the labor disputes commission and the local trade union committee. They resolve more than 500,000 statements daily, of which 98-99 percent are in favor of the worker. Basically, these are complaints about salary penalties, arguments about depriving workers of bonuses, or the exaction of disciplinary fines.

In our opinion, legislation on the procedure for reviewing labor disputes at an enterprise should be changed, taking into account the expansion of the rights of labor collectives. According to legislation, the commission on labor disputes at the present time is established from an equal number of representatives from the administration and the trade union committee, and it

functions in the review of worker statements on a parity basis—that is, it can reach a decision only in the event that both parties come to an agreement. Consequently, the representative of the administration in the commission must object to the suit when the dispute is unresolved, and the worker must submit a statement to the trade union committee of the enterprise.

Last year there were about 160,000 such cases, and almost all of the statements by the trade union committees were approved. As a result, the commission on labor disputes is transformed, in essence, into some kind of formal authority.

The AUCCTU, together with the USSR Goskomtrud, long ago prepared and submitted for review by legislative organs a proposal to change the procedure for the organization and work of the commission on labor disputes. We think that commissions on labor disputes at enterprises, institutions, and organizations should be created by selecting their members at meetings of labor collectives and that decisions should be made by a majority vote. In this case, the commission would act like a court on the basis of principles of law and would decide labor disputes by a majority vote.

Aviation Official Interviewed on Service Problems

OW2507042089 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Jul 89

[Studio interview with Lev Viktorovich Ilchuk, chief of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation Passenger Service Administration by Leonid Elin; from the "120 Minutes" program]

[Text] [Elin] Our guest is Lev Viktorovich Ilchuk, chief of the USSR Ministry of Aviation Passenger Service Administration. This is not the first time he has been our guest, and naturally, since we are presently being viewed mainly by representatives of our country's Far Eastern regions—the Far East, the North, and Siberia—we are interested in how people are getting to and from vacation spots this year. Is it better than last year? Yesterday, we showed a report on what was being done to improve the timely issue of tickets. The problem as far as we know, is primarily a shortage of aircraft. So what is being done in this area, Lev Viktorovich?

[Ilchuk] Generally, it is a natural question to ask today because we are tackling the mass exodus of the population from the northern and far eastern regions, and in August we will begin bringing the people back—so to speak—to their places of permanent residence. I must say that there has been some progress this season. What are these improvements? In Magadan, Kamchatka, and Sakhalin Oblasts, and Norilsk, Nizhnevartovsk, Nadym, and Mirninskiy Rayon of Yakutiya a large-scale experiment was carried out. Some 900,000 advance requests were received and processed, and people submitting the requests were given an opportunity to get direct return tickets several months before their flight. We even provided an opportunity for people to do this with two connections en route. Of the submitted requests, 93 percent were satisfied. We could not satisfy requests for the beginning of June and the end of August. This is understandable because at those times there is a mass exodus and then a mass return in connection with school vacations. Well....

[Elin interrupts] I know—pardon the interruption—that the question of somehow staggering the beginning of studies has been raised repeatedly, to shift the start by a least 2 weeks in different regions of the country so that, say, in one place studies would start on 1 September, elsewhere on 15 September, somewhere else maybe on 20 September, and so forth. This would help your work.

[Ilchuk] If this was done, then we could eliminate these peaks in early June and late August. If we do not get the support of directive organs about changing the beginning and end of the academic year, then naturally we will have to work another few years in order to satisfy the demands of the people in these northern and far eastern regions for air transport. What have we seen this season? First of all, we avoided excessive lines, even in such cities as Magadan and Norilsk, for the purchase of advance tickets.

[Elin] We envy you.

[Ilchuk] Yes, this is really the number one problem in central oblasts as well as in Moscow. That was the first point. Second, we have been able to get a picture of the situation concerning unfulfilled requests. In June, for example, and during 12 days of July, about 10 flights from Magadan were canceled. In other words, by that time the population had already managed to get to the mainland. Four flights were also canceled from Kamchatka, and there are now flights from Magadan and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy with vacant seats, some five to seven vacant seats on every aircraft. There are some Aeroflot problems involved here too, but in principle this is a symptom of saturation of demand, satisfaction of demand.

[Elin] It would be great if this was true everywhere.

[Ilchuk] Yes, but we should tell the people of the Far East.... [changes thought] After all, we are indebted to people living in Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, and Blagoveshchensk. Today, it is very, very difficult to purchase a ticket to fly to the central regions of the country.

[Elin] In this connection, I have another question. At the current session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, both the minister of civil aviation and the minister of aviation industry have been asked many questions regarding unfulfilled requests and about prospects in this work both in passenger and freight haulage. What can you say about this?

[Ilchuk] Well, people watching this program know that the session confirmed Aleksandr Nikitich Volkov as minister of civil aviation, and in his report at the session the minister said that the primary task of civil aviation today is to satisfy the population's requirements for passenger haulage in the far eastern and northern regions. We have been implementing this program for the past 2 years and will continue it. What does this mean? It means that the entire increase in the requirements for fuel, for aviation fuel, allocated to us by the country will be sent to these regions.

[Elin] What about everyone else?

[Ilchuk] Well, quite frankly, in the central regions aviation haulage problems will remain at the same level as in 1988 and 1989.

[Elin] Well, that is not very good. What is the problem?

[Ilchuk] The problem is as follows. First, it is fuel. Second, I would like to return to the speech made by the minister of aviation industry, who said we have a great shortcoming in the Ministry of Civil Aviation. So today, in the summer season, even if the government allocated fuel to us, the lack of sufficient aviation equipment, in particular highly fuel efficient aircraft such as the Tu-154M, Yak-42, and new models that should already be in the air like the Il-96-300 and Tu-204, does not permit us to solve this problem.

[Elin] And there is a shortage of engines, as far as I know?

[Ilchuk] Yes, today there is a new problem. We have some 50-70 aircraft standing idle every day without engines.

[Elin] These are shortcomings in the work of the Ministry of Aviation Industry.

[Ilchuk] Yes, the Ministry of Aviation Industry, but to put in more objectively, we should, in principle, focus on the plans of the Ministry of Civil Aviation.

[Elin] I understand. Well, I think we are being viewed by the leaders of at least the far eastern region, and many enterprises can also be found there as in Siberia and Central Asia. For example I know that there is a major plant in Tashkent that produces passenger planes. This criticism is directed primarily at you, comrades, because I emphasize that regardless of how well aviators work—although they have many shortcomings—much needs to be improved. Am I correct, Lev Viktorovich?

[Ilchuk] Yes, without a doubt, particularly in the spheres of culture and services.

[Elin] Yes, undoubtedly, but first of all, if there is a shortage of aircraft; if there is a fuel shortage, then no matter how well they try to serve passengers, one, unfortunately cannot fly anywhere on the plane's carpet. This is how things stand, in my opinion. Do you agree?

[Ilchuk] Leonid Ilich, I think you have put it most fairly, but we still fall very short when it comes to passenger service at airports and even the purchase of tickets. Today, there is the question of automating the industry, advance ticket sales, and improving in-flight services.

[Elin] Well, we will discuss that with you at our next meeting. Thank you very much.

Chief Appointed To Fight Against Organized Crime

18001457 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Aug 89 p 1

[Article by Yuriy Shchkochikhin: "Taming the Lion"]

[Text] **A new Ministry of Internal Affairs chief for fighting against organized crime was appointed at the end of last week. He was Aleksandr Ivanovich Gurov, doctor of jurisprudence, militia lieutenant colonel.**

I must admit that I did not expect this news (and I know that A.I. Gurov did not expect it either). Why? A person who is not a member of the "nomenklatura" for such a high position? Why? An officer—for a general's position? Why? A scholar—for practical work, and this particular kind of practical work? And, finally, this much of a leap up the service ladder for a person who in two of our dialogs (last July—"The Lion Jumped!" and this July—"Under the Control of the Mafia") expressed his own opinion, independent of that of the leaders, concerning our domestic mafia?

Yes, at first I was surprised but then I understood: This was probably the most pleasant news I have had in a long time. No, he is not from the "nomenklatura" and no, he is not a general, and yes, he does have his own point of view. That could not have happened in the former Ministry of Internal Affairs; that could not have been imagined before perestroyka.

A.I. Gurov is 44. He has traveled the path from a rank-and-file militiaman to an inspector for criminal investigation. He completed the law faculty at Moscow State University, then graduate school. After that he worked in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and defended his doctoral dissertation. And now he is where all the action is.

We journalists of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA hope that now some blows will be dealt to the mafia. And I am convinced that our readers share this hope as well.

Moscow Committee Set Up To Fight Crime

LD0908203489 Moscow TASS in English 2022 GMT 9 Aug 89

["Briefing in the Main Department of Soviet Militia"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow August 9 TASS—The situation in Moscow continues to deteriorate. This was [words indistinct] briefing in the main department of the capital's militia today. The rise in crime rate continued last week.

Yevgeniy Ryabtsev, chief of Moscow militia, stressed the timeliness and exceptional importance of the Supreme Soviet decision on the need to resolutely step up combatting the rise in crime. He said that under the decision a provisional committee was already being set up in Moscow to combat crime. The committee is to be headed by Valeriy Saykin, chairman of the Executive Committee of Moscow City Soviet. Provisional committees will also be set up in Moscow's districts.

Moscow Soviet Discusses Crime Problems

LD1008163289 Moscow TASS in English 1608 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—A complex situation that has formed in the country as a result of the increase of crime requires undelayed measures. Such is the opinion of participants in a conference on the fulfilment of the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet on decisively combating crime. The conference was held at the Moscow City Soviet today.

Leaders of law enfocement bodies of Moscow and of a number of Moscow enterprises, chairmen of regional executive committees, of the Moscow City Soviet, USSR people's deputies and representatives of the public attended the meeting.

Describing the situation in Moscow Valeriy Saykin, chairman of the executive committee of the Moscow city Soviet, said that it remains alarming. The number of grevious crimes against the individual and the incidence of organised crime in on the rise. He said groups of criminals are as a rule well-armed and equipped. This throws the light on the shortages in the material and technical supply of virtually all services of the law enforcement bodies.

It is only by coordinating the efforts of all the law enforcement bodies and security officers that organized crime can be checked and leaders of crime business can be brought to account, Vitaliy Prilukov, chaif of the directorate of the KGB of the USSR for Moscow and the Moscow region, said in his statement. he said criminals are ever more confidently entering the international scene. The legalisation of criminal incomes through cooperatives and opening of accounts in foreign banks is just one cause for the spread of crime. The KGB has the information that former Soviet citizens are recruited by foreign crime rings. Upon leaving the USSR they become big businessmen within a suspiciously short period of time and then arrive in the USSR to strike various deals, Prilukov said.

The participants in the conference were unanimous in the opinion that the activity of provisional committees for combating crime should be based on strict observance of the requirements of the USSR Constitution, laws of the USSR and union republics. It was emphasized that the lack of the legislative base for combating organized crime is felt acutely.

Problems of Former Prisoners Addressed

LD0808215989 Moscow TASS in English 2100 GMT 8 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 9 TASS—Speakers at a briefing held at the USSR Interior Ministry on Tuesday [8 August] pointed to the need for the earliest settlement of a problem of job placements and provision of social services to former prisoners. It was pointed out that existing difficulties often prod former prisoners for repeated offences. Repeaters commit every third or fourth crime every year. Some 40 per cent of repeated offenders were unemployed.

It was said at the briefing that the existing system of giving assistance in job placements and provision of social services for former offenders is not effective. In actual fact, staff members of organs of local government, management and public organizations at industrial enterprises and offices ignore this work. The situation has even deteriorated due to the fact that enterprises switching over to cost-accounting and self-financing show unwilingness to hire former offenders.

The existing system of limitations on domicile registration due to the criminal record of a former offender also has a negative effect on his lot after a release from prison. Apart from the border zone and territories with a special regime, such limitations are now in force in 70 Soviet cities and communities. Some 30,000 people released annually from places of detention cannot return to their former domiciles due to this reason. Speakers at the briefing said that the USSR Interior Ministry made a proposal to lift limitations on domicile registration on the grounds of a criminal record.

Now centres are being established at local soviets of people's deputies (local councils) in several cities and regions. Their task is to help former offenders to find jobs and to resolve housing and every-day problems.

It was also said at the briefing that a bill is also being contemplated on social adaptation of former offenders. It provides for legal guarantees for job placements and provision of housing as well as for responsibility of

managers of enterprises and other officials for unwarranted refusal to hire former offenders, etc. The USSR Interior Ministry is also contemplating a possibility of setting up purpose-oriented funds of social assistance to former offenders.

USSR United Workers Front Holds Congress

18280264 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Aug 89 p 2

[Report by A. Ginatova: "The Workers Unite...."]

[Text] **A founders' congress of councils of socialist movements of workers took place in Leningrad in June.**

A total of 83 delegates from 6 of the country's republics and 18 cities participated in its work. Unfortunately, the press was not admitted to the congress, and we requested that Yu.Ye. Rakov, secretary of the Petrogradksiy Rayon Committee of the CPSU, describe this event.

"The congress was formed by the USSR United Workers Front [OFT], and an appropriate declaration to that effect was adopted. The OFT charter was also adopted. An entire package of important documents was considered over 2 days; there was a resolution on consolidation of the power of the workers, on international problems, on the relationship to the CPSU. Appeals on election to local soviets (incidentally, the appearance of the draft of these appeals in the Leningrad press elicited much discussion), to the peoples and governments of Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, and Estonia.... A 21-member coordinating council was elected."

In response to why the congress was held at the S.M. Kirov Museum-Apartment, the rayon committee secretary explained that the choice was no accident; the organizers thus underscored the link with the revolutionary traditions of the working class.

Shortage of Food Supplies in Moscow Addressed

PM090815 1589 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jul 89 p 1

[MOSTASS correspondent B. Shestakov report under the rubric "In the Moscow City Party Committee": "Hopelessness or Impunity?"]

[Excerpts] That was exactly how the question was asked during the discussion at a routine session of the Moscow CPSU City Committee [Gorkom] Bureau about the serious shortcomings in food supplies to Muscovites. Indeed, the already unfavorable situation has become still more complex in recent weeks. Basic essentials, including meat and dairy products, are unavailable in many food stores, and supplies of bread and confectionery are irregular. The situation looks even worse in the evening, when most inhabitants return home after their day's work. The picture is aggravated by waiting lines, poor standards in trade, and abuses.

All this, naturally, affects Muscovites' mood and gives rise to serious complaints about the party and soviet organs. In short, L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom, stressed at the opening of the session that the question of the capital's food supply has become a political one, and therefore the Gorkom Bureau must take emergency measures to radically improve the situation. [passage omitted]

A whole file of leaders mounted the platform to report on their work. But, strangely enough, they were all apparently interested more in the opportunity to prove their activeness than in trying to radically improve Muscovites' food supply. This is what T.P. Arkhipova, chairman of the control and auditing commission of the capital's party organization, pointed out. The situation is critical, she stressed, and the culprits are acting each on their own initiative without making any effort to work out a concrete and, most importantly, coordinated program to remedy the situation.

References to hindrance from cooperative members and the press were constantly heard from officials. But some really unsavory cases of their own negligence came to light in the course of discussion. [passage omitted]

The session raised in harsh terms the question of the inaction of law enforcement organs, which have still been unable to provide a reliable barrier against mismanagement, violation of the rules of Soviet trade, bribery, and embezzlement of socialist property. People's and worker control bodies are passive in the struggle against these monstrous phenomena. [passage omitted]

L.N. Zaykov summed up the discussion. We must make a principled evaluation of the activity of soviet and economic leaders who undermine people's faith in perestroyka, he said. The situation shows that the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee [Gorispolkom] "team" has not yet been able to solve the questions put forward and has proved unprepared to offer a detailed program of action. Hence the attempts to relegate questions to the distant future. But the time for talk is past. We need specific timetables and specific people whom we can call upon to restore order. Muscovites are tired of slogans, they want to see foodstuffs on the shelves in stores and they want to be able to buy them in peace, without lines and aggravation. If communists in leadership do not manage to resolve this task, let them not delude themselves into hoping they will enjoy their former impunity!

In the resolution adopted by the Moscow CPSU Gorkom Bureau, Yu.A. Luzhkov, V.A. Zharov, and Ye. D. Kazantsev, chiefs of Moscow Gorispolkom main administrations, were strictly reprimanded for serious shortcomings in their work. If the situation does not improve in the very near future, stricter party measures will be taken against them. The following communist leaders were given strict warnings: P.S. Sutin, of the Moscow

City Construction Committee; L.V. Vavakin of the Moscow City Main Administration for Architecture; and Rayon Soviet Executive Committee chairmen S.I. Sholokhov (Krasnopresnenskiy), V.P. Zaytsev (Leningradskiy), A.I. Fetisov (Frunzenskiy), V.I. Kalinin (Gagarinskiy), M.T. Demin (Timiryazevskiy), and V.I. Kryuchkov (Tushinskiy).

Communist leaders P.S. Bogdanov of the Moscow Gorispolkom Internal Affairs Main Administration, P.E. Dikarev of the Moscow People's Control Gorkom, and V.P. Shcherbakov of the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions were instructed to continue work to impose the necessary order in the organization of the food trade, eliminate negative phenomena in this sphere, and observe social justice in the distribution and sale of food products.

The Moscow CPSU Gorkom Bureau requested that the city party organization's control and auditing commission carry out a thorough examination of the situation and make a party assessment of the activity of the leaders of enterprises in the food complex and trade that are causing disruption in supplies to the city.

An urgent request was also made to the Moscow party oblast committee (V.K. Mesyats) and the Moscow Oblast Soviet Executive Committee [Ispolkom] (I.M. Cherepanov) to take immediate measures to ensure that agro-industrial enterprises in the oblast carry out the deliveries of food resources to the capital envisaged in the contracts. [passage omitted]

Central Election Commission Resolution Outlined

LD0808210989 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 8 Aug 89

[Text] A Central Electoral Commission resolution has been received on the election of people's deputies of the USSR from individual constituences in place of outgoing deputies. The document reports the early cessation of the authority of Deputies Laverov, Matveyev, and Mostovoy, and the calling of elections for the Leninskiy territorial constituency No 413, Voroshilovgrad Oblast; Kalush territorial constituency No 461 Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, Ukraine; and the Sokuluk national territorial constituency No 342, Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic for Sunday, 15 October.

Situation Around Chernobyl 'Markedly Improved'

LD0408130289 Moscow TASS in English 1245 GMT 4 Aug 89

[Text] Kiev August 4 TASS—"The situation in the area around the Chernobyl nuclear power station has markedly improved since the accident," Vladimir Bebeshko, director of the Soviet Clinical Radiology Institute, told TASS.

"This happened due to the decay of short-life radionuclides and also an unexpected drop in the amount of Caesium-137 being passed down the food chain from soil into vegetation and then—into milk and meat."

Because of the significant improvements in radiation readings and also as a result of the implementation of restrictive measures, radiation doses for the overwhelming majority of the population appeared to be significantly lower than established limits, the scientist said.

These doses are three times lower in the rigid control zone and 10 times lower in the sanitary monitoring zone. Only in some populated localities did some residents show a slight overdose. In carrying through measures to enhance the safety of the population in the areas affected by the accident, the Soviet Government has recently decided to resettle residents of those settlements.

Bebeshko emphasised that although almost 40 months have passed since the Chernobyl tragedy, its impact on the destinies of thousands of people continues to be felt. The state does not slacken efforts to deal with the consequences of the accident and the best minds are involved in this work.

The conclusions by experts of the World Health Organisation, who visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Government, bear out that these measures have been effective. They praised Soviet scientists' actions to overcome the consequences of the Chernobyl accident.

'State of Emergency' in Omsk Due to Smoke

LD2207233689 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2230 GMT 22 Jul 89

[Summary] The prolonged period of hot, dry weather in the Urals, Western Siberia, and Kazakhstan has had a bad effect on the crops as they ripen. This weather also increases the danger of forest fires in Tyumen Oblast and Khanti-Mansi Autonomous District. There are many fires there at the moment, and the smoke is being driven south by the wind. On 21 July, Omsk City Soviet Executive Committee announced a state of emergency in the city due to the smoke and also the atmospheric pollution caused by industry and road traffic. "All measures to improve the ecological situation in this region are being taken."

Freak Weather, Pollution Hit Black Sea

PM2107114789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Own correspondent A. Dergachev report under the "Alarm Signal" rubric: "Beaches Closed in South"]

[Excerpt] Krasnodar—The hygiene and epidemiology station has banned bathing at Sochi's beaches—from Matsesta to Mamayka. All five beaches at Novorossiysk have been closed and there has been a partial closure in

Tuapsinskiy Rayon, Yeysk, and Taman: Virtually the whole Black Sea and Azov Sea coast located in Krasnodar Kray is in the prohibited zone.

What compelled the hygiene and epidemiology station to take such drastic measures?

"The main reason is the natural calamity which suddenly hit the Black Sea and Azov Sea coast at the height of the vacation season," R. Stepanova, deputy chairman of Krasnodar Kray Soviet Executive Committee, said. "It began with the torrential rain which flooded Yeysk and almost washed the small town with its inadequate municipal systems into the Azov Sea. Then disaster struck from another 'flank'—waterspouts began attacking Sochi. The first occurred in the Dagomys region and 'burst' in the mountains—the Vostochnyy Dagomys River broke its banks and filled the settlement's streets, flooding a polyclinic, several stores, and apartment block basements (one person drowned there). Exactly 1 week later there was a second, more massive blow: First a downpour of unprecedented force (100 mm of precipitation in a few hours) lashed the whole vast territory of Greater Sochi, then a tornado struck in the upper reaches of the Matsesta River and several million cubic meters of water poured into the Matsesta Valley. The flood caused havoc in the bathing premises of the well-known Matsesta hydropathic center, washed boiler house fuel oil containers into the sea, and put the purification plants on the Bzugu River out of action completely.

"There is another reason for the closure of the beaches: Common or garden negligence. Power outages in Novorossiysk on 26 June and 11 July brought the city's sewage pumping stations to a halt and the entire untreated mass was discharged into the sea through wells and emergency outlets! The pollution of the coastal water was such that it went off the scale of the measuring instruments...." [passage omitted]

Safety of Nuclear Test Range Questioned

PM2507110589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jul 89 First Edition p 4

[Article by own correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Falichev under the "View of a Problem" rubric: "Nuclear Test Range"]

[Text] Speaking at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies, Deputy N. Nazarbayev, then chairman of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers and now first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, said the following about the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Range: "The military is ready to persuade us that tests are virtually good for people's health. We realize that they are a state necessity at this time. But we should conduct a real, in-depth analysis of the effects of nuclear explosions on the environment and tell people about them. Not to mention spending a certain amount of money improving the lives of the people who live there." The deputy's words deserve serious attention.

Not so long ago an interdepartmental commission to investigate the health of the population and the environment completed its work. It comprised representatives from the USSR Ministry of Health, the State Committee for Hydrometeorology [Goskomgidromet], the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, other departments and organizations, and the public. At the test range over the last few days I have met with the command and commission members, and I traveled to nearby population centers.... All this time I could not stop thinking of what was said about the test range from the congress rostrum. So does the country actually need what people are doing there? Or has the time come to take a different look at the role of this facility?

The test range resolves various tasks linked with testing and "perfecting" weapons. You can see pilots there, missile troops.... But its main task is, of course, to test nuclear warheads and to solve various related scientific and technical problems. Experiments have been and are being held at the range to test the radiation "resistance" of various materials and technical models. Tank armor reduces a crew's exposure to radiation tenfold, if not more. Are there materials which would fulfill the protective role even better? How do radiation and other lethal factors influence living organisms under certain conditions?... The test range personnel are doing all they can to obtain accurate answers to these questions.

When the Chernobyl disaster happened and it was necessary to urgently assess the radiation and help those who were suffering, dozens of highly experienced specialists from the Semipalatinsk range flew out there with their instruments and equipment. And they are still there. The range's specialists are analyzing approximately 12,000 water and soil samples....

Nor can we forget, when talking about the test range, the U.S. nuclear testing program, which is geared to the development [sozdaniye] of new-generation nuclear weapons particularly in the interests of SDI. The Soviet Union's position on nuclear and space weapons is common knowledge: We oppose siting nuclear weapons in space. But if they are put in space we must have the means to counter them.

"The USSR's unilateral suspension of nuclear weapons upgrading could cause the existing parity in this sphere to be upset and lead to catastrophic, unpredictable consequences," was the USSR defense minister's reply to a deputy's question on the function of the Semipalatinsk Range. Unfortunately, the Washington administration makes no bones about stating—as U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney recently said—that it might advocate abandonment of the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty if that treaty prevents the United States from

deploying the SDI system. In general the United States refuses to strive for a total nuclear test ban. President G. Bush has bluntly said that in the foreseeable future such tests "will continue to be absolutely necessary for U.S. security." And this despite the fact that in 1986 the Soviet Government declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, which resulted in our nuclear test ranges falling silent for more than a year. But this initiative was not supported.

We could quote not just one or two but dozens of names of military men, civilians, scientists, and other specialists who have lived at the range for many years—some have lived there their whole lives. Thanks to their bold schemes, tireless work, and often their self-denial of ordinary earthly pleasures our country's defense shield—the response to the atomic bomb that appeared in the United States in 1945—was created in an extremely short time. We are still indebted to those pioneers in military-strategic parity.

Today, as is well known, the test range is not having the best of times. This is largely connected with the intensifying struggle to preserve the environment. The atmospheric discharge of inert radioactive gases in February following a routine test was a definite catalyst in increasing the attention paid to the range. This incident needed to be investigated and appropriately assessed. The commission members were given the necessary materials. Thus, M. Orlov, candidate of physical and mathematical sciences, chief of the USSR Goskomgidromet's Industrial Ecology Department; Candidate of Biological Sciences V. Stepanenko, leader of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences Scientific Research Institute of Medical Radiology's Internal Radiation Monitoring Laboratory, and others obtained access to declassified materials for the first time.

They covered the results of the first tests at the range, which, as is well known, were held in the atmosphere. Lieutenant Colonel N. Muromtsev, a veteran at the range, well remembers that time: He and his family have spent almost 30 years in the area. "I am no enemy to my children," he said.

Lieutenant Colonel S. Smagulov, chief of the radiation security service, said: "I was born and raised in Semipalatinsk—my mother and two brothers live here. My daughter was born here. She is now studying at the Novosibirsk Institute Faculty of Applied Mathematics. I am an ethnic Kazakh and I want only the best for my people. But when I hear some people talking rubbish, I can't help getting angry...."

However, not everyone holds that view. For instance, Doctor of Medical Sciences V. Zhankolova claims that the test range has a harmful impact on people's health.... The commission will draw the final conclusion.

But it seems to me that even the conclusions of this highly prestigious commission will hardly assuage the population's concern. People in the test range area, it would seem, should at least be equipped with basic radiation meters and know how to use them in certain situations. In actual fact it transpires that these issues have not been properly addressed here. The situation regarding the shortage of radiation meters in the country as a whole can be understood and, to a certain extent, explained, but it is impossible to comprehend why they are in short supply in a place where they should be a prime necessity. The following example is indicative. A military subunit where there was an escape of radioactive gases in February was unable to rapidly make a spectral analysis of them—as the situation demanded—because it lacked the technical equipment required. As a result people became nervous, and it took a considerable amount of effort and time to calm their spirits again. Yet inert gases do not react with the human organism.

Unfortunately, despite the highly sophisticated techniques involved in testing, it is not currently possible to wholly rule out such cases. This means that the proposal to set up a permanent ecological commission which could monitor the results of the range's activity in the atmosphere, water, and the soil is not groundless. After all, only objective and truthful information about the range can now resolve the tension that has arisen. This was repeatedly stressed during our conversation with Lieutenant General A. Ilenko, chief of the nuclear test range. In particular, he advocated the setting up of a comprehensive scientific center to study the influence of nuclear tests on people, nature, and fauna. Indeed, why do we not have such a center in a country where nuclear weapons have been tested for decades now? The information that is collected in various areas is dispersed throughout various departments and can be quite difficult to obtain.

I think the range's leadership should also take a more active stance in this respect. Unfortunately, close contacts and mutual understanding do not exist with the local authorities on all issues. Is this not because in the past there was no particular need for this? Today, however, we must seek points of contact. An extensive plan of measures coordinated with the chairman of the Semipalatinsk Oblast Soviet Executive Committee, the oblast's civil defense chief, and its chief physician has been worked out and is being implemented. It envisages various additional measures to provide information for the population and to monitor its safety. As for general interests, these lie in concluding agreements with civilian enterprises and organizations to conduct joint research and tests. Such agreements, for instance, have been concluded with the Kazakh SSR Nuclear Physics Seismology Institute, Kazpromstroyproyekt, and others. That is, the conversion of the defense industry is already directly affecting the test range. It can and should make a weighty contribution to this.

Of course, it is not hard to accuse the test range of everything under the sun. Although even a brief but

unbiased analysis of the ecological situation shows that it is not just a question of the test range. For instance, 140,000 tonnes of harmful chemicals are discharged into the Semipalatinsk atmosphere each year. Only 45 of the city's 292 furnaces are equipped with ash filters. Yet the coal used here contains uranium and radon. The situation with regard to sewage discharges is no better. The content of harmful substances in them exceeds permissible concentrations by hundreds of times in terms of a number of components. There are harmful organic substances such as phenol, xylain, and cresol, whose presence in the air is not monitored at all. These were the conclusions reached by S. Mashkova, chief engineer of the USSR State Committee for Protection of the Environment; and K. Daukeyev and N. Korniyenko, staffers at the oblast committee for protection of the environment, when they drew up a map of the ecological situation around Semipalatinsk. However, nobody raised the alarm.

The question of the adoption of a nuclear safety law and the setting up of permanent rapid-response forces was raised 14 July at the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Deputy O. Suleymenov proposed preparing a USSR Supreme Soviet appeal to the U.S. Congress containing specific proposals on the question of a moratorium on and the ending of nuclear tests.

Bearing in mind the fact that the population of Semipalatinsk Oblast has quadrupled since the test range was founded, it was clearly sensible to de-load the range, as the professionals say. That is, to reduce the number and yield of its explosions. The questions of improving supplies of medicines and prime necessities to the population also need to be resolved legislatively. Some things are already being done. Five billion rubles were recently allocated by a government resolution to ensure the social development of Semipalatinsk Oblast. [The article is accompanied by the following report from own correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Ladin]

Semipalatinsk, 20 Jul—A scientific and practical conference ended here 19 July. It summed up the results of the interdepartmental commission monitoring the population's health and the ecological situation in Semipalatinsk Oblast.

The conference, as journalists were told by A. Tsyb, commission chairman, corresponding member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, and director of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences' Scientific Research Institute of Medical Radiology, was, regrettably, not entirely scientific. From the very first day the scientists and speakers experienced the severe pressure of mistrust. The discussions often became akin to rallies. The specialists' conclusion that the level of radiation in areas adjoining the test range does not exceed natural background radiation prompted tumultuous disapproval from most of the auditorium. Yet this conclusion is not disputed by Kazakhstan's scientists.

The interdepartmental commission's conclusion cited ecological problems requiring resolution in the immediate future, defined nonradiation factors that have a considerable impact on the environment, and made specific recommendations for improving the range's activity. The conference also advocated the complete ending of nuclear weapons tests in the region.

Article Urges More Discussion of CPSU's Role

18001448 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 28 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA's Department of Party Life under the rubric "The Party in Perestroyka and Perestroyka in the Party": "The Time and Place"]

[Text] **You are invited to a conversation about the place and role of the CPSU in contemporary society. As is known, it was started on the initiative of the party organization of the capital, although, strictly speaking, this is not true. The discussion simply received an official status, but it did not begin because it never stopped. It continues exactly to the extent that the party lives, acts, and fights.**

In recent years the conversation became frank and open, and it occurred on the street, in meetings, at rallies, and on the pages of the press—at first through samizdat, and afterwards through bulletins of the people's fronts and social movements. In the pictures below you see pages of these newspapers, and you see how avidly they are bought, and how avidly the people read them.

Now the discussion is being recorded in the party press. It is true that the readers, not waiting for official invitations, have already joined in the conversation. And it is not surprising: No, certainly in our society there is no question that is more important and critical than the question of the role and place of the CPSU.

We are rightfully opening the discussion on the pages of SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA with letters from our readers.

"Against" and "For"

Over the course of many years CPSU members have had an advantage over non-party people. Communists occupy all key posts in the state. I agree with this, but this also means that there is a demand from them for everything. And today what do we ordinary workers get from the party. 1) social injustice, 2) more than 40 million people living on the poverty line, 3) shacks in which we grew old and in which our children are growing old, 4) stagnation in the economy.

All of these facts speak against the party. What can be said in its favor?

While everything is not good, somehow the state is developing, nonetheless. But, dear comrades, a state cannot be considered developed when it is selling its underground and above-ground resources just to exist.

The party gave reality to and declared perestroyka? But, you see, something had to be done urgently in order not to be worse off than at the start. And the party advertised perestroyka. Why do I think perestroyka is an advertisement? When they want to do something seriously, then they behave seriously, and they seek any pretext to do better. Alas, this is not observed in perestroyka.

I no longer need anything more, but I have children and grandchildren, and I do not want them to live their lives as poorly and without rights as did their father and grandfather.
[Signed] Yu. Khromov, Konakovo, Kalinin Oblast

It Depends on the Party Itself

In my opinion, it is more correct to say that the authority of the party depends on the party itself.

In my view, this is the way the party is undermining its authority in the present stage: 1) with the results of economic activity; 2) with the fact that managerial positions at various levels are occupied by people with low moral qualities; 3) with the failure of ideological work (still only slogans that have little connection with life); 4) with privileges, including those legitimized by various directives; 5) with stratagems in manning tables, where a party functionary is listed as a metal craftsman, a lathe operator, etc.

The party proclaims slogans and calls everyone to join perestroyka but is in no hurry to restructure itself. It is a great pity that the personal interests of a relatively small number of people stand in the way of resolving state problems, and that our life depends not on the principles of the state mechanism, but on the longevity of one or another person.
[Signed] G. Kurilko, Saratov

The Time and the Place

In presenting the rubric "The Party in Perestroyka and Perestroyka in the Party" on 1 July of this year, we were pointing the readers towards reasonable assessments, constructive proposals, and bold original ideas. In opening the discussion today, we repeat this challenge. Moreover, we ask that there be a resolute rejection of stereotypes—for example, a rejection of something like this: Any critical comments concerning party committees and their managers, and also of party leaders, are nothing more than attacks on the party. And the direct opposite: Without exception, all party committees are bastions of stagnation. Dependence on stock phrases of mass consciousness will render the conversation fruitless. Where is the truth? In the middle? This would be too simple. It can be said only that truth is always specific. It is determined by the time, place, and circumstances. Strictly speaking, we are undertaking this conversation in order to get closer to the truth.

We will try to indicate certain primary points.

Speeches in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, analysis of readers' mail, materials that come to the editorial office, and direct observations by journalists indicate that with respect to the party, there are two opposite and at the same time indissolubly linked mutually exclusive and mutually complementary trends.

On the one hand it is almost unreservedly recognized that it is actually the party that is the initiator of changes in the political, economic, and social spheres, starting in April of 1985. On the other hand, perestroyka is moving very slowly in the CPSU itself.

On the one hand, there is no doubt that it was exactly owing to the policy of the party on democratization and glasnost that it became possible to have the 19th all-union party conference, reform of the political system, competitive elections, and the historic USSR Congress of People's Deputies. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the resolutions of the party conference remain on paper for the most part, that the economic situation in the country remains complicated, that the standard of living is falling, that the shadow economy is growing, and that criminality is increasing.

On the one hand, no political force other than the CPSU can be seen that is capable of supporting the process of transformation and bringing reforms to their culmination. On the other hand, many local party organs are in no way a progressive force in the eyes of the people. They write from Murmansk Oblast, Krasnoyarskiy Kray, from the Far East, and from other regions M.S. Gorbachev visited that decisions made during his visits would have eliminated many problems. But the decisions have not been implemented, although specific instructions were given to local party leaders. Whether the extreme views on the role and place of the Communist Party in society are liked or not, they cannot be brushed off. Furthermore, it is impossible not to note the rebukes for lack of knowledge of the real situation and for "communist boasting" ["komchvanstvo"]. All of this irritates, if it does not embitter, the people. M.S. Gorbachev said at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee that "We must do things so that those questions discussed in shops, at meetings, and at home stand at the center of party discussions. The party cannot be maintained in a condition where everything around it is turbulent and there is just 'yawning' in many party organizations."

These things are known to everyone. But there are questions of another kind. For example, does the CPSU have an integral and scientifically-based concept for perestroyka? If yes, then why are there so many inconsistencies in its actions? Why is there such a poor comprehension and utilization of experience, like the

tremendous experience of the CPSU, as well as the experience of the fraternal parties who have already tested much of what we are just initiating?

These are difficult questions. However, the future of the CPSU, and, consequently, the country's tomorrow, depends on them. Therefore, it is better to say them out loud than to be diffidently silent. It is more fruitful to admit frankly that the authority of the party has been shaken because, after rousing society, it itself began more and more to lag behind the tempos of society's changes. But in a swiftly renewing society, only a swiftly renewing party can function successfully, and democratization in the party itself must keep a step ahead of the democratization of society. But a sharp contradiction has arisen between the demands of internal party democracy and party unity. Up until now unity was placed higher than democracy. This led to the development of hierarchical thinking and the dominance of bureaucratic methods that are so characteristic of the style of many committees and that are passed off as the victory of democratic centralism.

The bureaucratic style must be broken down—who objects to this? However, where do you begin to take it apart? Are the old party cadres capable of this? The necessity for a cadre renewal is obvious, but where do you come up with fresh forces? How do you develop new leaders in a 20-million strong communist membership, and how do you attract them to the leadership of party organizations?

This, naturally, is only a small part of the questions proposed for discussion. And you barely start to think about them and each raises dozens of others. Of course, the question of authority is truly an endless one. If the authority actually belongs to the CPSU, if the CPSU has monopoly control over all spheres of life, then apparently the normalization of the party under these conditions is impossible, and there is a need for a transfer of authority to the one to whom it should belong. And if authority actually does not belong to the party, but, let us assume, to departmental monopolists, how, then, is the influence of the CPSU on life restored? What degree of concentration of authority in its hands can be considered optimal?

And, all the same, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA is especially interested in opinions on the role of the party in the industrial sphere. What is party management of the economy on the whole, and how are the political methods of this management expressed? Which classes and social strata and groups' interests does the CPSU represent in the economic arena? For example, do civilian cooperatives fall among them? Are the party committees of ministries, institutes, plants, and mines laboratories of political thinking and centers of creative forces or a "drive belt" that turns the flywheel of the plan? Do we reserve for the party committee the right to control the activity of an administration? And if this is a party committee and an administration of a cost accounting concern? And an enterprise with mixed capital?..

However, this is enough for the beginning of questions. We want to remind the readers that all questions, of course, are of a discussion nature.

Cooperatives Said To Abuse Legal Loopholes

18001425 Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Jul 89 p 4

[Article by Yu. Dmitriyev: "Cooperatives and the Rule of Law"]

[Text] First, here are several statistics we believe to be significant that were quoted yesterday at a briefing by Chief of the GUBKhSS [Main Administration for Combating the Theft of Socialist Property] of the country General Vyacheslav Runyshkov. It turns out that approximately 180,000 cooperatives were registered in our country as of 1 July of this year. To be sure, about 140,000 cooperatives have started operations. Proceeds from the sales of their goods and services amounted to R4.3 billion. One million and nine hundred and fifty-three thousand citizens are engaged in these new activities. Who are they? An overwhelming majority (88 percent) are young or middle-aged, able-bodied people, the rest are retirees, housewives, and college and school students.

Therefore, the network of cooperatives is growing rapidly. In essence, this is a sector of our economy and a quite large legion of people who contribute to eliminating the shortage of some goods and services. This is a new endeavor, and undoubtedly a useful one for us. At the same time, we are irritated by inordinately high prices at cooperatives. Also, there are numerous and obvious proofs of speculation—massive purchases of foodstuffs and industrial goods at state-run shops in order to immediately resell them at higher prices....

As was officially stated at the briefing, negative phenomena have also been registered in the cooperative sphere along with positive results. Many operators get involved in deals punishable under the criminal law under the guise of this form of economic operations. Facts? Plenty of them. Volgograd, the "Caucasus" cooperative cafeteria. Suddenly, Georgian vodka, "chacha," appeared in it which was delivered here in generous amounts by a Gazilishvili from Georgia. Buying a liter of booze from him for R20, manager of the cafeteria Mamedov and his accomplices sold the same liter...for R40. All of them had to answer to the court.

Some "cooperators" steal money even before they start operating. For example, this happened in Alma-Ata. One operator who got a loan of 10,000 in the bank supposedly for setting up a cooperative immediately disappeared from the city. An all-union search for him has been initiated...

Imperfections in the system of material supply for cooperatives prompt their employees to seek various ways, including unlawful ones, to provide raw and other materials. Thus, the Leningrad City Court recently convicted a storekeeper of the "Pozitiv" association Petrova who had stolen paper for color prints worth more than R13,000 which she had sold to the cooperative "Sekret" in the city of Bendery, the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

Individual cooperators who skillfully take advantage of loopholes in the existing laws extract significant nonlabor-derived incomes by using hired labor, including that of teenagers. For example, the Moldavian cooperative "Sintez," consisting of 16 members, continuously uses more than 380 persons on work contracts.

Cooperators inflict considerable damage on the state through evading the taxation of profits. Such cases have been discovered by financial organs in several regions of the country. Numerous violations of article 12 of the law, which bans the formation of management cadres of cooperatives by persons with prior court records for financially motivated crimes, are one of the reasons for the negative tendencies in the cooperative movement. Selective verifications found such persons in the Ukrainian and Kazakh SSR, Kabardino-Balkar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], Krasnodar Kray, Rostov, Saratov, Leningrad, Tyumen, and many other oblasts.

The USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] counts on the assistance of the press and all of the mass media in forming objective public opinion on the operation of internal affairs organs in combating crime in the cooperative sector of the economy and developing a negative attitude toward the embezzlers, bribetakers, and speculators who use this sphere to extract non-labor-derived incomes.

Forces 'Undermining' Perestroyka Detailed

18001472 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 29, 22-28 Jul 89 p 5

[Article by S. Andreyev: "Prediction Which Should Not Come True"]

[Text] *"Sharp social conflicts are flaring up at present in one region or another. National discord has strengthened, and trains are exploding. What is going on, after all?"* [Signed] *A. Sheremet, Leningrad*

We offer to you the point of view of Leningrad essayist S. Andreyev as one "version."

Despite the obvious need for changes in our country, there are a good number of forces aimed at undermining perestroyka and bringing about a transition to a regime of complete suppression of democratic principles in society.

Let us look at the pattern of their actions.

Thus, in order to frustrate perestroyka as a political action, they have most likely decided to take the following path: Fuel the dissatisfaction of people with specific conditions of existence and periodically cause the flare-up of hatred, for which it is easiest to use the motive of national hostility as a means of expression. Since the social protest of workers against those who really own the means of production, along the vertical line, so to speak, is hampered by the presence of the state apparatus, the "horizontal" bitterness of some nations against others finds a much easier outlet.

In addition to clashes on nationality grounds, the productive sphere is gradually being drawn in; within it strikes are used as a method of pressure, transportation mainlines are blocked, the unloading of cars at railway junctions is frustrated, and so forth.

Thus, the goal of these forces is for local conflicts to gradually begin affecting the technology chains all over the union, causing disruptions at enterprises and thus depriving the workers in different regions of the country of their legal earnings. All of this would aggravate the situation. In turn, any method may be used to provoke strikes and cause an explosion of worker indignation.

In their opinion, an open clash between the state forces of law enforcement and the agitated masses should become the next stage, at which the loss of life would show to those who hesitate what measures of suppression the government would resort to in the event the dissatisfaction transcends certain limits. This is the exact point at which the motives of nationalism begin to be gradually replaced by the motives of counteracting the authorities.

Such counteraction should definitely acquire a structural form; that is, be organized in a certain movement whereby detachments of hooligans will appear whose actions will be effectively coordinated by some kind of headquarters. Initially blows should be delivered at the executive organs—the militia and procuracy who are within easy reach. Under these circumstances, the supreme authority finds itself in conditions without a way out: If it resorts to reprisals, the negative mood of the masses mounts; if it cannot effectively counteract extremism, it shows its own weakness. At present it is obvious that the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Fergana fit this very pattern.

At the next stage, those who are interested in destabilizing the regime will, through the mafia, form armed detachments capable of moving at a certain point, this time against the political organs of power: the raykoms [rayon party committees] and ispolkoms [soviet executive committees]. The time for this will be chosen in such a manner that the populace will turn out to be disappointed with the results of the policy pursued by the apparatus and will not give vigorous support to the authorities, which will have discredited themselves by

Draft Law on Taxation of Artwork Criticized

18001451 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 29 Jul 89 p 1

[Letter to the editor by S. Alimov, Russian Soviet Socialist Federated Republic honored artist, and secretary of the board of the USSR Union of Artists; Ye. Amaspyur; A. Volkov; and S. Dudnik, RSFSR People's Artist, Laureate of the USSR State Prize, professor; I. Lubennikov, secretary of the board of the USSR Union of Artists: "A Tax...on Pictures?"]

[Text] A draft USSR law on changes to the procedure and rates of taxation of the population has been published. Its examination and adoption by the USSR Supreme Soviet are at hand.

The draft of the new law is nothing more than an attempt to resolve economic problems at the expense of people with initiative and, what is most illogical, at the expense of the creative intelligentsia.

Art and literature were and remain the only means of fostering human culture by virtue of their ability to get to know the world, influence the mind, feelings and consciences of people, and to form moral ideals. Today, the level of prices for works of art in our country is many times lower than in the developed capitalist and socialist countries. A practice has been established in the world that the resources that are being devoted to culture and works of art are generally not subject to taxation, and that, on the one hand, they stimulate creative thought, and, on the other hand, they represent patronage and philanthropy.

The draft law absolutely does not take into account the specifics of creative work and its vital necessity for Soviet society, especially at the present time.

From the standpoint of the USSR Union of Artists as a professional organization, the following factors have not been considered:

No one, including the government, guarantees the artist a regular wage, even on the scale of a living minimum. Artists (on the whole) are self-supporting, and society does not protect them against poverty;

The artist is not guaranteed commercial success because of the elastic state of the market, and he is not guaranteed steady work and the presence of orders;

An artist needs money for leasing workshops, the payment of community services in them, and for materials and instruments: canvases, brushes, marble, stoves for glazing, printing presses, and sawing materials, whose prices are steadily increasing;

The honorarium that an artist receives once a year, or even once in several years, is virtually the result of many years of creative activity. It is impossible to measure practically the period during which the artist created a work. The payment of compensation in installments in our field is impossible in a majority of cases, inasmuch as a majority of the works is created on the initiative of the artist without contracts and orders.

The honorarium system is structured in such a way that the compensation that an author receives is practically a lump sum, and he does not participate in future profit resulting from use of the work. The state and the enterprise receive them, and they do not share with the painter, designer, or architect.

Thus, it should be stated that the published draft law, on the one hand, does not take the conditions of creative labor into account and, on the other hand, it overlooks the long-existing tradition of unjustifiably equalizing the incomes of citizens according to an average level, which leads to the infamous wage-leveling.

Economic

Vlasov Discusses Consumer Goods Shortfalls

18270131 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Jul 89 Second Edition pp 1-2

["Abridged version" of speech by Deputy A.V. Vlasov, chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers, at 27 July RSFSR Supreme Soviet Session: "Increasing Production of Consumer Goods"]

[Text] Comrade deputies!

We regard the consideration at this session of the government paper concerning the tasks for increasing the production of consumer goods as a practical step in the realization of the points of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

You know that the process of renewal is difficult and contradictory. Having generated great hopes and expectations, perestroyka has not yet produced the desired results, especially in the economic and social spheres. Certain problems have even been aggravated.

The generally alarming picture is exacerbated by the growing shortage of consumer goods which is causing a flood of angry letters, complaints, and demands from the workers. This was mentioned with indignation in many speeches at the Congress of People's Deputies. Expressing the will of the Soviet people, the congress demanded that immediate measures be taken to stabilize the situation on the consumer market in the near future and to eliminate the shortage of necessities.

Strictly speaking, questions of saturating the market did not just come up today, all of a sudden. Since the very beginning of perestroyka, since April 1985, they have been included among the priority issues. It was emphasized at the 27th CPSU Congress that unless they are

solved all efforts for improving distribution relations will be less than effective and the task of improving the well-being of the people will not be fulfilled.

As we know, party requirements for fuller satisfaction of the demand of the population were reflected in the Comprehensive Program for Development of the Production of Consumer Goods and the Sphere of Services in the RSFSR During 1986-2000. Naturally questions related to its fulfillment are constantly monitored by the government.

From the standpoint of customary, evolutionary approaches the matter does not seem to be going badly. During 3 years of the 5-year plan, the plan for production of nonfood commodities in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] as a whole was overfulfilled. The overall increase amounted to R20 billion and the average annual rate exceeded the assignments of the comprehensive program. The volume of output of goods with improved quality increased by a factor of 1.6. Industry reached the established program parameters in terms of this indicator as well.

But the expected breakthrough in the consumer goods market did not occur. What is the matter?

One cannot but mention that a certain role was played by the reduction of purchases of imported goods. And the reduction was significant—over 3 years it amounted to almost R9 billion.

The main thing, however, is that the guidelines set by the comprehensive program contradicted the altered economic and social situation and the realities of life. This aspect was essentially missed by soviet and economic organs. They were unable to anticipate the "explosive effect" of the growth of consumer demand, which arose because of the distortions in the implementation of the economic reform. It is these distortions, along with the disorder of the financial system, that generate the increased shortage of many goods and services and nullify the positive changes that have been noted in their production.

As was noted at the congress, all of our imperfections, omissions, and problems joined together at one point—the imbalance of the market. Last year, for example, the increase in incomes in the republic amounted to R23 billion and the production of consumer goods—only 10 billion. During the first half of the year the shortage of goods and services increased by another more than R5 billion.

The growing disproportion between the monetary incomes of the population and the goods to cover them sharply increased the pressure of the monetary mass on the consumer market and led to a significant reduction of consumer reserves. According to calculations, the minimum unsatisfied demand for goods is estimated today at R35-40 billion. Moreover, while the value indicators were overfulfilled, the plans for the production of the majority of kinds of nonfood commodities in physical terms were not fulfilled. Last year there was a considerable reduction of the output of household items. The list of goods in critically short supply expanded considerably. It included detergents, soap, razor blades, toothpaste, perfume, cosmetics, electric irons, dishware, timber and construction materials, and many other items.

The reduction of commodity supplies and the interruptions in trade cause a kind of chain reaction: panicky rumors, whipped-up demand, and a desire to make purchases for the future. The matter reached a point where certain objects in daily demand were rationed in the local areas.

At the suggestion of USSR people's deputies a decision was made recently to increase the purchases of consumer goods and medicines by R10 billion. In particular, in order to alleviate the situation in the supply of washing items for the population, contracts were concluded for importing 300,000 tons of laundry powders and 172,000 tons of toilet soap.

Large additional orders are being placed at nonprofile enterprises of the republic. As a result, even this year the deliveries of washing substances to trade will almost double.

I should like to emphasize that these measures, important as they are, could merely cover up the critical nature of the problem and not remove it. In order to finally stabilize the situation, we need an entire complex of measures that provide for a rapid increase of commodity supplies.

The RSFSR Council of Ministers considered and generalized the suggestions of each ministry and department and all the oblasts, krays, and autonomous republics for increasing the production and improving the quality of consumer goods. The result of this was a program of action that makes it possible to radically improve the situation on the consumer market. Its realization will make it possible even this year to increase the volumes of production of nonfood commodities by R10.6 billion or 9.4 percent. The earmarked rate is higher than in the first 3 years of the 5-year plan by a factor of 1.5.

There will be even more to do in 1990. The control figures for the production of goods have been earmarked in the volume of R150 billion, an increase of 24 percent over this year's level.

As concerns full restoration of its healthy condition, this is a task for the next 5-year plan. As calculations show, in order to carry it out, by 1995 we shall have to almost double the output of nonfood commodities.

The program that has been developed includes a broad complex of measures, both immediate and long-range. In it primary significance is attached to accelerated creation of a large modern base for the production of nonfood consumer goods.

This is of principal significance for the Russian Federation. Today we are reaping the fruits of many years of inattention to the development of the consumer sector of our economy. The share of group B industry, for example, in the structure of the national economy is less by a factor of 1.5 than it is in other union republics. Moreover, during the past 10 years it has dropped from 24 to 23 percent. In terms of the per capita volume of production of nonfood commodities, the RSFSR occupies seventh place in the USSR.

True, the picture is beginning to change under the 12th 5-Year Plan.

During the 3 years new capacities have been introduced for producing 196 million meters of fabric, 14 million pairs of leather footwear, and 15 million rubles' worth of sewn items. With the participation of foreign firms footwear factories have been put into operation in Moscow, Kaluga, and Tolyatti with a capacity of 2 million pairs each. Last year we put the Ryazan leather plant into operation. It is the largest in Europe with a capacity of 700 million square decimeters of leather. In the future this work will become even larger in scale.

Technical retooling of 314 enterprises has been started this year using credit for the purchase of equipment. This will make it possible not only to increase the volumes of production of clothing, footwear, fabrics, and knitted items sharply—by almost R4.2 billion—but also to considerably improve their consumer qualities.

Questions of reconstruction and technical retooling are of exceptional significance and cannot be put off. The fact is that the wearing out of the active part of fixed production capital in light industry, the textile industry, and local industry is reaching 40 percent. Only one-fourth of the machines and equipment in these branches is providing for the necessary product quality. About one-third of the workers are employed in manual labor.

The issue here has mainly to do with machinebuilding for branches of group B. Since the beginning of the 5-year plan, assignments for the development and series assimilation of the most important kinds of modern technical equipment have been only half fulfilled by the ministries of the machine and defense complexes. For this reason, light and textile industries failed to receive 24 kinds of new technological equipment. Production of 64 more kinds of technological equipment is failing.

We must be self-critical and admit that, critical as the situation is, the leaders of the Ministry of Light and the Food Industry and the Ministry of the Textile Industry, Comrades Biryukov and Belyayev, and the local soviet and economic organs are not devoting the proper attention to these problems. They clearly do not have enough initiative and persistence, and their dependent attitudes are making themselves known.

The republic's own scientific and technical potential is still being poorly utilized in the reconstruction and technical retooling of branches of group B.

The low rates of modernization of branches of group B and the strengthening of their material and technical base are largely conditioned by serious shortcomings in capital construction.

The average time it takes from the beginning of the planning and the completion of the construction of facilities is 8-10 years. The amount of incomplete construction continues to grow. The Barnaul blended yarn combine, for example, has been under construction since 1975. It took more than 10 years to build the sewing and knitting factory in Elista, the spinning and knitting factory in Kurgan, and many other facilities.

New and exceptionally complicated and responsible tasks are arising for the government in connection with the restructuring of construction management that has begun. We are speaking first of all about turning more decisively in the direction of the social sphere and paying more attention to the construction of facilities that directly affect the vital interests of people. This includes, of course, enterprises that produce consumer goods. We shall direct the attention of the Gosplan [State Planning Committee], Gosstroy [State Construction Committee], and the republic construction ministries to this. It would seem that there is a lot of work to do here for both the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the local soviets of people's deputies.

Comrades! At the Congress of People's Deputies a great deal of attention was devoted to increasing the production of consumer goods at enterprises of group A.

Recently the USSR Council of Ministers critically analyzed this aspect of industry under union jurisdiction. A serious program was developed for increasing the output of goods, mainly at specialized enterprises and factories. For example, this year the production of television sets and radios will increase up to 11 million units as compared to 1988. The production of vacuum cleaners and washing machines will increase at especially rapid rates—up to 6 million, as will videotape players—from 118,000 to 450,000 units.

Special attention should be devoted to the question of more extensive enlistment in the output of nonfood products of enterprises whose profiles do not include these products. As was emphasized at the congress, it is important to use all production capacities which today can be reoriented toward the output of goods. It should be noted that in the machinebuilding, defense, and fuel and energy complexes this work is essentially just getting

underway. Thus the output of goods for the people has not yet been taken up by every fourth enterprise in the system of the Ministry of the Communications Industry, 40 percent of those in the Ministry of the Coal Industry, and two-thirds of those in the Ministry of Power and Electrification. In the Ministry of Heavy, Power, and Transport Machinebuilding, the Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry, and several others they produce only 20-50 kopeks' worth of these products per ruble of wages.

The program for reorientation of group A industry that was developed by the USSR Council of Ministers takes into account suggestions made by the republic government. This has to do with utilizing free space and assigning new profiles to 200 enterprises.

It goes without saying that this will require additional resources and improvement of material and technical supply. Unfortunately, so far there are no changes for the better concerning this in the plans of the USSR Gosplan. In a situation like this it is possible, as they say, to cut any initiative off at the roots.

We see the task of the government and especially of the local soviet organs today as working with ministries and enterprises of group A in the most active way to put to work the reserves for increasing the production of goods. At the present time we are participating in the development of a draft of a state plan for conversion of the defense industry. It is also important to continue the work for assigning new profiles to enterprises whose products are not selling. It is also necessary to deal with the significant number of enterprises that are temporarily closed or are under construction and to consider the possibilities of using them for producing consumer goods, especially those that are in critically short supply.

Here, unfortunately, one still frequently encounters sluggishness and sometimes even direct resistance from the union ministries. And local soviet organs also sometimes display a lack of initiative, inertness, and indifference.

When speaking about the immense possibilities of increasing the production of goods, naturally, we should not lose sight of the immediate reserves. And we are speaking primarily about maximum utilization of production capacities, especially highly productive equipment.

These figures show how this potential is being realized in light and textile industries . At enterprises for producing sewn products the utilization of capacities does not exceed 80 percent, for footwear, leather haberdashery, and knitted items—90 percent, and woolen fabrics—64 percent.

I must say that we have not really been able to put to work such a reserve as the organization of the production of consumer goods at enterprises of all republic ministries. Today in the Ministry of Automotive Transportation (Comrade Sukhin), the Ministry of the River Fleet (Comrade Bagrov), the Ministry of Highways (Comrade Brukhnov), and a number of other ministries the production of goods does not exceed one kopek per ruble of wages. Yet, as an inspection in the RSFSR Council of Ministers showed, they have considerable capacities for producing them.

We also consider it necessary to radically change our attitude toward local industry. Today the annual production volume in the branch amounts to R7 billion. This is considerable. But as calculations show, at the existing production capacities it would be possible to obtain R1 billion in additional output.

In reality, when increasing the production of nonfood commodities it is important to seek out new directions and new forms, especially on the path to integration and cooperation. The first steps are already being taken. Another promising form of cooperation is for other branches to invest their funds in the development of light industry and render assistance to it in construction.

A significant new addition to the Russian market are goods manufactured on the basis of cooperation between light and textile industries, on the one hand, and enterprises of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Vietnam, India, and the Philippines, on the other. This year these countries should produce 1.4 billion rubles' worth of clothing and footwear, and in 1990—almost 2 billion rubles' worth.

There is one other area. We are speaking about the construction of individual shops, sections, and branches of enterprises of group B in small and medium-sized cities and worker villages that have free work force. At the present time there are already 800 branches in operation in the republic. More than 200,000 people are employed at home. They produce more than 1.7 billion rubles' worth of products. This year it is intended to open 200 more branches.

In a word, comrades, the task is to saturate the market with various kinds of goods and to search out all the possibilities of raising the level of the territory's self-support. Today this question should be at the center of the attention of soviet organs in connection with the forthcoming adoption of the Law on Local Self-Management and Local Business. And it was correct for managers to begin early to prepare for changing the territories over to economic accountability [khozraschet] and self-financing.

The experience of soviet organs in this area in a number of oblasts could be of use to the Tyumen, Kemerovo, and Tomsk oblispolkoms [oblast executive committees]. For the territories under their jurisdiction are still producing from 16 to 54 kopeks' worth of goods per ruble of the wage fund.

The position of certain ispolkoms cannot be called anything but dependent.

The earmarked program requires adequate expansion and strengthening of the raw material base. Today it might well be the weakest link in the development of the production of consumer goods. Light industry is constantly experiencing a critical shortage of practically all kinds of raw material and sustains large losses because of poor quality.

First of all we must discuss increasing the production and delivery of natural raw material. The situation here is quite critical. During the past 12 years deliveries of long-fibered flax have decreased by almost half. Industry's orders for leather raw material are being satisfied by little more than half. The state order for procurements of wool is being fulfilled by the kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] of the republic by no more than 70 percent of the required amount. The situation is the same with respect to the deliveries of hides and furs.

The situation has reached a point where today we are forced to purchase up to 50,000 tons of wool abroad annually, spending about 240 million hard currency rubles for this. It is quite extraordinary that in 1987-1988 for the first time in the history of Russia it was necessary to purchase about 8,000 tons of flax fiber through imports. The republic agroproms [agroindustrial complexes] are mainly to blame for this (Comrades Aleksankin, Kulik, and others).

Worse, raw materials are being squandered in the agroindustrial associations. Last year alone they independently sold abroad essentially at discounted prices more than 940,000 pieces of cowhide, 2 million pieces of pigskin, and about 4 million pieces of leather from smaller animals. At the same time this year the plan for deliveries to light industries enterprises is being fulfilled by an average of 70 percent.

It is obvious that we cannot solve the problem of the raw material subbranches without a radical restructuring of the economic mechanism or without increasing the interest of the enterprises. The effectiveness of the production and processing of natural raw material can be increased through economic integration of light industry, the APK [agroindustrial complex], and Rospotrebsoyuz [Republic Union of Consumer Societies of the RSFSR].

One should certainly mention the fact that increasing the production of products from light and textile industries is chronically being held back by the critical shortage of artificial fibers, threads, and dyes. Orders for these products are satisfied by 80-85 percent.

We have been especially painfully aware of the shortcomings of chemical production this year. The shortages in the deliveries of lavsan and capron threads by Daugavpils, Volzhsk, Svetlogorsk, and Mogilev associations of the Ministry of the Chemical Industry have aggravated even more the shortage of goods that are in mass demand.

In this connection one cannot but discuss a problem which one might call "aggressive dependency." Against the background of the increasing ecological protests from the public, certain local soviet organs, without adequate justification, are refusing to give their consent to have located on their territories enterprises without which it is impossible to increase the production of consumer goods.

Thus the Bashkir ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] along with the rayispolkoms [rayon executive committees] have begun to speak out against the construction of the Blagoveshchensk chemical fiber complex which is outfitted with imported equipment even though it was begun at their request and in keeping with their prior agreement. This is an alarming signal. For the complex, which is planned to produce 200,000 tons of polyester fibers and threads, will fully cover the country's demand and will make it possible to avoid importing.

The earmarked program for increasing the production and improving the quality of consumer goods will require serious organizational work of all ministries and departments, councils of ministers of autonomous republics, and kray and oblast ispolkoms.

We shall not conceal the fact that central and local state management agencies are still using mainly administrative pressure levers to "persuade" labor collectives, to appeal to the conscience of managers, and so forth.

The fact is that the new economic mechanism is being established. The incentives placed in it, particularly the orientation toward maximum profit, do not yet provide for sufficient coordination of the interests of the labor collectives with the interests of the society. Both the deficits in the economy and the monopolistic practices of the producers are leaving their mark here.

Distortions in the implementation of the economic reform are manifested primarily in the fact that the enterprises will use any means to increase cost volume at the expense of increasing the output of high-grossing products and unsubstantiated price increases. It is reaching a point where certain of them are refusing the state order.

On the whole, assignments for producing nonfood products worth a total of R3.8 billion have been placed at enterprises of the republic this year. Plans for the output of many goods in physical terms as well are below the control figures.

The republic government has instructed the ministries and local soviet organs to find in each case a concrete solution that provides for achieving the control figures. At the same time we see as one of the most immediate tasks the creation and development, within the framework of the economic reform, of a system of measures that motivate the enterprises to increase the output of goods needed by the people. These measures should apparently be of an extraordinary nature, which is dictated by the present situation.

In particular there is an urgent need to make adjustments to the planning system. We are speaking primarily about the lack of balance of the assignments with respect to the volume of production in value and physical measurements. It is this lack of correspondence that frequently motivates the enterprises to fulfill the plan at the expense of the price factor.

Thus the USSR Gosplan established for the Ministry of Light and the Food Industry for 1988 a volume of output of products at retail prices with an increase of 18 percent, and the basic kinds of products in physical terms—from 2 to 4 percent. In order to carry out this assignment the enterprises had to produce goods at retail prices which exceed the 1987 prices by an average of 20 percent.

The problem of balancing the production plans with the material resources and the possibilities of acquiring them through wholesale trade has become especially critical. In our view, we should consider the possibility of changing over from the products list principle of forming the state order to the target principle. With this policy, all products included in it should be centrally provided with raw materials, processed materials, and batching items.

It also seems that in cases where the state order is not provided with raw and processed material resources and the enterprise has found them independently, it should be permitted to dispose of the products produced with them.

In general, comrades, all of us—both the government and the permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet—should think seriously about how to increase the role of the state order.

In our view, the republics and local soviet organs should be given the right to establish it. The principle here could be this: The union-wide state order provides for interrepublic deliveries of goods, the republic state order—for interoblast deliveries, and the local state order—for deliveries of those goods which are fully consumed on the territory. As for products produced in excess of the state order, all of them are left at the disposal of the enterprise. On the whole there should be only one approach here: Provide for union-wide needs first.

It would also be expedient to expand the composition of the state order in physical indicators for those kinds of goods that are of increased social significance.

Certain measures have already been taken in this direction.

In the future, as the market is saturated, the composition of the state order could be decreased. Naturally the economic incentive funds of the enterprises should also depend on the fulfillment of the plan in physical terms.

Serious measures are also needed for increasing the motivation of the enterprises to adopt intensive plans. Unfortunately today the opposite has become widespread.

For example, the Vladimir association for producing cotton fabrics adopted for 1989 a plan R5.3 million below the control figures. And already from the results of the first half year the plan was overfulfilled by R19.8 million.

Here is one more side of the problem. The fact is, that with the existing provisions, local soviet organs are also interested in having the enterprises adopt reduced plans since all above-plan output can be sold locally or exchanged for other goods that are needed on the given territory.

Therefore it seems that economic sanctions should be applied against enterprises that adopt reduced plans for the production of goods.

Increasing the production of goods for the people is also being held back by the imperfection of the pricing and financial-credit mechanisms, as well as unsolved problems in the organization of labor and wages.

Take the existing price-setting system. One must say frankly that today, in spite of the measures that have been taken, it is not working for the satisfaction of the growing needs of the people. Prices continue to grow and the inexpensive assortment continues to "erode."

This is conditioned to no small degree by the system of contractual and temporary prices. Thus the Yartsevo cotton fabric combine, having changed the design on terry cloth towels, set a contractual price for them in the amount of R4 while their permanent retail price is from 2 rubles 40 kopeks to R10.

Of course this does not mean that we must curtail the output of especially fashionable goods and items with the index N.

Improvement of the consumer qualities of goods is of fundamental significance to us. Unfortunately, the aesthetic and technical level of many of our items continues to fall below the level of the best foreign analogs. Losses from defective work are great. In 1988 the enterprises'

expenditures on eliminating defects in the group of goods for cultural and domestic purposes alone amounted to about R100 million. According to data of the inspection team of the RSFSR Ministry of Trade, during the first quarter of this year they rejected or lowered the quality rating of about half of the furniture that was inspected, every second child's bicycle, every third refrigerator, and more than 20 percent of the sewn items and footwear.

Based on the Law on the State Enterprise, labor collectives must strictly coordinate the earnings of the workers with the results of their labor not only in terms of quantity but also in terms of quality.

And one more thing. The task of balancing the market makes it necessary to establish for all enterprises a policy whereby an increase in their wage fund would be provided by a corresponding increase in the output of consumer goods and the volume of paid services for the population. Unfortunately, the normative ratio between the growth of labor productivity and the average wages applied as a basic regulating lever does not produce this effect. Apparently different methods of regulation must be developed.

These are a couple of fundamental approaches of the RSFSR Government pertaining to improvement of the economic mechanism. They are directed primarily toward putting a stop to "group egoism" and local prejudice, harmonizing the interests of the labor collective and the society and introducing additional incentives for increasing the production of goods.

It is not difficult to see that the approaches we propose, affect a number of points in the Law on the State Enterprise that have not justified themselves. They will undoubtedly have to be revised. One would like to hope that the newly created State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for the Economic Reform will support our suggestions.

Of course we understand that measures for improving the economic mechanism will produce the proper effect only if each worker, engineering and technical specialist, and employee is interested in expanding the output of goods and feels a sense of responsibility for the achievement of high final results. This can be achieved only by introducing forms of management and principles of the organization of labor and wages that enable each worker to be actually in charge of his work.

The council of ministers, the ministries and departments, and the local soviet organs will have to work seriously on introducing mainly leasing relations.

The cooperative movement also requires the most constant attention of soviet and economic organs. One must say that the people's negative attitude toward cooperationists is largely related to the fact that their activity has been unsupervised. The situation with a lack of control and with everything being allowed has also generated excessively high incomes which are not commensurate with labor productivity or product quality. Note that the cooperationists are still producing little more than 1 percent of the overall quantity of consumer goods in the republic.

The cooperative movement is now in the stage of establishing itself. The latest decisions gave the local soviets extensive rights to regulate their activity. The guideline here should be a strict analysis and evaluation of the necessity for one cooperative or another and the approximation of the prices of the goods they produce to the level of state prices.

Priority development of the branches that produce consumer goods naturally presupposes the need for greater attention to the conditions for the labor and life of the people employed in them. A paradoxical situation has developed. These branches directly influence the level of well-being of millions of people. And at the same time workers employed in them are experiencing many difficulties and inconveniences.

Almost one-third of a million women or up to half of the people employed in light and textile industries are working under conditions that do not meet the requirements of the norms and rules for labor safety. Every fourth one is in need of housing. The needs for children's preschool institutions are far from fully satisfied. In addition to all this, the earnings in these branches are 18-20 percent lower than the average for the republic.

It is no wonder that labor turnover is high here and the shortage of the work force now exceeds 200,000.

The Government of the Russian Federation sees its task as solving the problems that have accumulated step by step, energetically, and consistently, and as achieving a real improvement in the social conditions for the workers of the branch.

The first strides in this direction are already in evidence. The corresponding ministries and leaders of enterprises as well as local soviet organs should provide for precisely this growth of allocations. Here it is necessary to influence all available reserves and capabilities more actively.

We cannot but be bothered by the reduction of the rates of housing construction at enterprises of the Ministry of Light and the Food Industry, the Ministry of the Textile Industry, and the Ministry of Local Industry. Thus during the first half year in the Ministry of Light and the Food industry the amount of housing that was introduced was only 21 percent of the annual plan.

The construction of facilities of the social sphere, as usual, is lagging behind the construction of production facilities. They have been working on the polyclinic for the worsted fabric association in Chita since 1979 and the one in Tyumen since 1982. The Donetsk cotton

fabric association in Rostov Oblast, which is short almost 2,000 workers, has been building a dormitory to accommodate 640 people for 4 years now.

These and numerous other cases cannot be called anything but remnants of the "residual principle" which has been condemned by the party.

Now the government has given instructions to the ministries and local soviet organs to investigate each enterprise carefully in order to eliminate disproportions between production and nonproduction construction. We shall look for and utilize any possibilities of directing additional funds and resources for the development of the social sphere. In all this the government is counting on significant support from the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

Comrades! The RSFSR Council of Ministers inseparably links the solution to the problems facing it to improvement of all units of management of the production of consumer goods. Here, naturally, we proceed from the fact that today the republic's responsibility for the condition of the entire commercial complex has been raised to a principally different level.

Here one should keep in mind that because of the elimination of the USSR Ministry of Light and the Food Industry, light industry enterprises located on the territory of the RSFSR will be transferred to its jurisdiction. Moreover, individual enterprises and organizations now under union jurisdiction that produce nonfood commodities will also be placed under its jurisdiction. At the same time the rights of local soviet organs are being expanded and they are being given greater responsibility for satisfying the demands of the region's population for necessary goods and balancing the monetary incomes and expenditures of the population.

The main line in all of this work is further increasing the independence and responsibility of the enterprises and associations for increasing the output of consumer goods. New forms of associations are to be created—concerns, associations, and unions which, as practice shows, have great possibilities of solving these problems.

A number of complex new problems are appearing for our branch ministries. Today they are being called upon to act in a new capacity as subdivisions of the association type. Their task is to provide for scientific and technical progress, to carry out balanced and proportional development of the branches, and to raise the level of concentration, specialization, and cooperation in production.

Under the new conditions it becomes especially important for industry and trade to study, form, and predict demand.

One of the key problems of the domestic market is still the unsatisfactory work of the wholesale trade. Trade has not yet become an active organizer of the movement of goods, the study of the demand, and for formation of the supply for coordinating production and the needs of the regions.

In our view, we must proceed more actively toward the creation of marketing services and unified commercial centers.

Comrade deputies!

The government is fully aware of all the complexity of the tasks facing us and its direct responsibility for normalizing the situation with respect to the production of goods for the people. We are counting on an animated and constructive discussion of measures that are suggested concerning this. We are convinced that during the course of this discussion many concrete suggestions will be made which will help to adjust our policy more precisely.

Officials Study Marketing at Academy, Abroad

LD1008163789 Moscow TASS in English 1611 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—By TASS correspondent Andrey Orlov:

Officials of more than fifty Soviet ministries, organizations and enterprises will begin studies at the USSR Academy, which is the principal personnel training centre of the country's foreign economic service, is charged with the liquidation of one of the most acute drawbacks obstructing the functioning of Soviet economy in new economic conditions— the shortage of managers capable of finding their bearings in different world market situations, quite unusual for Soviet executives.

The "students" are diligently studying such new subjects as marketing, are delving into stock-exchange secrets, mastering unusual terminology which appeared to be absolutely alien to socialist economy but recently.

The search for new non-standard solutions is continuing. It has resulted in the creation of an absolutely new type of educational establishment—the higher commercial school. The teaching there is done not only by Soviet scientists and executives, but also by prominent representatives of Western business circles. After a theoretical course of studies some of the "students" are sent abroad for upgrading.

The inter-government agreements on cooperation in training personnel for economic activities, which the Soviet Union has signed with the United States, Canada, Great Britain, FRG, Italy and France, have opened up possibilities for the upgrading of Soviet specialists there at study centres and firms.

In general, the system of training foreign economic personnel will allow to turn out more than six thousand specialists this school year according to the new study programme.

Large Free Trade Zones Planned in Four Areas
AU2207192089 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 22-23 Jul 89 p 1

[Manfred Schell report: "Will the Industrial Park of Kaliningrad Become the Home for Volga Germans?"]

[Excerpt] Bonn—Through discreet contacts with Western experts, the Soviet leadership is currently probing the possibility of creating large free trade zones in the Leningrad area, in Odessa by the Black Sea, in Siberia, and, this is especially surprising, in Kaliningrad. The idea of making special legal regulations in order to give a new home in a free trade zone in Kaliningrad to the dispersed Volga Germans was also discussed.

The planning of such an economic zone in the region of Kaliningrad proceeds on the assumption that German and American corporations and other efficient enterprises would establish joint ventures, a commitment that has been too much of a risk for them so far because of the absence of attractive conditions. In this way, investments of many billions [currency not specified] could be made in the Kaliningrad region. [passage omitted]

Agricultural

Soviet Farms To Earn Convertible Currency
LD1008163289 Moscow TASS in English 1606 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—Soviet agricultural enterprises will sell part of high-quality wheat grain, pea, lupine and oil-bearing seeds to the state for freely convertible currency in accordance with a decision of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Council of Ministers said in a resolution published today.

The Soviet Parliament considered it expedient to spend part of Soviet currency on buying seeds and grains from Soviet farms rather than abroad to step up the home production of necessary crops and reduce their import.

The resolution says that the new purchase system is being introduced as an experiment for the years 1989 and 1990. The state will pay 60 rubles in convertible currency for a tonne of strong and durum wheat, 40 rubles for a tonne of other high-quality wheat varieties, 80 rubles for a tonne of pea and lupine, and 90 rubles for a tonne of sunflower, soya, rapes, falseflax and mustard seeds.

Farms will be paid hard currency only for wheat produced in excess of average annual amount of wheat sold by them in the years 1981-1985 (say, if a collective farm sold an average of 10,000 tonnes in the early 1980s and will sell 12,000 tonnes now, it will get hard currency only for 2,000 tonnes), and for oil-bearing seeds produced above the average annual amount sold in the years 1986-1988.

The hard currency for payments will be obtained through the cuts in imports of grain, oil-bearing seeds and vegetable oil and the farms will be free in spending the earned currency.

The currency profits of state and collective farms, and other agricultural enterprises will be put on their bank accounts by the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity (Vneshekonombank) on instructions from the All-Union Foreign Economic Association Exportkhleb which has currency for import.

The USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Foods and Purchases has been instructed to study the possibility of hard currency stimulation of the work of lease organisations, lease cooperatives and peasant households selling high-quality grain, pea, lupine and oil-bearing seeds to the state, and, if necessary, submit proposals to the USSR Council of Ministers.

Ligachev Speaks on Increase of Fruit, Vegetables
PM1008132189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Aug 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Vegetables and Fruit for Industrial Centers"]

[Text] Astrakhan, 3 Aug—Measures to increase the production of vegetables, fruit, and melons and to improve their supply to the country's industrial centers were discussed at a conference in Astrakhan. Taking part in its work were CPSU Oblast committee [obkom] secretaries, chairman of oblast soviet executive committees [oblispolkoms], chairman of the agro-industrial committees of Moscow, the Komi, Tatar, and Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics [ASSR's], Krasnodar Kray, and Volgograd, Gorkiy, Leningrad, Perm, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, and Chelyabinsk Oblasts, and the leaders of a number of ministries and departments, consumer cooperatives, and industrial enterprises and associations.

Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, opened the conference.

The report delivered by Ye.I. Sizenko, first deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Council of Ministers, gave a thorough analysis of the state of affairs in the fruit and vegetable economy. It is giving rise to justified alarm. Last year, for instance, the fulfillment of the plan for the production of fruit and vegetable produce and its sale to the state was disrupted. Deliveries to all-union and republican stocks were just 51 percent for potatoes, 91 percent for vegetables, 71 percent for fruit, and 69 percent for melons. The

targets for deliveries of output to major centers of the country and the regions of the Far North were not fulfilled. The situation has not improved this year either.

The speaker revealed the main reasons for the breakdown in supplies. They are above all poor state discipline and the lack of an economic mechanism whereby it would be extremely disadvantageous to disrupt deliveries.

This year, the speaker stressed, a quite good vegetable harvest has been raised and there is every opportunity for fully providing all the republic's regions with vegetables.

The conference was addressed by I.N. Dyakov, first secretary of the Astrakhan CPSU Obkom; Yu.M. Luzhkov, first deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee [gorispolkom]; A.A. Sokolov, chairman of the Gorkiy Oblispolkom; A.S. Sysstov, USSR minister of the aviation industry; G.M. Fadeyev, USSR first deputy minister of railroads; V.A. Petrov, chairman of the Perm Oblispolkom; V.M. Gubskiy, secretary of the Rostov CPSU Obkom; V.I. Oleynik, director of the Chelyabinsk metallurgical combine; L.V. Bagrov, RSFSR minister of the river fleet; I.M. Dadayev, director of the "Solnechnyy" sovkhoz, [state farm] Chechen-Ingush ASSR; Z.F. Pulatov, secretary of the Dagestan CPSU Obkom; and A. Zavarzin, commander of the central staff of student detachments of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League Central Committee, and others.

They noted that supplying the country with fruit and vegetables including deciduous fruit [frukty] is a very important component of the Food Program. They are a good addition to every family's dining table. Giving the country more vitamin-rich produce is a feasible business. But new approaches and different scales are needed here. It is worthwhile for the vegetable growers, truck drivers, procurement workers, workers of river and rail transport and workers in the processing enterprises, trade, and consumer cooperatives to work strenuously. The fact that the economy of the agrarian sector is strengthening lends confidence that this task will be resolved. Last year the profitability of production on kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes reached 31 percent and a profit of R44 billion was obtained. There was a sharp reduction in the number of lossmaking farms and they now comprise 3.5 percent of the total number of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Some 14 percent more grain was obtained and 10-12 percent more meat and milk. Despite the fact that the country began the implementation of the decisions of the March Central Committee Plenum under the conditions of last year's and this year's drought, which encompassed large regions of the commodity production of agricultural output, we succeeded in preventing a decline in the production of stockraising output and its supply to the population. That was the result of the strenuous labor of the livestock workers and the organizational work of the party, soviet, and economic organization.

Addressing the conference, Ye.K. Ligachev noted that multilevel work is under way in the country to implement the party's present agrarian policy elaborated at the March CPSU Central Committee Plenum and to resolve the food problem. This work is being performed under complex conditions but it is gathering momentum increasingly and, the main thing, the countryside is confidently switching to the economic principles of economic management.

Mutually advantageous integration of industrial and agricultural enterprises and of city and countryside is expanding. Cooperation of this kind is under way not only within the framework of oblasts but also on an interregional basis using the territorial division of labor and sharing. A conference was held in May in Tashkent to further develop direct economic ties between the oblasts and industrial enterprises of Moscow, Siberia, and the Urals on the one hand and the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the Central Asian republics on the other. We have gathered here in Astrakhan for the same purpose.

The work of Murmansk Oblast on direct links with the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of Krasnodar Kray deserves attention. Through the efforts of Murmansk Oblast production and procurement bases with refrigerators and of labor and leisure camps for young people from the Arctic taking part in the harvest are being planned and constructed in the kray. The kray's kolkhozes and sovkhozes are building up deliveries of vegetables and fruit to the northerners. Plans are being outlined for economic ties between Moscow and Astrakhan Oblast. They are being reinforced with capital investments and material resources from the Moscow organizations. This approach fully complies with the planned perestroyka of the leadership of the local economy on the basis of self management and self financing and opens up additional opportunities for the improvement of the cities' food supplies and the strengthening of the economy of the farms producing output and in general for enterprising activity.

Why is attention being riveted on improving the population's potato and fruit and vegetable supplies?

This is explained by the fact that the present level of production, storage, and processing does not ensure the fulfillment of this task. Moreover, while in the 11th 5-Year Plan the volume of vegetable production increased substantially, in the current 5-year period it is declining. In 1988 per capita consumption of vegetables and melons was 100 kg, while the figure for fruit and berries was 52 kg, with a rational norm of 140 kg and 75 kg respectively. For a long time we have had to resort to

substantial imports of this produce. Moreover, we have started to buy potatoes abroad. Potato imports sometimes reach 400,000 tonnes.

The task is to saturate the country's food market with fruit, vegetables, and potatoes in the next few years.

Ye.K. Ligachev noted that a trend toward a decline in the production and consumption of fruit and vegetables has emerged recently even in the RSFSR's southern market gardening zone. Deliveries to industrial centers are not being met.

The main reason is the farms' poor economic interest and the poor standard of irrigated arable farming. Matters are very bad with regard to the organization of the sale, storage, and processing of fruit and vegetable produce. Take Astrakhan Oblast. There are no modern procurement and sales bases in the oblast. The processing industry is neglected. There is a similar situation in Dagestan, Chechen-Ingush ASSR, Rostov Oblast, and a number of other regions producing fruit and vegetables. As a result there are irreparable losses of the tomatoes, water melons, melons, and fruit which Soviet people are expecting.

The way out has been outlined: developing processing and storage on the farms, at procurement and wholesale bases, while machine building must accelerate the production of manufacturing equipment. As is well known, the production of equipment for the canning industry has been assigned to the Ministry of the Aviation Industry and the production of refrigerating plants to the USSR Ministry of Heavy Machine Building. It is important that this should be highly productive, reliable, automated equipment. But that is not all. The production of containers and packaging materials must be developed. Here it is up to the RSFSR Council of Ministers, the Russian Union of Consumer trade Cooperatives, and local organizations.

It is also essential to set up the transportation of vegetables and fruit, preventing losses and the reduction of quality. The work of the Astrakhan organizations and the RSFSR Ministry of the River Fleet in organizing the shipment of tomatoes and melons deserves approval. Here the crews have started to be responsible for the reception of produce on the ships and its safe keeping. Riverside points for the reception and storage of fruit and vegetables are being constructed. And matters have taken a different turn. Television and newspaper items about spoilt produce delivered to Moscow by the river transport workers have disappeared. We hope that the river transport workers' example will accelerate the perestroyka of the organization of fruit and vegetable shipments by rail and automotive transport.

The question of prices for fruit and vegetable produce is a special one. It is well known that prices are a fine and effective instrument for bringing economic influence to bear on production. They also have a social content. In accordance with the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee March Plenum, as of next year it is permitted to supply fruit and vegetables under contracts, setting prices agreed between producers and consumers. There is no doubt that this will encourage an increase in the production of vegetables and fruit and an improvement in their quality.

There is no doubt that the market mechanism of purchase prices must be introduced together with state regulation of maximum retail prices for fruit and vegetables.

A considerable role in supplying the population with fruit and vegetables is assigned to the consumer cooperatives, which procure and deliver produce. Their organizations should work actively with the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, family household farms, and cooperatives of horticulturalists and market gardeners. As for family farms, here we must remove every kind of restriction and actively promote their development, integrating them with kolkhozes and sovkhozes. There are improvements here. This year the number of cows, pigs, and sheep is growing on family farms while the revenue of private farms has increased by R1 billion, or 23 percent.

There is some point in enlisting not only the rural but also the urban population to the growing of vegetables, fruit, and berries on the basis of the collective and family contract and the creation of cooperatives.

Measures are being taken in the country now for the mass production of small-scale equipment for family farms and collective horticulture and market gardening. The local soviets and party committees must join in this work.

Thousands of people—workers, kolkhoz members, and specialists—are employed in the fruit and vegetable production process—the production, storage, processing, and sale of fruit and vegetable produce—the CPSU Central Committee secretary noted. Thousands of primary party organizations are operating here. Communist head many labor collectives. These same questions are also within the sphere of influence of many party raykoms, gorkoms, and obkoms, local soviets, and trade union organizations.

The soviets and economic organs should concentrate on the development of the material and technical base of production and the storage and processing of vegetables and their adequate supply to the population. It is very important to constantly improve the labor and daily life of vegetable growers and processing workers: After all their work is difficult and there is a great deal of heavy manual labor. It is essential to provide them with equipment and social amenities.

The party committees and primary organizations must pay more attention to the education and organization of people working in this sector and to the formation of

permanent highly qualified cadres and stable labor collectives for the fruit and vegetable farms and processing enterprises. Here, Ye. K. Ligachev stressed, it is important to provide fruit and vegetables to the population of the oblasts and krays which grow them and to increase the delivery of this produce to other regions of the country.

TASS correspondents asked several of the conference's participants to comment on its results. Here is what they said.

Yu. M. Luzhkov, first deputy chairman of the Moscow Gorispolkom:

"We have made fruitful use of our trip to Astrakhan. We agreed primarily on improving the quality of the fruit and vegetable produce procured. For this we have decided to help the Astrakhan people strengthen the material and technical base of those kolkhozes and sovkhozes which supply Muscovites with the largest quantity of tomatoes and water melons. This will serve not only to strengthen ties but also to considerably improve deliveries of produce to the capital."

A. A. Sokolov, chairman of the Gorkiy Oblispolkom:

"We have to bring in a large quantity of fruit and vegetables from outside, yet here, this produce sometimes goes to waste because of the lack of moorings and storage bases. During our stay here we have agreed with the economic leaders of Kharabalinskiy Rayon to construct these establishments and to supply the farms with packaging and film. All this will serve to improve direct ties and to improve the quality of the population's supply with vitamin-rich produce."

V.M. Gubskiy, secretary of the Rostov CPSU Obkom:

"The meetings in Astrakhan and the measures worked out here will help to expand many bottlenecks in the fruit and vegetable production process. The harmonious work of producers, procurement workers, and transport workers is needed. In our oblast a procurement and sales organization has been created. It has helped to resolve many hitches. I believe that this conference will be a powerful incentive on improving the population's supply with fruit and vegetables."

I.I. Skiba, chief of the CPSU Central Committee Agrarian Department, took part in the conference's work.

Nikitin Describes Agro-Industrial Complex

LD1008151489 Moscow TASS in English 1339 GMT 10 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—Vladilen Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who was recently appointed chairman of the state commission of the USSR Council of Ministers on food and procurements by the Soviet parliament, said in an interview with GOVERNMENT HERALD that his recently established commission is called upon to outline the general strategy for the development of the agri-industrial complex and to draft major state programmes for building up food stocks. It is deprived of the right to interfere in organisation of production.

He writes that the new government body is charged with functions of building up all-union stocks of food and agricultural raw materials, implementation of the social policy in the countryside, improvement of methods of economic management, regulation of economic relations in the agri-industrial complex and its relations with other industries. It is also entrusted with implementing foreign economic, scientific and technical contacts with other countries.

Another reorganisation (?in) the management of the agri-industrial complex is aimed at improving poor performances of the sector. Nikitin names three main reasons for the lag of agricultural sector. He cites first of all the unequal exchange between agriculture and industry, backwardness of agricultural and food machine-building, a chronic shortage of building materials and other resources.

According to the head of the commission, the second reason is distortion of Lenin's ideas on cooperation, extreme centralisation and monopolism of numerous partners. As a result, peasants have no interest in developing agriculture.

Nikitin believes that the third reason is insufficient attention to the social sphere. "A shortage of well-appointed housing, lack of good roads, a low level of trade, medical, cultural and every-day services are a reason for the fact that several hundred thousands of people annually leave the countryside for the cities, turning into consumers of food instead of its producers," says the chairman of the commission.

In his opinion, the new system of management will give a free hand to primary production groups which can saturate the market with foodstuffs.

Ligachev Addresses Sugar-Production Seminar

LD1008220289 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 10 Aug 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report from Voronezh by Correspondent Yevgeniy Sinitsyn—identified by screen caption]

[Text] A conference seminar devoted to the issues of increasing sugarbeet and sugar production opened in Voronezh today.

[Sinitsyn] The conference seminar was opened by Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev. [video shows audience in hall and close-up of Ligachev speaking]

[Begin Ligachev recording] Comrades, you are aware that recently we have been forced to introduce a coupon system for the distribution of sugar for our country's population. Prior to this, there had been sufficient sugar for many decades and free trading in it had been organized almost everywhere. Well, regarding why we have introduced a coupon system and how we need to get out of this, we will return again in the reports and speeches. [end recording]

[Sinitsyn] A report was delivered by Aleksandr Vladimirovich Vlasov. It was, let us be blunt, not an optimistic report, which revealed the reasons for the sugar shortage. [Video shows Vlasov at rostrum, then Sinitsyn in sugarbeet field]

We were not previously aware that sugar might move from the purely economic into the political category and that from its absence in the shops, certain unkind persons would judge whether we have a sweet life in the fifth year of perestroyka. However, despite the fact that 1.6 million tonnes of sugar were missing in the shops last year, its per capita consumption in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic alone amounts to 51 kg, while the scientifically recommended norm is 38 kg. What is the reason for this then? Are people brewing their own moonshine? That is, indeed, happening, but statistics show that there is now less of it. Even if the whole country consisted of people with a sweet tooth, such a shortage nevertheless would be shameful. Indeed, this shortage is increasing all the time and it is doing so because the production of sugarbeet is decreasing. There are many reasons for this, the main one being that it is a very labor-intensive crop and involves a very great amount of manual labor. Speaking about this against the background of these machines on display is probably absurd, but there is a need to speak more loudly in order to rouse those on whom the necessary quantity of these machines for the production and processing sugarbeet depends. [video shows Ligachev and group touring open-air display of machinery]

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Lev Maksimov—identified by screen caption] The participants in today's conference-seminar include Oleg Nikolayevich Shishkin, USSR minister of general machine-building.

Oleg Nikolayevich, obviously the conversation and redesignation of a number of your defense enterprises for the production of peaceful output have made you an interested person at this conference.

[Shishkin] We consider that the primary task we have just grasped from considering all the problems in the production of sugar is to pool the efforts of the technologists and developers of equipment for sugar refineries with the efforts of our designers, who possess a fairly high intellect from the viewpoint of the production of machines of every possible type. [end recording]

[Sinitsyn] The conference-seminar will resume its work tomorrow.

Scientific

Details Given on 'D' Module for Mir Station

18660201 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 2 Aug 89 p 4

[Article by G. Lomanov: "In Outer Space with a 'Bicycle'"]

[Text] **"It is better to see it once than to hear about it a hundred times," said one of the colleagues when upon arriving in Zvezdnyy Gorodok [Star City] the journalists assembled around a full-scale mockup of the orbital space complex. One could sense irony in the voice, and not without reason. A visual demonstration is a good thing, but this time, perhaps, the saying had another meaning. Attached to the mainframe of the system—the "Mir" station—was the so-called, add-on equipment module "D". The very same module about which we had heard of more than once.**

The fact that the "Mir" is actually an inhabitable room in which real research will be conducted when scientific and technological modules moor at the station has been talked about in the press for four years now. The anticipation was obviously dragged out. Our newspaper reported the reasons for the delay in an interview with Yu. Semenov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chief designer of spacecraft and space stations (SI of 30 May 1989). It is not worth repeating the reasons, especially since we were ultimately given an opportunity to become familiar with one of the modules—an exact duplicate of the one which is planned to dock at the main frame this autumn.

Module "D" consists of three compartments—instrument-cargo, instrument-research, and airlock. Its maximum diameter is a little more than 4 m, its overall length is 14 m, and its volume is 60 cubic meters. The airlock, from which the crew will exit into outer space, seems quite small, but if it is compared to the transfer compartment of the station from which they exited, only one thing can be said—it is a mansion. A shower is provided in module "D"—which the "Mir" does not have—after intensive exercises all of the cosmonauts working on the station could only wipe themselves off with wet towels. This is bearable if a flight is planned for a week, but when an expedition lasts months....

The module has its own engines—if a fair amount of fuel remains after the docking, it can be used for maneuvering and orientation of the entire complex. Six gyrodines will help to stabilize the coupling of the space units, the same as that of the "Kvant," except that module "D" has them on the outside and not inside. Provision has been made for the possibility of mounting

solar batteries—which will enable increasing the energy capacity of the entire system. To mount them, it will be necessary for the cosmonauts to go into outer space.

I hope that it will be clear from this short explanation why the new unit is called an add-on equipment module. As was noted by A. Viktorenko, the commander of one of the crews getting ready for the flight, module "D" will increase the comfort level of the system and will raise the volume of research work somewhat. Why a little? Familiarity with the research instruments with which the module will be equipped will help answer this question. "Volna-2" ["Wave-2"] is intended for the study of the flow of fluids in capillaries under conditions of weightlessness. "Inkubator-2" ["Incubator-2"] will be used to hatch quail eggs. The spectrozonal apparatus MKF-6MA—a modernized and automated MKF—is well-known to readers and has already worked on stations and even on the "Soyuz-22," which was specially equipped for it. There is one other photo camera—the KAP-350. And, finally, a rotary platform, manufactured in the CSSR, is mounted on the outside of the module, just like the ones that were on the interplanetary "Vega" stations that investigated Haley's Comet. Pilot-Cosmonaut A. Serebrov expressed himself quite energetically with respect to the three television cameras installed on the platform: "It is time to put such equipment into a museum."

A fourth, more modern camera, will be delivered later by a cargo ship—it will also have to be installed by the cosmonauts in space. The "truck" will also deliver the already mentioned KAP-350 unit. Of course it is inconvenient to pull research equipment through several tight bays from one end of the complex to the other, and then mount it inside and outside, but there is nothing one can do. The launch weight of module "D" is about 23.5 tons—this is the maximum weightlifting capability of the "Proton" rocket.

And, finally, an SPK—system for moving in open space—will arrive at the module in orbit. Both the developers and the crew call it simply the "bicycle." Compressed air will move it. Thirty-two microengines will make it possible to perform very complex pirouettes in outer space. A person in a spacesuit who "mounts" an SPK is a kind of miniature spaceship which can cruise around for about 6 hours near the "Mir" station or the "Buran" spacecraft. The "bicycle" is intended first and foremost for the inspection of various objects—starting with the satellite, which a large apparatus would have difficulty approaching—and ending with the "Buran," whose facing of brittle tiles cannot be approached as easily as the outer skin of the "Mir."

American austronauts tested a similar system a long time ago. They first worked on it on the "Skylab" space station, whose spacious bays permitted a little flying. Ours will have to be tested immediately in outer space and, therefore, a safety lanyard will be used for the first exits into outer space.

"The synthetic cord with a diameter of about 3 millimeters is very strong, and it will withstand any jerk, but it is not very convenient to move around with," says A. Serebrov. "The lanyard interferes with the dynamics of movement, and it is more difficult to steer the 'bicycle' with it."

Several test modes with the SPK in open space are planned. In the first, most cautious test, the cosmonaut will move away from the bay 5-8 m and come back. Well, if all modes go smoothly, it will be possible to fly along the entire complex—from module "D" to the "Kvant." With a lanyard, a cosmonaut can move about 60 m from the mainframe, and without it, a good 100 m. It will very likely be interesting to ride this "bicycle" in shoreless outer space. But we will not get ahead of our story, and we will wait until the module finally moors alongside the "Mir."